To All: Allow me to preface what I'm about to say with the fact that the recent (2-year) strength in the U.S. dollar has been matched by that of the renminbi, and few others (e.g. Swiss franc, DM at times).
So they talk, talk, talk about a renminbi devaluation being inevitable; and soon investment takes a substantial drop, and remains low, only for no one wanting to be caught in the "inevitable" devaluation. This brings a great deal of pressure on the targeted (sic) market to, in fact, devalue.
A handy device for U.S. and European banks and investment houses who would dearly love the cheap share prices to be had via purchases made in a marginally stronger currency, and in a region where share prices already have a great deal of bad news in them. Prices so cheap that the recently relaxed ownership criteria in some countries will provide an opportunity to buy enormous influence, if not controlling interest, in some very lucrative enterprises.
For those who have not read or reviewed Mr. John Naisbitt's Global Paradox, he is quite convincing when he explains that "the bigger the world economy, the more powerful its smallest players." So wealthy, he puts, that some of the erstwhile smaller players in world markets would attain significant influence on many impactful global issues. And, I put, when planning their positions as a group (e.g. ASEAN), all the more impact.
Do I believe the past year's pattern of aggressive currency speculation was in itself at fault for the crisis in East Asian economies? Of course not.
Do I believe the debt disposition of certain East Asian economies provided good opportunity for the legacy players in global politics to buy some time for their attempts at bringing some of the future players in-line with their various agendas? Yes, I do.
For those who are either reluctant to, or just will not, entertain the notion of such an effort, you should advise yourself more widely and roundly. |
