Why We're Suing Microsoft
By SCOTT MCNEALY
For me, lawsuits hold about as much appeal as root canal. Sparring in the courts usually represents the failure of companies to do business in a fair and legal manner. Our company didn't grow from zero to nearly $10 billion in 16 years by suing our customers, or our competitors for that matter.
So we thought long and hard before filing suit against Microsoft in October 1997. But we decided it was necessary. We have a distribution contract with Microsoft, which agreed to distribute products that incorporate our Java technology. And we owe it to our shareholders, our other customers and our partners to ensure that this contract is honored. We believe Microsoft has not abided by the agreement. (A trial date hasn't yet been set, but we've argued some important motions.)
Microsoft's Contract
Microsoft signed a contract to distribute Sun's Java technology within its products, in a manner that conforms to our specifications and passes our compatibility tests. Microsoft needed to license our technology because it knew full well in 1996 that the World Wide Web -- fueled by Java -- was driving a new model for computing that Microsoft couldn't ignore. At the same time, it was clear that the Java technology could break the operating system lock-in that the Windows monopoly depended upon.
Interest in the Java platform, already high, became intense: Hundreds of thousands of programmers began writing software using the Java technology and thousands of companies began building such applications for internal and commercial use. Users can choose what kind of computer they want to use to run the applications; the applications don't tell them which computer to use. And Sun and its licensee-partners worked diligently to improve the technologies that make up the Java platform.
Alarmed at the growing acceptance and capabilities of the Java platform, the people at Microsoft tried a new tactic. They began to insist -- unlike any of the other 100-plus licensees -- that their contract didn't mean what it says. They claimed they had a right to change the formula to suit their needs. It didn't take long for "fear, uncertainty and doubt" about the future of the Java platform to set in -- surely Microsoft's intended result.
Imagine if McDonald's felt its customers wanted Coke that was sweeter, so the fast-food chain unilaterally changed the formula, distributing a new concoction at its 10,000 or so outlets. Imagine if McDonald's said it just wanted to give customers a new choice. It would take Coca-Cola about a nanosecond to come down hard on its distributor -- using the courts if need be.
Well, maybe software is different from soft drinks. Maybe different rules apply. Maybe things are different in the Digital Age.
Why don't we ask Microsoft CEO Bill Gates what he thinks? In an essay on this page in November 1997, he declared that his company needed strict controls over how its technology was distributed: "Without a uniform Windows installation, end-users could not be sure of the performance of the integrated operating system, and Microsoft could not stand behind its product. Furthermore, Windows would become Balkanized, like the many incompatible versions of UNIX. This would eventually drive prices for PC products higher as software developers and hardware manufacturers would have to develop and test their products for all the different versions of Windows. And innovation would slow because developers would be reluctant to write new programs if they couldn't be sure that new features would work on all Windows PCs."
Ironic, isn't it? In fact it's even worse, because we believe the evidence makes clear that Microsoft's intent is far more malevolent than simply "going their own way." Microsoft is attempting to flood the market with what its own executives, in internal e-mail cited in the Justice Department's antitrust filing, call a "polluted" version of Java technology.
They are taking this action -- and I'm using their own words, again from the Justice Department's filings -- to "steal" the Java programming language and subvert the growth of a new software industry that's not dependent on the Windows operating systems.
The Java technology is a promising one. I've never met a software programmer who liked to spend his time "porting" or rewriting software in order for it to run on one particular operating system. I've never met a programmer who wants to limit his potential market, either. Our licensing agreements are designed to ensure that applications written to the Java platform can run on myriad devices beyond what we now call personal computers, giving programmers the choice to build on many environments at once. And finally, the easy-to-use Java technology saves programmers time.
For businesses, quickly developing, deploying and maintaining applications is often a key to competitive advantage. And today, a company's internal network must link to more than its employees. Customers and suppliers need access. The Web is now the default network, driven by the Java platform.
What do consumers get? More software that runs more places. They can use a PC or they can choose whatever network device they like and still connect to the Web to run relevant and useful applications.
Java technology can achieve these goals where others have failed, because we built it from the ground up with the network in mind. It has built-in security and safety features, for instance. And it has the ability to provide a code base that is useful in devices as small as smart cards and as big as mainframe computers.
Where we really broke the mold is in how we deliver and continue to develop the technology. We make the language and development kit free for all software programmers. In addition, we publish all the specifications for everyone to see. We invite anyone to comment on these documents as we draft them.
On top of all this, we license the source code -- the crown jewels of any software -- to hundreds of companies such as IBM, Novell, Oracle and others, so that they can work with us on evolving the technology and so that they can distribute it within their software and hardware. As part of this arrangement, they are required to pass compatibility testing with any of their implementations. This way, customers can be confident that applications written to the Java technology will work on compatible platforms.
Microsoft, at least initially, showed some interest in participating in this process -- until it recognized that this model had the potential (again, quoting from internal e-mail in the Justice Department's filing) to "devalue and replace" Windows.
Instead of figuring out -- like the rest of us -- how to innovate and compete in the brave new world of network computing, Microsoft decided to use its monopoly power to distribute a polluted implementation of the Java technology simply to defend its entrenched position, and attempted to convert the Web into its proprietary domain. Microsoft wants to keep programmers locked into that proprietary domain, continuing to deny them the ability to create and distribute a single application that can run under a variety of operating systems.
A Deal Is a Deal
A whole lot has changed in the past 20 years. Technology is fueling some mind-boggling innovation. But all the technology in the world doesn't alter a simple golden rule of business: A deal is a deal. Legally enforceable private agreements are at the very core of the free enterprise system.
That's why we're in court. We are committed to doing everything we can, inside the courtroom and out, to preserve the value of the Java technology for our customers, our partners, for Sun and our shareholders, and for the industry.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
