SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Strategies & Market Trends : World Outlook

 Public ReplyPrvt ReplyMark as Last ReadFilePrevious 10Next 10PreviousNext  
To: Les H who wrote (38742)10/15/2023 6:38:25 PM
From: Les H  Read Replies (1) of 50947
 
Not in sync: Who was alerted to worrying indications ahead of Hamas attack, who did not
Analysis: Conflicting accounts about which sectors of the IDF knew some opaque details about an imminent Saturday attack, and why those who knew did not alert the military in its entirety

ynetnews.com

The night before the war, not a creature was stirring

Following the initial report on Thursday about the "weak signals" received by the military, and the urgent conference call among the Chief of Staff, the Head of Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet Chief, and the Commander of the Southern Command, Yedioth Ahronoth and Ynet revealed on Sunday that military sources insist the Gaza Division received the same information as the Southern Command. This claim stands in contrast to claims by Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, division commander: "We were not aware of the attack, it took us by surprise."

In addition, the Shin Bet's Head of the Southern District, identified as A', was in the field by Saturday morning, underscoring the gravity attached to these "signals". The "Tequila" team, a unit dedicated to handling extreme situations, was also promptly dispatched to the location.

Notably, the Air Force commander was absent from the security establishment officials' conference call. This is crucial information: earlier preparation of the force, including having two Apache helicopters at the ready, would have significantly improved the outcome, coupled with a fundamental level of preparedness at the division level. For instance, the duty officer in the division was only a second lieutenant and not on combat duty (though it's worth mentioning he displayed bravery and successfully neutralized terrorists).

This demonstrates the level of significance the division attributed to the incoming information, supposedly because neither the Southern Command nor the General Staff conveyed a sense of urgency. The prevailing notion was that the event was a training exercise by Hamas, rather than an aggressive action like an attempted abduction, and definitely nowhere near the magnitude of a simultaneous attack involving 15 sites using over 1,000 terrorists. This is just one of many chilling details yet to be revealed in the forthcoming, undoubtedly harrowing investigation.
Report TOU ViolationShare This Post
 Public ReplyPrvt ReplyMark as Last ReadFilePrevious 10Next 10PreviousNext