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Macgregor was the "squadron operations officer who essentially directed the Battle of 73 Easting" during the Gulf War. [3] Facing an Iraqi Republican Guard opponent, he led a contingent consisting of 19 tanks, 26 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 4 M1064 mortar carriers through the sandstorm to the 73 Easting at roughly 16:18 hours on 26 February 1991 destroyed almost 70 Iraqi armored vehicles with no U.S. casualties in a 23-minute span of the battle. [3] He was at the front of the formation in the center with Eagle Troop on the right and Ghost Troop on the left. Macgregor designated Eagle Troop the main attack and positioned himself to the left of Eagle Troop. Eagle Troop Scouts subsequently followed Macgregor's tank through a minefield during which his crew destroyed two enemy tanks. As Macgregor was towards the front of the battle involved in shooting, he didn't "request artillery support or report events to superiors until the battle was virtually over, according to one of his superior officers." [3] The risks he undertook "could have been criticized had the fight turned ugly." [3]
At a November 1993 exercise at the Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Lt. Col. Macgregor's unit vastly outperformed its peers against the " Opposition Force (OPFOR)." The series of five battles usually end in four losses and a draw for the visiting units; his unit won three, lost one, and drew one. [3] Macgregor's unit dispersed widely, took unconventional risks, and anticipated enemy movements. [3]
Macgregor was "one of the Army's leading thinkers on innovation", according to journalist Thomas E. Ricks. [5] He "became prominent inside the Army" when his book Breaking the Phalanx was published in 1997, arguing for radical reforms. [5]Breaking the Phalanx was rare in that an active duty military author was challenging the status quo with detailed reform proposals for the reorganization of U.S. Army ground forces. [6] The head of the Army, United States General Dennis Reimer, wanted to reform the Army and effectively endorsed Breaking the Phalanx and passed copies out to generals; however, reforming the U.S. Army according to the book met resistance from the Army's de facto "board of directors" — the other four-star Army generals — and Reimer did not press the issue. [7]Breaking the Phalanx advocated that "the Army restructure itself into modularly organized, highly mobile, self-contained, combined arms teams that look extraordinarily like the Marine Corps' Air Ground Task Forces". [8] His article called "Thoughts on Force Design in an Era of Shrinking Defense Budgets" was published in The Dado Center Journal (the IDF's "Journal on Operational Art").
Many of Macgregor's colleagues thought his unconventional thinking may have harmed his chances for promotion. [3] While an Army NTC official called him "the best war fighter the Army has got," colleagues of Macgregor were concerned that "the Army is showing it prefers generals who are good at bureaucratic gamesmanship to ones who can think innovatively on the battlefield." [3] Macgregor was also seen as blunt, and to some, arrogant. [3] Despite his top post-Gulf War NTC showing, his Army career was sidelined. [3] The summer of 1997 marked the third time the Army refused to put him in command of a combat brigade, [3] "a virtual death warrant for his Army career, relegating him to staff jobs as a colonel for the remainder of his service." [4]
