We are at delicate juncture, according to Armstrong
But his melt-up scenario remains in place
the argument is essentially that funds fly to relative safety, and as confidence is lost w/r to the public sector (government bonds and all bonds tied to the government bonds by relative rates per yield-chase), the funds enter stocks, especially when the governments continue to print / spend what wasn't there
the logic seems sound since 1999, 2001, 2008, 2018, and onward
OTOH I rebel at the idea that there is no natural upper limit to valuations, but I remember Zimbabwe episode, when its stock market went up 900,000 percent (900,000%) - the fellow who shorted the Zimbabwe stock market relative to its currency cannot be said to had won - he perished alongside the fellow he shorted the shares to, unless he had a way to exchange his cash for 'something/anything' outside of the closed-system, and that 'something/anything' coincidentally went up
whatever the case, we are in for it and shall learn by it |
