GEEK'S-EYE VIEW
Sun's Java strategy should focus on
the Java Virtual Machine.
By Brett Glass
Sun Microsystems' battles to defend its Java technology
and trademarks against the expanding Microsoft empire
have been the stuff of headlines, lawsuits, and flame
wars. Most of Sun's problems have been correctly
characterized as resulting from Microsoft's partially
successful efforts to use its Windows monopoly to
fragment a powerful technology.
However, they also are the result of three strategic
mistakes Sun made at the very outset. None of these
missteps has proved fatal--yet. But together these errors
threaten to undermine Java seriously, unless Sun takes
immediate corrective action.
Semantic error
The first mistake, as is all too common when avowed
techies attempt to market new products, has been one of
positioning. Instead of pushing Java's greatest strength,
the "virtual machine" technology that allows an
application to run on nearly any operating system safely
and without recompilation, Sun has cast Java more as a
language that just happens to be cross-platform. This
does a disservice to the most important and least known
feature of Java's technology: that it is possible to compile
nearly any existing computer language--not just Java--to
run on Java's run-time engine. This doesn't mean Java the
language isn't elegant or worth learning; it is. But by
putting the cart before the horse, Sun has neglected what
must be one of its primary goals: to enable users to
choose its products despite the nearly complete
Windows monopoly.
Sun's second mistake, which follows directly from the
first, is how it has chosen to name Java and its
components. Sun gave the language a short and catchy
name and called the engine by the much more awkward
"Java Virtual Machine." This name perpetuates the
illusion that the "Write once, run anywhere" aspect of the
technology is secondary to the language. Microsoft has
capitalized on this tactical error by propagating the
incorrect notion that Java is "just a language."
But Sun's most telling error has been its failure to keep
complete control of the virtual machine. With legions of
programmers and plenty of cash to hire more, Sun
should not have lazily allowed other vendors to
implement the cross-platform engine. Microsoft and
Netscape should never have been entrusted with this
all-important component. Had Sun implemented the
virtual machine itself for all the important operating
system platforms (as it has now begun to do, belatedly,
with its Activator plug-in technology), it would have had
a hot product to license or even sell directly to end users
for an immediate gain. (Sun's JavaSoft subsidiary, which
is responsible for Java, has yet to turn a profit.)
What's more, were Sun the sole author (or nearly so) of
Java virtual machines, 100 percent cross-platform
compatibility would be easier to achieve, and divergence
of the language would be a nonissue. Java the language
could be released to standards committees with no
negative effect on the platform's viability, eliminating the
most strenuous objections to Java as a whole. (This is, in
fact, the Red Herring's position: see December's open
letter to Scott McNealy) Any language or compiler that
created a program for Sun's virtual machines would
automatically be able to run on any system, allowing
users to choose alternative hardware platforms and
operating systems--including Sun's--with confidence.
Machine language
In promoting Java, Sun has fretted too much about the
chrome on the fenders and failed to concentrate on the
important part--the engine. Sun can turn things around by
giving the Java Virtual Machine a short, trendy,
nontechnical name and marketing it independently from
the language, thus becoming the primary source of
compatible virtual machines for all environments. Sun
also should ensure that other languages can be used with
the engine via the publication of standard,
language-independent interfaces similar to those used by
IBM's System Object Model architecture.
In summary, Sun must both maintain viable markets for
its primary hardware and software businesses and
preserve user choice in the face of the Windows
monopoly. Though the company's initial strategy was not
too far off the mark, a few midcourse corrections will
surely make the difference between a smashing success
and a slow, painful slide toward insignificance.
Brett Glass is a software developer and a freelance
technology columnist.
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