SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Strategies & Market Trends : ajtj's Post-Lobotomy Market Charts and Thoughts

 Public ReplyPrvt ReplyMark as Last ReadFilePrevious 10Next 10PreviousNext  
Recommended by:
ajtj99
To: Sun Tzu who wrote (95730)10/11/2025 4:09:39 PM
From: Sun Tzu1 Recommendation  Read Replies (1) of 96636
 
Out of curiosity I did a bit of research on D.E. Shaw.
Pre-Shaw's departure, the firm was heavily a stat-arb shop.
After he left, it became a multi PM with various horizons and strategies, even dabbling into illiquid assets.

The significance here is as to where market inefficiencies exist. Prior to computerized technical analysis becoming common, Shaw was able to run stat-arb and day trade to glory. But now there is so much competition that he can't. So he has switched to other strategies with longer time horizons (and they are even less transparent than they used to be).

Bottom line
  • The firm’s mix today spans multi-strategy quant, macro, equities, credit/private credit; flagship funds Composite (multi-strategy) and Oculus (macro) posted strong 2024 results (~18% and >36%, respectively). ( Reuters)

  • It is also raising sizable private-credit “capital optimization / risk-transfer” vehicles (e.g., Diopter II closed $1.3B in 2025; >$5B raised across that sleeve). This pushes the firm further toward longer-horizon/illiquid exposures. ( Bloomberg)

On my volume premise (volume as a proxy for alpha)
  • Contemporary, sourced claims about D. E. Shaw’s historic market footprint cluster around ~2–5% of NYSE volume in the 1990s—not 20% (that higher figure circulates anecdotally about large cap stocks but I can’t find a reliable citation).

  • Since then, the firm diversified away from intraday stat-arb toward medium/long-horizon quant and non-equity strategies. As a result, trading volume is no longer a clean proxy for “algorithm count/efficacy.” Recent performance and capital deployment (esp. macro and private credit) are better indicators.

Inferred horizon-mix model (illustrative) Using public signals (AUM scale-up, strategy launches, fund performance, private-credit growth), here’s a conceptual evolution of risk-capital by signal horizon. This is an inference, not disclosed by the firm.

  • Short-term (<1 day): dominant in the 1990s ? minority today

  • Medium-term (1–30 days): stable to rising share

  • Long-term (>30 days / illiquid): material rise post-2010 (macro & private credit)

I’ve plotted an illustrative stacked area (and CSV):


Assumed shares of risk capital (%):

Year

1995
Short-term

70
Medium-term

25
Long-term

5
2000 60 30 10
2005 45 40 15
2010 30 45 25
2015 25 40 35
2020 20 40 40
2025 15 40 45


Why this pattern (drivers):

  • Alpha decay & microstructure shifts (decimalization, competition) compress short-horizon edges.

  • AUM scalability pushes toward multi-month quant, macro, and private markets where capacity is higher.

  • Documented fund mix/performance and new private-credit vehicles corroborate a longer-horizon tilt. ( Reuters)

Practical takeaways (for your proxy metric)
  • 1990s: Volume ? algorithmic edge was a reasonable proxy.

  • 2020s: Prefer risk-attribution across sleeves (macro vs. equities vs. credit), drawdown profiles, and capital returned vs. raised over raw execution volume. Recent return dispersion (Composite vs. Oculus) and private-credit scaling show algorithmic efficacy without high equity-tape footprint. ( Reuters)

Report TOU ViolationShare This Post
 Public ReplyPrvt ReplyMark as Last ReadFilePrevious 10Next 10PreviousNext