By David Makovsky "Haaretz" Tuesday, September 29, 1998 www3.haaretz.co.il
NEW YORK - Scott Ritter knows Iraq pretty well by now. A veteran arms inspector for the United Nations Special Commission
charged with tracking Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, Ritter, who recently resigned his post, was intimately involved
in the UN effort to keep Saddam Hussein honest.
Over an extended period, Ritter and other inspectors worked to break the code Saddam was using to issue instructions involving the
movement of weapons Iraq wanted to keep hidden from inspectors. Well into this year, the cat and mouse game being played in Iraq
made regular headlines around the world.
What few know is that the UN inspectors, with Israeli help, eventually broke the Iraqi code and were on the verge of a major
breakthrough in uncovering concealed weaponry. Then, this summer, the inspections were halted. That's when Ritter quit his job -
out of pure frustration, he says.
In this exclusive interview with Ha'aretz, Ritter reveals how weapons were being moved around in Iraq, what role Israel played in
helping the inspections team, and his own personal disillusionment with the United States for what he characterizes as its lack of
support for the inspections program, public hype to the contrary notwithstanding.
How did Iraq conceal weapons from UNSCOM?
"In April 1991, Saddam Hussein issued a presidential directive ordering that Iraq lie to the Special Commission [UNSCOM] and to
the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], [and that Iraq] would keep [its mass destruction] capabilities.
"In May 1991, the materials that were kept were turned over under instruction of the president to the Special Security Organization
(SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG). These are presidential security forces."
How big is this special organization?
"The SSO is one of the most secretive organizations in Iraq. It probably numbers around 5,000 people. The SRG is the military arm
that had four brigades, around 15 battalions, and is about the size of a division - maybe 20,000 people."
Was the special organization set up for this purpose of concealment?
"The special organization was set up to protect the president of Iraq. Back in the 1980s this special security organization also had a
responsibility for protecting Iraq's weapons... So they have been linked from the very beginning with these weapons, but today they
have the responsibility of hiding them from the Special Commission."
Is their job basically to conduct one big shell game?
"That's right, it's a shell game. Now what you're getting to is the problem I faced. We were beating our heads against the wall going
after the shell game. We're playing their game. I said to [then] chairman [of UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus, that] rather than going after the
shells, let's go after the man moving the shells.
"One reason why I went to Israel and started working with the Israelis is because I believe that the methodology that Israel uses to
hunt down terrorists are the same methodologies we needed to use to go after the weapons of mass destruction. So I asked Israel
to help the commission formulate analytical models, analytical techniques and to advise on operational issues."
When was that?
"I first approached [Israel] in 1994. We started working in 1995."
Was it helpful?
"I can honestly say that if it weren't for Israel, the Special Commission would not have been able to carry out the anti-concealment
effort."
What was Israel's unique contribution?
"I can just say Israel had a good reputation of being innovative, of being capable, of being good. And we approached Israel due to all
those factors. It's Tel Aviv that can be hit by these missiles, not New York City, and we were actually, frankly speaking, a little
dismayed with the lack of intensity, the lack of enthusiasm, that emanated from Washington on this issue. The U.S. treated it more
as an academic exercise and I thought Israel treated it as it is - a matter of life and death. So we came to Israel."
Were your trips and cooperation with Israel authorized by the head of UNSCOM? Was it also approved by the U.S.?
"Ekeus started this, yes. It was all authorized by Ekeus. It was a totally authorized thing and it was approved by the U.S.
government. Every aspect was approved by the U.S. government."
Who ran the Iraqi concealment program?
"Abed Hamid Mahmoud, the presidential secretary. He is probably the most powerful man in Iraq after the president. He is
Saddam's bodyguard, confidant, right-hand man. Qusay Hussein [Saddam's son] cannot go the president without going through
Abed Hamid Mahmoud. He is the gatekeeper. He is the man responsible for coordinating the national security policy of Iraq. He's
the secret power in Iraq. He runs what's called the joint committee, [which] coordinates all the national security...
"He's the one who brings people in and gives them concealment tasks. He's the one who [manages] the concealment operation
center that monitors all the stuff that is moved around Iraq. Abed uses the special security organization [SSO] as the tool for
concealment.
"I can name officers within the special security organization who did concealment, and I can tell [the UNSCOM] chairman, how,
when, where, and why specific acts of concealment took place. That's how good we got. I can't say how we did it. But I can say
how good we got.
"So we started with nothing and in the end we were down to where we knew when, where, how, why, who and what was happening.
And that's why the frustration. It was not a single source of information. We used everything that we had available to us. And that's
why what happened in July and August [when the U.S. halted inspections] was so frustrating. Because now that we have identified
how they're doing it, and now that we get the kind of information we need on the timely basis we need, we're inside their
decision-making cycle. We're reacting before Iraq can react."
You really could get the information before they move the shell?
"Before they move the shell. And I got stuck. That's why I was so mad. Because I finally came up with the solution. I broke the
code. We untied the Gordian knot. We figured it out. We had the problem solved and now we just need to go do the job. It took us
three years, but we solved the problem.
"But the U.S. didn't let us. Not only didn't they let us, they won't let us - because to go do it ratchets it up to the ultimate level of
confrontation. Because there's no way Iraq will allow us to inspect the people who need to be inspected. We're talking about the
people closest to Saddam Hussein. We're talking about the security forces, the personal security forces of Saddam, we're talking
about the family of Saddam. These are the people doing concealment.
"It basically works like a Mafia organization. When you organize crime [or set up a] terrorist organization, you have cells. And in
order to become a cell leader, you have to be trusted by the family, so you have to be very close to the family. So the people being
selected are direct blood relatives of Saddam. There are primarily Tikritis (people from Saddam's hometown) or there are alliances of
marriage to other tribes, like the Alduries. People of this nature are also close to Saddam. Abed is the one who says I can trust this
man or I can't. Abott does the interviews. That's all compartmentalized. [Even] if you get one cell, you don't what the other guy is
doing.
"Now the cells can rely on a larger infrastructure, the Special Security Organization, the Special Republican Guard. These elite
organizations are populated by people loyal to Saddam. Now they don't have a mission per se of concealment, but you if you need a
truck, you can go to that Special Republican Guard and vehicle resources. If you need 15-man working party, you can go to that
Special Republican Guard unit and get 15 soldiers to do something for you. So you have the resources of the SSO and SRG at your
disposal to do you want to hide these weapons. You're given vehicles, you're given money, you're given a safe house. You're given
the responsibility to go out and find a location to hide this stuff.
"A lot of people will go out the way it's known you to go to relatives. You go to your uncle who has a farm in Samara, and you say
on that farm, 'I need to use that shed. I can't tell you what for, it's a family business.' Thirty days later, they leave and he has a
soldier on his team. He asks: 'Do you have a relative near here?' They go to the cousin and say, 'We need to use your farm and hide
stuff on your farm.' And that's how they move stuff around."
How many people do you think are involved?
"I think we are talking about hundreds of people involved. It is probably several cells doing chemicals, several cells doing ballistic
missiles, several cells doing biological [components], and a cell doing nuclear [devices]. You might be talking 50, 60 sites in Iraq at
any one time with all that. Then you have the groups responsible for monitoring... personnel, they you have a group responsible for
monitoring UNSCOM - trying to collect intelligence on what UNSCOM is doing. This is significant operation.
"And Iraq has this regime of terror and control. The thing about the joint committee is that they can tap into any resource in Iraq."
Did Israel help crack the code of concealment?
"We used the methodology that Israel was considered to be the best at in the world. We cracked the code, not Israel. Israel was
not in the lead on this, but I can say that UNSCOM could not have solved this problem without the help of Israel. It's absolutely
essential. We could not have done what we did. We couldn't even come close without the help of Israel.
"I was in charge when I went to Israel. Israel responded. My requirements and my tasking came from the executive chairman. Israel
did not control the Special Commission. Israel didn't want to control the Special Commission. Israel was a fair player on all of this. It
was extremely responsible."
Could you further characterize the relationship with Israel?
"I will leave it to the Israelis to do that."
Can you say how many times you were in Israel?
"I was there a lot. From 1994 until 1998 I was there a lot."
Can you comment on the FBI investigation into your links with Israel?
"It's the most outrageous that I ever encountered with the United States government. I was sent to the Special Commission by the
U.S. government to work for the executive chairman. Those are my orders. So I did that. I was told that strength of the Special
Commission would be in its independence, that the Special Commission could not be seen as a tool of any country and that I have
to help make the Special Commission independent. I did that. I succeeded.
"In 1994, we need some new methodologies that we weren't getting from the United States, so we went to Israel.
"I went to the executive chairman (Ekeus) and we raised the issue of approaching Israel, and he approved. I have to say that as an
American citizen, I went to the U.S. government and told them that I was doing this and they didn't stop me. When the relationship
really began in earnest starting in July of '95, everything I did in Israel was approved by the executive chairman. Everything we did
was consistent with the mandate given by the [UN] Security Council. And everything I did was made known to and approved by the
U.S. government."
Every step of the way?
"Every step of the way. Now they didn't agree with a lot of what I did. They didn't agree at all. They didn't like the idea of UNSCOM
becoming this independent, nor UNSCOM having a capable partner like Israel supporting us. They weren't happy with this at all.
They tried to stop it every step of the way. But I kept them informed. I had their approval and everything was approved by the
executive chairman.
"That's why it just frustrates me they would consider that I was committing espionage. The bad guy here is Saddam. Israel was
helping UNSCOM go after Iraq's prohibited capability. I didn't receive any money from Israel, I didn't receive any favor from Israel. I
didn't receive squat from Israel. I got a shake of the hand, a pat on the back. The key thing is I was using Israel. Israel wasn't using
me.
"Certain officials in the U.S. government are so narrow minded that they can't see that. Israel never made an offer of money, never
made an attempt to pay me or influence me whatsoever. Ever.
"Yeah, we had friendly relations. They are some of the most professional people I ever met in my life. They are also great people,
wonderful people. I count many of them as friends. I would hope in this future when this all calms down, there is a way that we can
stay in touch as friends. But the relationship was purely a professional relationship."
Was it the CIA that instigated the FBI investigation?
"The bottom line is that it was the CIA that raised the concerns. They said that the relationship that Israel and Ritter had could be
an espionage relationship. Even though they knew all the facts and they approved everything. They turned it over to the FBI and the
FBI ran with it and then it became sought of a self-continuing effort. Every time I went to Israel, the pile got thicker. Every time I did
my job, the FBI just collected more data, saying its espionage. It was terrible."
When did the FBI investigation become known to you?
"I knew in January, February 1997 that the U.S. had a concern about the nature of the work and I worked very closely with the
government to try and talk about what their concern was. And it came down to basically bureaucratic jealously. You know, I have a
better relationship with the Israelis than they do. They are not in control. They lost control.
"I'm an American. Israel can't have an intelligence relationship with an American that is not controlled by the U.S. These are their
concerns. I said basically if that's it, the 'tough luck. Because, you sent me here to work for a case. You told me to be independent.
I'm doing what you told me to do, and I'm succeeding. So unless you give me a direct order to stop, and I'm always an American,
you give me a direct order, you say stop, I will stop today. You ask me a question, I will answer it.'
"I'm not hiding anything from them. But they never said stop.
"I think they were concerned that I was providing Israel with classified U.S. information. Now that has been resolved. I think the CIA,
after starting this ball rolling, realized they made a horrible mistake and they've actually put out an official ruling that said that Ritter
never had a security clearance or didn't have a security clearance while he was working with UNSCOM. It is illegal for the U.S. to
provide classified information to somebody who doesn't have a clearance. Therefore, any information provided by the United States
to Ritter was unclassified. So Ritter could not have not have turned over classified information to Israel and that was the end of it.
That should have closed it. It's not. And you have to ask the FBI why it is not closed today."
What can you say about the Israeli officials you met?
"First is the professionalism. The people I dealt with were dedicated, professional, smart. They worked their asses off. When you go
down to Washington you are overwhelmed with the 9 to 5 mentality. There wasn't this 9 to 5 mentality. This was national security.
Plus they think out of the box."
What does that mean 'to think out of the box?'
"In America, you have rules. We're going to address this problem. Let's read the rules here. They say we can think this, we cannot
do this. That's how we are going to solve this. That's how we're going to do it.
"The Israelis are: 'What's another way of looking at this? How else can we do this? Let's think of alternatives here. Is there another
way we can solve this problem?' The Israelis were innovative and courageous in terms of putting forward ideas. They were not afraid
to have an idea shot down. Again, professional. A level of trust developed.
"The Israelis looked at me and didn't see a United Nations officials, or an American. It's all professional. It's somebody whom they
can respect, whom can they can work with. That's what impressed me about them. And the fact that they were always sympathetic
with the cause. I never once felt when I was over there that I was somehow imposing on them or somehow inconveniencing them.
When I was over there, we were a team. We were all going for the same cause. We were working really hard. They are good
people."
A VIEW OF WHAT IRAQ HAS
NEW YORK - Following is former UN arms inspector Scott Ritter's assessment of what weapons Iraq is currently hiding. He bases
his assessment on data derived from various Iraqi documents in UNSCOM's possession and reports provided by reliable Iraqi
defectors.
Nuclear - Ritter notes that so long as Iraq does not have a fissionable core, it does not possess a nuclear bomb. At the same
time, he believes Iraq has three implosion-type nuclear devices, which would become bombs once Iraq obtains the fissionable
material.
Chemical - A recent UNSCOM inspection of Air Force headquarters uncovered a document showing that Iraq overdeclared the
number of bombs dropped and the tonnage of chemical agent used during the Iran-Iraq War. As a result, several thousand bombs
and seven hundred tons of chemical agent that were listed as expended may well still be in Iraq's possession.
Biological - There is evidence pointing to the possibility that Iraq tested biological weapons on live humans in 1995.
Missiles - Iraq claims that it has never produced an operational ballistic missile, however UNSCOM believes that Iraq still has an
operational ballistic missile force of between 5 and 12 al-Hussein missiles which were partially disassembled in 1997 and dispersed
to various locations. They can be reassembled on short notice. Iraq is also believed to possess various components for some 25
additional missiles. Mobile missile launchers can easily be manufactured at any time. |
