' In 1996 when Corporation 2000 first started researching the
business continuity implications of the Year 2000 crisis, nearly every
organisation contacted stated their Year 2000 project, had the
objective of first completing their remediation work by the end 1997,
and finalising testing by the end of 1998. This would have given a
whole year as a buffer zone. During 1997 every organisation
contacted, including those who started in 1997, now had objectives
of becoming compliant and fully tested by December 31st 1998. To
the best of our knowledge, as of 10th February 1998, not one major
company or government agency in Europe or US had attained the
first remediation target. At the time there was also a strong realisation
that in addition to the individual organisational pursuit, this was very
much a team challenge, there was little point in a Police force
attaining full operational compliance only to find that basic
infra-structure or other criminal and judicial systems failing to
complete the necessary activity in time.
The UK government had just created a new Cabinet committee,
chaired by Margaret Beckett, President of the Board of Trade that
would focus on infra-structure and ensuring national contingency
plans are in place. The Chairman of the US Software Productivity
Reasearch Inc, Capers Jones had stated that there was a strong
probability that somewhere between 10% and perhaps 35% of
potential year 2000 software problems will still be present at the
dawn of the next century. For the UK he predicted that across the
board 20% of applications would not be resolved by January 1st
2000. Another leading expert and author Ed Yourdon also wrote on
9th February that, `The inescapable fact is that there's simply too
much software, too many embedded systems, too few programmers
and engineers, and too little time to fix either the government's or the
private sector's critical systems'.
At this stage it was clear that although the Home Office's `Dealing
with Disaster' document comprehensively dealt with the best
practices and integrated plans for emergency management, there
were features of the Year 2000 crisis that required special early
consideration, namely.
The forces, local and health authorities themselves will be impacted
by their own non-compliance of systems. The re-introduction of
manual processes could mean units operating at only half the normal
operational strength
The potential for simultaneous incidents over an extended period of
at least a month
Systemic failure that impacts the whole economy such as vital
equipment failure in power transmission units that could be used
extensively throughout the network
Potential overwhelming of emergency call centres caused by
electronic device failures such as security or fire alarms. Then later
incident inquiries or missing persons requests
Possibility of communications breakdown in mobile and land lines
Some Health Authorities may not be in a position to admit casualties
due to failures in power generators
Criminal element within society may plan or react to the opportunity
the night presents
Difficulties may be experienced with prison population if there is
pro-longed infra-structure breakdown. The Prison Service may also
find embedded system in their security systems.
Millennium bug could impact chemical or factory processes, gas
distribution, necessitating evacuation of an area. Automatic prediction
of the size of the evacuation area would not necessary be available
without the normal technological forecast instruments. . . .
As of February 10th 1998
Low confidence: Urbanville Electricity, Urbanville Water, Aviation
industry, local and health authorities
Medium confidence : Urbanville Transport, gas, Oil, Central
Government, Emergency services.
High Confidence: Telecommunications, Nuclear Energy, Railroad. . .
.
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