The Great Superterrorism Scare by Ehud Sprinzak
Last March, representatives from more than a dozen U.S. federal agencies gathered at the White House for a secret simulation to
text their readiness to confront a new kind of terrorism. Details of the scenario unfolded a month later on the front page of the New
York Times: Without warning, thousands across the American Southwest fall deathly ill. Hospitals struggle to rush trained and
immunized medical personnel into crisis areas. Panic spreads as vaccines and antibiotics run short--and then run out. The killer is a
hybrid of smallpox and the deadly Marburg virus, genetically engineered and let loose by terrorists to infect hundreds of thousands
along the Mexican-American border.
This apocalyptic tale represents Washington's newest nightmare: the threat of a massive terrorist attack with chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons. Three recent events seem to have convinced the policymaking elite and the general public that a disaster is
imminent: the 1995 nerve gas attack on a crowded Tokyo subway station by the Japanese millenarian cult Aum Shinrikyo; the
disclosure of alarming new information about the former Soviet Union's massive biowarfare program; and disturbing discoveries about
the extent of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein'. hidden chemical and biological arsenals. Defense Secretary William Cohen summed
up well the prevailing mood surrounding mass-destruction terrorism: "The question is no longer if this will happen, but when."
Such dire forecasts may make for gripping press briefings, movies, and bestsellers, but they do not necessarily make for good
policy. As an unprecedented fear of mass-destruction terrorism spreads throughout the American security establishment,
governments worldwide are devoting more attention to the threat. But as horrifying as this prospect may be, the relatively low risks
of such an event do not justify the high costs now being contemplated to defend against it. Not only are many of the
countermeasures likely to be ineffective, but the level of rhetoric and funding devoted to fighting superterrorism may actually advance
a potential superterrorist's broader goals: sapping the resources of the state and creating a climate of panic and fear that can
amplify the impact of any terrorist act.
CAPABILITIES AND CHAOS
Since the Clinton administration issued its Presidential Decision Directive on terrorism in June 1995, U.S. federal, state, and local
governments have heightened their efforts to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. A report
issued in December 1997 by the National Defense Panel, a commission of experts created by congressional mandate, calls upon
the army to shift its priorities and prepare to confront dire domestic threats. The National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve must be
ready, for example, to "train local authorities in chemical- and biological-weapons detection, defense, and decontamination; assist
in casualty treatment and evacuation; quarantine, if necessary, affected areas and people; and assist in restoration of infrastructure
and services." In May, the Department of Defense announced plans to train National Guard and reserve elements in every region of
the country to carry out these directives.
In his 1998 State of the Union address, President Bill Clinton promised to address the dangers of biological weapons obtained by
"outlaw states, terrorists, and organized criminals." Indeed, the president's budget for 1999, pending congressional approval,
devotes hundreds of millions of dollars to superterrorism response and recovery programs, including large decontamination units,
stockpiles of vaccines and antibiotics, improved means of detecting chemical and biological agents and analyzing disease
outbreaks, and training for special intervention forces. The FBI, Pentagon, State Department, and U.S. Health and Human Services
Department will benefit from these funds, as will a plethora of new interagency bodies established to coordinate these efforts. Local
governments are also joining in the campaign. Last April, New York City officials began monitoring emergency room care in search
of illness patterns that might indicate a biological or chemical attack had occurred. The city also brokered deals with drug
companies and hospitals to ensure an adequate supply of medicine in the event of such an attack. Atlanta, Denver, Los Angeles,
San Francisco, and Washington are developing similar programs with state and local funds. If the proliferation of counterterrorism
programs continues at its present pace, and if the U.S. army is indeed redeployed to the home front, as suggested by the National
Defense Panel, the bill for these preparations could add up to tens of billions of dollars in the coming decades.
Why have terrorism specialists and top government officials become so obsessed with the prospect that terrorists, foreign or
homegrown, will soon attempt to bring about an unprecedented disaster in the United States? A close examination of their rhetoric
reveals two underlying assumptions:
The Capabilities Proposition. According to this logic, anyone with access to modem biochemical technology and a college science
education could produce enough chemical or biological agents in his or her basement to devastate the population of London, Tokyo,
or Washington. The raw materials are readily available from medical suppliers, germ banks, university labs, chemical-fertilizer
stores, and even ordinary pharmacies. Most policy today proceeds from this assumption.
The Chaos Proposition. The post-Cold War world swarms with shadowy extremist groups, religious fanatics, and assorted crazies
eager to launch a major attack on the civilized world--preferably on U.S. territory. Walter Laqueur, terrorism's leading historian,
recently wrote that "scanning the contemporary scene, one encounters a bewildering multiplicity of terrorist and potentially terrorist
groups and sects." Senator Richard Lugar agrees: "fanatics, small disaffected groups and subnational factions who hold various
grievances against governments, or against society, all have increasing access to, and knowledge about the construction of,
weapons of mass destruction.... Such individuals are not likely to he deterred . . . by the classical threat of overwhelming
retaliation."
There is, however, a problem with this two-part logic. Although the capabilities proposition is largely valid--albeit for the limited
number of terrorists who can overcome production and handling risks and develop an efficient means of dispersal--the chaos
proposition is utterly false. Despite the lurid rhetoric, a massive terrorist attack with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons is
hardly inevitable. It is not even likely. Thirty years of field research have taught observers of terrorism a most important lesson:
Terrorists wish to convince us that they are capable of striking from anywhere at anytime, but there really is no chaos. In fact,
terrorism involves predictable behavior, and the vast majority of terrorist organizations can be identified well in advance.
Most terrorists possess political objectives, whether Basque independence, Kashmiri separatism, or Palestinian Marxism. Neither
crazy nor stupid, they strive to gain sympathy from a large audience and wish to live after carrying out any terrorist act to benefit
from it politically. As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins has remarked, terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead.
Furthermore, no terrorist becomes a terrorist overnight. A lengthy trajectory of radicalization and low-level violence precedes the
killing of civilians. A terrorist becomes mentally ready to use lethal weapons against civilians only over time and only after he or she
has managed to dehumanize the enemy. From the Baader-Meinhoff group in Germany and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to Hamas
and Hizballah in the Middle East, these features are universal.
Finally, with rare exceptions--such as the Unabomber--terrorism is a group phenomenon. Radical organizations are vulnerable to
carly detection through their disseminated ideologies, lesser illegal activities, and public statements of intent. Some even publish
their own World Wide Web sites. Since the 1960s, the vast majority of terrorist groups have made clear their aggressive intentions
long before following through with violence.
We can draw three broad conclusions from these findings. First, terrorists who threaten to kill thousands of civilians are aware that
their chances for political and physical survival are exceedingly slim. Their prospects for winning public sympathy are even slimmer.
Second, terrorists take time to become dangerous, particularly to harden themselves sufficiently to use weapons of mass
destruction. Third, the number of potential suspects is significantly less than doomsayers would have us believe. Ample early
warning signs should make effective interdiction of potential superterrorists easier than today's overheated rhetoric suggests.
THE WORLD'S MOST WANTED
Who, then, is most likely to attempt a superterrorist attack? Historical evidence and today's best field research suggest three
potential profiles:
Religious millenarian cults, such as Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, that possess a sense of immense persecution and messianic frenzy
and hold faith in salvation via Armageddon. Most known religious cults do not belong here. Millenarian cults generally seclude
themselves and wait for salvation; they do not strike out against others. Those groups that do take action more often fit the mold of
California's Heaven's Gate, or France's Order of the Solar Temple, seeking salvation through group suicide rather than massive
violence against outsiders.
Brutalized groups that either burn with revenge following a genocide against their nation or face the prospect of imminent
destruction without any hope for collective recovery. The combination of unrestrained anger and total powerlessness may lead such
groups to believe that their only option is to exact a horrendous price for their loss. "The Avengers," a group of 50 young Jews who
fought the Nazis as partisans during World War II, exemplifies the case. Organized in Poland in 1945, the small organization
planned to poison the water supply o f four German cities to avenge the Holocaust. Technical problems foiled their plan, but a small
contingent still succeeded in poisoning the food of more than 2,000 former SS storm troopers held in prison near Nuremberg.
Small terrorist cells or socially deranged groups whose alienated members despise society, lack realistic political goals, and may
miscalculate the consequences of developing and using chemical or biological agents. Although such groups, or even individual
"loners," cannot be totally dismissed, it is doubtful that they will possess the technical capabilities to produce mass destruction.
Groups such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad, which so many Americans love to revile--and fear--do not make the list of
potential superterrorists. These organizations and their state sponsors may loathe the Great Satan, but they also wish to survive
and prosper politically. Their leaders, most of whom are smarter than the Western media implies, understand that a Hiroshima-like
disaster would effectively mean the end of their movements.
Only two groups have come close to producing a superterrorism catastrophe: Aum Shinrikyo and the white supremacist and
millenarian American Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, whose chemical-weapons stockpile was seized by the FBI in
1985 as they prepared to hasten the coming of the Messiah by poisoning the water supplies of several U.S. cities. Only Aum
Shinrikyo fully developed both the capabilities and the intent to take tens of thousands of lives. However, this case is significant not
only because the group epitomizes the kind of organizations that may resort to superterrorism in the future, but also because Aum's
fate illustrates how groups of this nature can be identified and their efforts preempted.
Although it comes as no comfort to the 12 people who died in Aum Shinrikyo's attack, the cult's act of notoriety represents first and
foremost a colossal Japanese security blunder. Until Japanese police arrested its leaders in May 1995, Aum Shinrikyo had neither
gone underground nor concealed its intentions. Cult leader Shoko Asahara had written since the mid-1980s of an impending cosmic
cataclysm. By 1995, when Russian authorities curtailed the cult's activities in that country, Aum Shinrikyo had established a
significant presence in the former Soviet Union, accessed the vibrant Russian black market to obtain various materials, and
procured the formulae for chemical agents. In Japan, Asahara methodically recruited chemical engineers, physicists, and biologists
who conducted extensive chemical and biological experiments in their lab and on the Japanese public. Between 1990 and 1994, the
cult tried six times--unsuccessfully--to execute biological-weapons attacks, first with botulism and then with anthrax. In June 1994,
still a year before the subway gas attack that brought them world recognition, two sect members released sarin gas near the judicial
building in the city of Matsumoto, killing seven people and injuring 150, including three judges.
In the years preceding the Tokyo attack, at least one major news source provided indications of Aum Shinrikyo's proclivity toward
violence. In October 1989, the Sunday Mainichi magazine began a seven-part series on the cult that showed it regularly practiced a
severe form of coercion on members and recruits. Following the November 1989 disappearance of a lawyer, along with his family,
who was pursuing criminal action against the cult on behalf of former members, the magazine published a follow-up article. Because
of Japan's hypersensitivity to religious freedom, lack of chemical- and biological-terrorism precedents, and low-quality domestic
intelligence, the authorities failed to prevent the Tokyo attack despite these ample warning signs.
ANATOMY OF AN OBSESSION
lf a close examination reveals that the chances of a successful superterrorist attack are minimal, why are so many people so
worried? There are three major explanations:
Sloppy Thinking
Most people fail to distinguish among the four different types of terrorism: mass-casualty terrorism, state-sponsored chemical- or
biological-weapons (CBW) terrorism, small-scale chemical or biological terrorist attacks, and superterrorism. Pan Am 103,
Oklahoma City, and the World Trade Center are all examples of conventional terrorism designed to kill a large number of civilians.
The threat that a "rogue state," a country hostile to the West, will provide terrorist groups with the funds and expertise to launch a
chemical or biological attack falls into another category: state-sponsored CBW terrorism. The use of chemical or biological weapons
for a small-scale terrorist attack is a third distinct category. Superterrorism--the strategic use of chemical or biological agents to
bring about a major disaster with death tolls ranging in the tens or hundreds of thousands--must be distinguished from all of these
as a separate threat.
Today's prophets of doom blur the lines between these four distinct categories of terrorism. The world, according to their logic, is
increasingly saturated with weapons of mass destruction and with terrorists seeking to use them, a volatile combination that will
inevitably let the superterrorism genie out of the bottle. Never mind that the only place where these different types of terrorism are
lumped together is on television talk shows and in sensationalist headlines.
In truth, the four types of terrorism are causally unrelated. Neither Saddam Hussein's hidden bombs nor Russia's massive
stockpiles of pathogens necessarily bring a superterrorist attack on the West any closer. Nor do the mass-casualty crimes of
Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City or the World Trade Center bombing. The issue is not CBW quantities or capabilities but rather
group mentality and psychological motivations. In the final analysis, only a rare, extremist mindset completely devoid of political and
moral considerations will consider launching such an attack.
Vested Interests
The threat of superterrorism is likely to make a few defense contractors very rich and a larger number of specialists moderately rich
as well as famous. Last year, Canadian-based Dycor Industrial Research Ltd. unveiled the CB Sentry, a commercially available
monitoring system designed to detect contaminants in the air, including poison gas. Dycor announced plans to market the system
for environmental and antiterrorist applications. As founder and president Hank Mottl explained in a press conference, "Dycor is
sitting on the threshold of a multi-billion dollar world market." In August, a New York Times story on the Clinton administration's
plans to stockpile vaccines around the country for civilian protection noted that two members of a scientific advisory panel that
endorsed the plan potentially stood to gain financially from its implementation. William Crowe, former chair of the joint chiefs of staff,
is also bullish on the counterterrorism market. He is on the board of an investment firm that recently purchased Michigan Biologic
Products Institute, the sole maker of an anthrax vaccine. The lab has already secured a Pentagon contract and expects buyers from
around the world to follow suit. As for the expected bonanza for terrorism specialists, consultant Larry Johnson remarked last year
to U.S. News & World Report, "It's the latest gravy train."
Within the U.S. government, National Security Council experts, newly created army and police intervention forces, an assortment of
energy and public-health units and officials, and a significant number of new Department of Defense agencies specializing in
unconventional terrorism will benefit from the counterterrorism obsession and megabudgets in the years ahead. According to a
September 1997 report by the General Accounting office, more than 40 federal agencies have been involved already in combating
terrorism. It may yet be premature to announce the rise of a new "military-scientific-industrial complex," but some promoters of the
superterrorism scare seem to present themselves as part of a coordinated effort to save civilization from the greatest threat of the
twenty-first century.
Morbid Fascination
Suspense writers, publishers, television networks, and sensationalist journalists have already cashed in on the superterrorism
craze. Clinton aides told the New York Times that the president was so alarmed by journalist Richard Preston's depiction of a
superterrorist attack in his novel The Cobra Event that he passed the book to intelligence analysts and House Speaker Newt
Gingrich for review. But even as media outlets spin the new frenzy out of personal and financial interests, they also respond to the
deep psychological needs of a huge audience. People love to be horrified. In the end, however, the tax-paying public is likely to be
the biggest loser of the present scare campaign. All terrorists--even those who would never consider a CBW attack--benefit from
such heightened attention and fear. |
