Reagan to Bush I and "the USSR's surrender" (not sure I understand Iraq wrt Bush 1)
China was already morphing :)
Yes. China was already morphing... perhaps in a more or less steady progression post Nixon/Bush I... and I don't see any rational linkage to consider in relating change occurring in China to change occurring in the USSR in that period. It doesn't appear it was a function of some grand conspiracy in coordination between them... both as "the content" and "the timing" were dynamics tied to "other things" that are easily enough parsed. I think both changed as they did, when they did, in response to the changing realities they faced.
In China, that meant a fairly straight forward (if not smooth) process of converting from Plan A to Plan B.
Conflict still undoubtedly played a role in "setting the conditions", in the changing realities in each instance. The Vietnam War had to end before it was likely that there would be any functional rapprochement between China and the U.S. The U.S. losing that war isn't something many American's are likely to dwell on much, least not in parsing its impact on the changes that followed... much less are they likely to ponder the "sequences in events" in relation to how policy formulation might have played out in the diplomacy that was conducted in that era... Did "change" occurring in China help in relation to "negotiating" the American surrender in Vietnam ? I don't know... but would be worth poking at... Or, did the American capitulation in that war serve as a preconditioning element necessary to enabling the changes that followed ? Again... I don't recall seeing anything written on that... and it might be worth poking at the timelines to see what reality might have been... that neither side would have wanted to allow to become public awareness.
The diplomatic and cultural interaction enabled early on in that period might have been necessary to convince Chinese leadership that (wildly dysfunctional) "communist principle" might have to yield, at some point, (see North Korea vs. South Korea for the modern parallel in counter-points) to ensure the population doesn't starve to death.
My opinion was always... the war in Vietnam was stupid... as most American's really had more in common with Vietnam's perfectly rational desire to escape the yoke of French colonialism, and, it seems, we could easily have negotiated a different path to a resolution had we made different policy choices. And, that wasn't different, either, from the myopia that drove American policy re China before WWII, or after the end of the war. You could hardly avoid noting "the same" occurring in the Pacific again today... in what looks like an intentional "slow walk" into duplication of American policy re Japan prior to WWII...
The spy balloon issue might change that... but, the "leaks" tied to speculation here say that it was Xi that was trying to restart a more functional diplomacy with the Blinken visit... and perhaps rogue elements in the PLA seeking to torpedo his leadership in that potential, to undermine and potential for a policy shift, to ensure they sustain an accelerating path toward conflict just as Japan did in the 1930's. Otherwise, the coverage I've seen of the event is "shallow" at best... to blatantly "ignorant" at worst... almost all of it totally devoid of any real element of "situational awareness" relative to the event itself or the relationship it may have to the larger structure of the "events in the world". I'll leave that there...
It's a theme repeated in American history... that too many ignore. Politics often has a lesser role than most imagine in dictating events... while existing relationships, as the U.S. has long had with France as an emerging part of the (18th century) post war European concerns... dating back to shared interests in countering British imperialism... along with a deep cultural affinity based on shared values in revolutionary principles. But, the American's Euro-centric political origins [IMO only able to be maintained by sustaining disproportion in immigration from Euro-cultural relic states] grew, steeped in conflicts between Spain, France, Britain... The "Atlanticist" tendency that is its potent legacy even today... also "geographic"... as the East Coast elites own tendency to elitism / imperialism still shares that worst part of the European legacy... seen in dismissing "fly over country"... and in maintaining a relationship with the states west of the Mississippi/Missouri systems that is (for now, still) a not too distant proxy of colonialism [which is spawning not insignificant "separatist" tendencies in the rural areas]. A lot of U.S. policy errors, broadly, are a function of that error in Atlanticist myopia...
or, of its culture... [yes, meaning a shared cultural myopia with much of Europe... the same tendency as seen clearly enough in the vid of the German's laughing at Trump's warning them re dependency of Russian energy. Trump... solidly eastern, urban... but, conservative, and thus more deliberately clear eyed in being aligned with actual American interests vs the corrupt Euro-myopianism of Obama, Biden. ] The Asian minorities in the U.S. have been assimilating, more slowly than others, but, generations along now, still different in the degree that there's not all that much of an adopted and shared understanding, still, between the majority of American's populating the eastern half of the country and Asian cultures. They are more likely to be personally aware of holocaust survivors... far less likely, perhaps, to ever have met anyone interned in concentration camps, here, during WWII... where as, living in the west, I have had friends and neighbors with that as a key part of their family legacy.
In WWII... that Euromyopia, among other things, meant defending England and liberating France was necessary to accomplish before even considering addressing a proper focus on the war in the Pacific. Perhaps echoes of that today, again, even, as the new war in Europe goes hot, while the war China is waging against the U.S. in the Pacific seems "on track" as it intensifies into a new Cold War... as it is being seen on the U.S. side ?
Iraq wrt Bush 1
As China's policy changes were likely both "internal" and conditioned by or predicated on the outcomes enabled at the end of "conflict" In the Vietnam War, in the USSR... there was a similar issue...
At the end of the post WWII Cold War in Europe, Russia had a need for change, but also had to have a reason... one that the "leaders of the USSR" in its failing state clearly understood as imposing a need for embracing change... rather than only having it happen to them. As it became increasingly obvious the Soviet Union was failing, the Russian's military leadership were still advising the political leadership that they could "win" a war in Europe...
The Gulf War is rarely considered in context of anything other than the excess in the PR campaigns re Saddam's chest thumping propaganda, or the WMD issue having been used as the pretext selected to (successfully) sell the war to the American people. Most (on the left, today) focus on "excesses" in the mostly western and American led effort, or on the multiple instances of obvious stupidity apparent in the "post war" (?) occupation. But, of course... there's more to the context than that. Iraq was, if not a Soviet client state... a well entrenched weapons customer... and, at the time, before the start of the air combat operations, the third largest military in the world. Russian "technicians" manned their "best in the world" air defense systems, and led the training for and flew their aircraft in combat... The Russians convinced Saddam their air defense systems would rapidly destroy U.S. airpower... and numerically superior Russian tanks engaged in the defense, would defeat western armies on the battlefield... But, it wasn't just a sales pitch... they believed it to be true... and had skin in the game. They led Russian leadership to believe that too, and, that "pitch" re outcomes in Iraq, was "the same" as what they'd planned, predicted, and expected would occur in any war in Europe, too. So, Saddam's less than winning performance... was also thus a "test case" posturing the likely outcome of an engagement between Russia and the west in Europe.
As is proving true in their war in Ukraine... they'd overlooked a few things in generating their plans and expectations re the outcome of the war in Iraq... but, they were clearly not wrong in interpreting that conflict as a likely predictor re any that might occur in the European space... for which the west's capabilities were only more deliberately engineered.
The timeline proves the fact, too... as the wall didn't come down until after the Russian's martial capabilities had been widely discredited in Iraq... and most critically in the eyes of Russian leadership. The Gulf War was the last battle of the Cold War...
It didn't change any of the reality of what was happening, economically and politically, in Europe at the time... but, it presented Russian leadership with "additional information" that they really didn't have before to consider then... which did then condition their subsequent choices...
For the U.S., the outcome in Vietnam drove a radical re-thinking... the end of the draft, professionalization of the military... technical and focus changes along with leadership changes... some of the result of which was clearly enough demonstrated in Iraq... and, again, and again, in subsequent efforts. Afghanistan was never [IMO] going to be a "win" [for any other than the WEF crowd and beneficiaries of the $ flows] ... but, its also true that the U.S. had their way in that war, at fairly low cost, for as long as they wanted to sustain it... which they did "on plan"... until "done". FWIW, that also likely had more to do with change in Russia than other things... as the USSR had "taken care of that issue" while it existed... the issue being "regional stability" in that corner of the world. That [not their own Ukraine-like Afghanistan adventure] was essential to the Soviets security, and an open ended risk to the rest of the world without anyone else doing it. It was never going to be the problem for the U.S. [other than in the Taliban allowing Al Queda to use it as a base of operations to foster terror globally] that it was for Russia... when it was made the focus as the ancillary hot war to the Cold War... Russia's Vietnam. Because, no one ever believed the U.S. intended to "conquer and control" Afghanistan the way the Russians intended... as a perpetual and irrevocable occupier taking possession. And, there's no point in the U.S. sustaining that effort beyond the point... that others are capable of doing it instead... while ensuring no future repeats of 9/11.
The cascade of events and resulting "inevitabilities" in that time... from Vietnam, Iraq, the end of the Cold War, Afghanistan... to Georgia, Ukraine most recently, with Putin playing the role of [Biden, or] the "Million Dollar Man" [we can build back better... still tacitly dependent on some acknowledgement of prior failure]... has been less kind to the Soviets, and now the Russians, than it has been to the Americans ? But, I put "inevitabilities" in quotes... because, it is clearly a misnomer to label the outcomes in result of one's choices as being "inevitable" ? Different choices may give different results... or, simply expose other errors you were unaware of before... or otherwise, still lead you to failure ?
Probably enough on that... I'll stop rather than extrapolate from it to the new challenges extant today... and the new elements in growing awareness that are unable to be avoided... ? |
