The Iran strike shows we don’t need bases in the Middle East
Our massive gulf footprint is more liability than asset.
June 28, 2025
By Dan Caldwell
and Jennifer Kavanagh
Dan Caldwell is a former senior adviser at the Defense Department and a veteran of the Iraq War. Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.
On June 21, B-2 bombers launched from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri flew 37 hours round trip to attack Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow and Natanz, while 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from a submarine in the Persian Gulf at Natanz and Isfahan. These strikes were supported by dozens of aerial refuelers, reconnaissance aircraft and fighter jets that escorted the bombers into Iran.
Look closely, and you’ll notice something peculiar: Many of the aircraft involved in the operation do not appear to have taken off from the large U.S. air bases in the Middle East — or, if they did, that fact has been carefully concealed. Whether this reflects a choice made to spare gulf state partners’ ties with Iran or because these states denied the United States permission to use bases on their territory, the implication is the same. When the president decided it was time for the United States to act against Iran, the 40,000 troops and billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware that Washington keeps parked in the Middle East were of limited use.
Worse, these forces ultimately proved to be a vulnerability when, 36 hours later, Iran retaliated by launching missiles at al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. While the incoming missiles were intercepted and no soldiers were harmed, most of the aircraft were moved out of al-Udeid, and ships stationed at the U.S. naval station in Bahrain were sent out to sea to keep them safe.
For the White House and the Pentagon, this reality should be a wake-up call. U.S. military forces in the Middle East bring more risks than benefits, and it’s time to get most of them out for good.
For decades, the United States has kept tens of thousands of military personnel in the Middle East, spread across bases in the Persian Gulf region and the Levant. The size of the U.S. military footprint has changed over time, swelling during the 1991 Gulf War and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. There has never been a serious attempt to draw down, however. U.S. soldiers, aircraft and warships have become a regional fixture.
Proponents of keeping these forces in the Middle East argue that their presence provides the United States significant benefits in suppressing regional crises and bolstering our allies’ security. But realizing these benefits requires that the United States has liberal permissions from host countries to use bases on their territory to conduct offensive operations.
This is not always the case. U.S. military commanders in the region often face limits on what they can do and where their personnel, planes and ships can operate. Operation Midnight Hammer would not be the first time that such restrictions impeded U.S. forces in the Middle East. Turkey, for example, initially did not allow the United States to use its airspace or bases for operations during the 2003 Iraq War, forcing significant alterations to war plans.
Sustaining U.S. forces in the Middle East is costly, to the tune of tens of billions of dollars per year during peacetime. Some of these costs would be incurred even if the same forces were located in the United States. But not all. U.S. personnel in the Middle East require more extensive defenses than do those based at home, including hardened facilities and advanced air defenses, to protect them from drone and missile attacks.
Indeed, the biggest downside to having 40,000 U.S. forces in the region is that they end up being vulnerable targets for state and non-state adversaries. This was true well before the events of the past week. Both the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut or the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia left Americans dead.
The current U.S. military posture in the Middle East brings serious costs, risks and burdens, and the benefits are overstated. The Pentagon can fix this imbalance by bringing many U.S. forces home from the Middle East and rebalancing the remaining forces across the region.
The top priority should be moving those forces in the most exposed locations. The Trump administration has already indicated it intends to draw down forces in Syria but should not stop before reaching zero. The administration should also recommit to plans to reduce the number of U.S. forces in Iraq. It should also close bases most proximate to Iran’s missiles and drones, including those in Kuwait.
Remaining forces in the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia can be concentrated at a smaller number of more secure facilities, such as Prince Sultan Air Base near Riyadh. Rotational airpower and naval power that surged to the region after the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, and the start of the Iran-Israel War can also be withdrawn once the situation stabilizes.
The “12 Day War” fortunately did not cost any American lives, but it highlighted our vulnerabilities in the region and underlined how our existing force posture was superfluous to achieving our aims. The war’s end provides an opportunity for the United States to do what it has tried and failed to do for the better part of a decade: rationalize and downscale its presence in the Middle East. We should not miss this opportunity to act.
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