| | | The First Draft of the Ukraine War’s History
Washington’s policy-makers showed themselves more wicked and feckless than their Vietnam- and Iraq-era predecessors.
theamericanconservative.com
snip:
Zelensky’s advisor, David Arakhamia, later commented, “They were prepared to end the war if we agreed to, as Finland once did, neutrality and committed that we would not join NATO. In fact this was the key point.” The Istanbul negotiations even produced a draft agreement. Zelensky’s aide, Alexey Arestovich, described the negotiations as completely successful: “We opened the champagne bottle.”
But Washington would have none of it. Bennet later explained, “The Americans decided to crush Putin rather than to negotiate.” Shortly thereafter Boris Johnson showed up in Kiev with promises of more weapons and a message from Biden. Horton cites a Ukrainian paper, Ukrainska Pravda: “Putin should be pressured, not negotiated with…. The collective West now felt…that Putin was not really as powerful as previously imagined, and there was a chance to ‘press’ him.”
Following orders, Ukraine abruptly broke off the talks. There are not good sources yet about this American push to throttle an early ceasefire, or, given what we know now about Biden’s condition, who was responsible for it. But Washington decided continuing the war was preferable to a Finlandized Ukraine.
Since then Ukraine and Russia have suffered a million casualties, and Ukraine’s infrastructure may be wrecked for a generation. Russia’s ties to China are closer than at any time since the 1950s. In my baby-boomer life, I’ve participated in mass demonstrations against two wars, Vietnam and Iraq. There have been no real demonstrations against our Ukraine policy, which Americans have experienced as a blip—or perhaps, as hawkish politicians proclaim, an economic and strategic benefit. |
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