Novorossiysk, a warm-water port that allows year-round operations, sits on the northeastern edge of the Black Sea, backed by mountains. Its geography makes it valuable: deep water, relative distance from the front, and insulation from seasonal constraints that plague other Russian ports.
It was to this port that Russia ran the moment it became clear that life in Sevastopol, Crimea, had become untenable for the Black Sea Fleet.
That collapse did not happen suddenly. Ukrainian military intelligence, under Kyrylo Budanov, methodically degraded Russia’s air-defense architecture in Crimea through repeated raids. Each strike was incremental, designed not for spectacle but for erosion. As gaps began to appear, Ukraine expanded the campaign, using Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles to remove additional air-defense assets with precision.
When the Sullivan-Biden administration transferred a limited number of ATACMS to Ukraine in April 2023, Kyiv used them exactly as intended — to destroy high-value, long-range Russian air-defense systems that had previously placed Crimea out of reach.
The result was cumulative and decisive.
Eventually, the sky opened up.
Sevastopol’s docks became unsafe. Then Crimean waters themselves became unsafe for Russian naval operations. One by one, the assumptions that had protected the Black Sea Fleet collapsed. Faced with an environment they could no longer defend, Russian ships packed up and withdrew eastward — to Novorossiysk, hundreds of miles from the front line and far from Ukrainian shores.
Distance was supposed to equal safety.
For a time, that assumption appeared to hold.
Once the Black Sea Fleet relocated to Novorossiysk, the pace of its destruction slowed dramatically. The port’s distance from Ukrainian shores, combined with layered defenses and the belief that underwater threats were manageable, imposed a pause on Ukraine’s naval campaign. What had been a steady degradation in Crimea turned into something closer to a stalemate.
Novorossiysk was treated not merely as a fallback, but as a sanctuary — a place where submarines and surface vessels could operate, rearm, and launch strikes without facing the constant threat that had consumed Crimea. From there, Russia continued to fire Kalibr cruise missiles into Ukraine, particularly targeting the south.
That sense of safety ended yesterday.
Confirmation came from the highest levels and was quickly corroborated by open-source intelligence.
The Institute for the Study of War reported that Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) strike against a Russian submarine — the first confirmed attack of its kind in naval history — on the night of December 14–15.
According to ISW, the Ukrainian Security Service released footage, later geolocated, showing “Sub Sea Baby” UUVs striking a Project 636 Varshavyanka-class (NATO Kilo-class) submarine while it was docked at the Novorossiysk Naval Base in Krasnodar Krai. The strike caused explosions and inflicted critical damage on the vessel.
The SBU noted that the submarine was equipped with four Kalibr launchers, which Russia had been using to strike Ukrainian territory, and assessed that the damage may have rendered the submarine inoperable.
Satellite imagery from Planet Labs shows that two Kilo-class submarines were present at the base as of December 5, with follow-up imagery on December 11 indicating that at least one remained docked there shortly before the strike.
Novorossiysk is no longer a sanctuary.
The submarine Ukraine struck carries a price tag of roughly $400 million. Whether it is fully destroyed or merely crippled almost does not matter. Either way, it is out of the fight for a long time.
And the reason for that is not Ukrainian firepower.
It is Russian arrogance.
Russia does not have a functioning dry dock in the Black Sea outside of Sevastopol. Not one. The only facility capable of handling critical submarine repairs sits in Crimea — the very base the Black Sea Fleet was forced to abandon under fire. Moscow never bothered to build redundancy. It never imagined needing it.
Novorossiysk has no equivalent capability. Whatever temporary or improvised repair infrastructure exists there is wholly insufficient for a heavily damaged Kilo-class submarine. Critical hull, propulsion, or systems repairs require a dry dock — and Russia cannot safely move the vessel back to Sevastopol, nor does it have the time or resources to construct a new one in Novorossiysk.
This is not a short repair cycle. It is a strategic removal.
Russia had two Kilo-class submarines operating from Novorossiysk, both regularly used to launch Kalibr cruise missiles into Ukraine, particularly against southern regions. With one now destroyed or disabled, only a single submarine remains available for these missions.
That matters.
Each Kilo-class submarine removed reduces pressure on Odesa and on the maritime corridors Ukraine relies on to move goods through the Black Sea. These boats were among Russia’s most survivable strike assets in the theater. Losing even one alters the balance.
German military analyst Tendar argues that this strike may push Moscow toward proposing a naval truce — and the logic is hard to ignore.
If Novorossiysk itself is now under threat, then the Black Sea Fleet has nowhere left to retreat. The last assumption of safety has been disproven in the span of twenty-four hours.
The asymmetry is brutal. Ukrainian naval drones cost well under half a million dollars apiece. Precise figures are hard to pin down because the systems remain on a rapid development curve, but the underlying reality is simple: these are drones carrying explosives and high-end guidance — and they are cheap.
Russia, by contrast, is losing assets worth hundreds of millions.
At some point, Ukraine will be able to launch coordinated swarm attacks — underwater drones paired with aerial systems, potentially synchronized with long-range missile strikes. That capability may not be fully mature yet, but it is close enough that Russian planners are forced to model it.
And once you are gaming a scenario seriously, it already has power.
Tendar’s conclusion follows naturally:
“The strike today against the Russian submarine ‘Varshavyanka’ marks the beginning of the end of Russia’s last naval holdout in this region. Russians will never again feel safe anywhere in the Black Sea. Together with raids against Russian shadow fleet tankers, this will further complicate Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine, as well as against other states in the Black Sea region. I wouldn’t be surprised if Moscow soon ‘offers’ a naval truce.”
That offer, if it comes, will not be born of goodwill.
It will be born of fear.
I am still waiting on additional information regarding the Ukraine–U.S.–Germany discussions in Berlin. Early indications suggest that Germany entered those talks with a narrow set of objectives — and achieved them. I will likely publish later tonight.
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