In 1996 Tandem divested itself of Ungerman-Bass which had
contributed significantly to revenues but negatively to
the bottom line. The adjusted revenue growth curve from
94-97 was pretty good. I don't have the numbers in front
of me, but in excess of 15%, I think, including 96 & 97,
though 97 wasn't split out.
92-94 has been discussed at length earlier on this thread.
To net it out, Tandem was forced to convert from a mainframe-
like price structure to a near-commodity UNIX and even NT
-like server price structure. Margins were devastated and
Tandem's marketing model turned on its head. Unit sales
showed strong year over year growth, but margins collapsed.
That was turned around by the end of 95. Look at the net
revenue figures and/or unit sales, and, you will see an
entirely different picture emerge. There are things the
"Himilaya junk" can do that no other system built by anybody
anywhere can match (in terms of availability and scalability
for transaction processing, I mean -- ultimately a
computer's a computer in terms of what it can compute given
long enough and a dry enough place to run in).
The tale is yet to be told on how well CPQ capitalizes on
the Tandem acquisition, though. I'm not competent to
comment on that but will watch with great interest.
DEC's another matter entirely. The two are not even close
to comparable. I don't pretend to have any great insights
on DEC. As acquisitions for CPQ, DEC and Tandem appear to
me as virtually diametric opposites, despites some superficial
resemblence of their offerings in high-end markets. |
