Turn Ukraine Into a Bristling Porcupine
No matter how this war ends, Russia will need to be deterred from attacking again.
By Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow for cyber power and future conflict at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Foreign Policy
May 22, 2023
A Ukrainian artillery soldier fires a howitzer towards Russian positions near Bakhmut, Ukraine, on Nov. 8, 2022. BULENT KILIC/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
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The Spanish American philosopher George Santanaya once remarked that “only the dead have seen the end of war.” In truth, however, all high-intensity wars eventually end, and Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine will end at some point, too. When this happens—whether as a result of victory or mutual exhaustion, whether the guns remain silent or some degree of fighting continues along a static front line—the West needs a game plan to deter future Russian aggression. It must make sure that this will not be a repeat of 2014, when Russia paused its invasion in Crimea and the Donbas while it prepared for a full-on war. This time, there must not be a follow-on war a few years down the road.
There seem to be four stable choices for Ukraine that won’t just pause the war. First, Ukraine could become a full NATO member protected by the alliance’s guarantee—enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—to come to Ukraine’s defense if Russia attacks again in the future. Second, Ukraine could receive some kind of new NATO status, which de facto integrates its armed forces with NATO militaries without the collective defense clause under Article 5. Third, Ukraine could sign bilateral security guarantees with select countries that pledge to come to Kyiv’s aid in the event of war. And fourth, the West could turn Ukraine into a bristling porcupine, armed to the hilt with massive Western training and other support, so that it would be all but impossible for Russia to swallow.
It goes without saying that these options are not mutually exclusive. Helping rearm and train Ukraine will probably be part of any scenario. In the short term, however, only a clear, committed porcupine strategy is likely to be both politically feasible and truly capable of deterring Russia.
First, there is still no consensus among NATO member states on whether Ukraine should join the alliance; a premature push by some members will likely trigger vetoes by others. Second, a new NATO status of de facto integration into the alliance short of an Article 5 guarantee could be the worst of both worlds for Kyiv: It could trigger further Russian escalation while leaving Ukraine uncertain about the precise military support it would receive in case of war. Third, security guarantees by Western powers without a concrete military commitment would be a no-go for Ukraine for similar reasons. It has already been burned by the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Britain, France, Russia, and the United States pledged to guarantee Ukraine’s security and borders in return for Kyiv giving up nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Who would believe the United States this time, let alone France or Germany, that they would intervene?
Consequently, the only practical policy to deter Russia once a cease-fire is in place is to help turn Ukraine into a formidable military porcupine with hardened, lethal quills. This should be accomplished by a core group of countries coordinated under a military assistance command under the auspices of the United States. For Ukraine, the porcupine strategy means keeping its economy on a war footing to produce arms, raise weapons technology to a NATO standard, and otherwise sustain a formidable military over the long term.
Only a clear, committed porcupine strategy is likely to be both politically feasible and truly capable of deterring Russia.
Last week, we got the first serious hint that the West may be moving toward a porcupine strategy for post-war Ukraine. Along with a massive, $3 billion package of immediate military aid, Germany announced a long-term program to supply more than $8.5 billion more over the next nine years. Meanwhile, German defense contractor Rheinmetall became the latest company to reach a long-term agreement with Ukraine. It will construct a major facility in Ukraine to build and service tanks and other military vehicles. It is already an important deterrence signal to Moscow that Berlin is supporting Ukraine militarily in the long term. Britain and France also announced deliveries or pledges of long-range attack drones, Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles, light tanks, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. Although these are for the current war, the fact that Ukraine is increasingly shifting to more advanced Western systems will help it transition to a Western-style military after the war.
An ideal porcupine strategy is built around the assumption that the defender’s sharp quills can inflict enough pain on the attacker to convince him that he will not attain his goals on the battlefield. That does not necessarily require the defender to be stronger than the attacker. Rather, it means helping Ukraine rearm and train in an agile, lighter way to make sure it can fight a flexible defensive military campaign against any future invading Russian force. It needs to be clear to the Russians that any attack would meet continuous ambushes, counterattacks, and hits by long-range artillery and missiles. Then, when the attacking Russians are already severely depleted, the bulk of Ukraine’s well-armed, well-trained force would push back or destroy the invaders. It is a porcupine strategy with a hammer blow at the end.
As the ongoing war demonstrates, a porcupine defense strategy for Ukraine needs to acknowledge that any future war is likely to be similarly dominated by large-scale land battles, mutual attrition, and the need for lots of firepower and protection from it. This needs to be reflected in a long-term rearmament plan for Ukraine. Therefore, in addition to man-portable anti-aircraft and anti-armor systems; loitering munitions; and cheap, expendable drones and other attritable platforms, Ukraine would need adequate numbers of main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored self-propelled howitzers.
To deter Russia from attacking again, some of the long-term priorities are the same ones Ukraine has now. First and foremost is firepower. Ukraine needs multiple launch rocket systems, howitzers, loitering munitions, as well as adequate stockpiles of guided and unguided munitions. Another priority—both now and long-term—is air defense systems of all types and ranges. Any Ukrainian defense strategy needs to be built around denying Ukrainian airspace to Russian bomber formations and other aircraft, as well as reducing the impact of missile and drone attacks.
In the medium- to long-term, a comprehensive air defense strategy will also require at least two squadrons of Western-made fighter aircraft capable of being armed with beyond-visual range air-to-air missiles, JDAM-bombs, and long-range, air-launched cruise missiles. These will help cover gaps in ground-based air defenses and provide ground formations with close air support. Last week’s decision by the United States and several European countries to supply F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine and train Ukrainian pilots is therefore not only good news for Kyiv in the current war, but a welcome step in a long-term air defense strategy. After firepower, ground-based air defense, and fighter jets, other priorities for long-term deterrence include main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and man-portable anti-tank guided missile systems.
Turn Ukraine Into a Bristling Porcupine Before Russia Starts Another War (archive.ph) |
