Global Intelligence Update
Red Alert
October 27, 1998
Russian Domestic Policy Affected by Doubts of Military Loyalty
As unrest continues to grow in the North Caucasus, Russia
announced last week that it will not increase its troop presence
in the region. Instead, Moscow will rely on local security
forces to maintain order in the troubled territory. This
announcement follows a report that Russian officials are pulling
out of Dagestan, a republic of the Russian Federation bordering
on Chechnya, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. After having lost in a war
with separatist forces in Chechnya, it appears that Moscow is on
the verge of surrendering neighboring Dagestan as well. It is
our conclusion that the decision to let Dagestan go is a result
of uncertainty in regards to the Russian Army. The uncertainty
is less a question of readiness than it is of whether, given
discontent over Moscow's failure to adequately fund or even feed
Russian troops, Russian Army soldiers will obey Moscow's orders.
Russian Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin announced on Friday
October 23 that Russia would not send more troops to the North
Caucasus to quell the developing unrest. Stepashin told the
Russian news agency ITAR-TASS, "We have sufficient forces in the
region." He insisted that order will be maintained through
cooperation with local security forces. To illustrate this
cooperation, Stepashin pointed to recent violence in Dagestan in
which two policemen were killed. "Our Dagestani colleagues
showed good professional skills: the whole gang was done away
with. I stress – it was done by local police and federal forces
were a support." However, Stepashin's reference to "Dagestani
colleagues" as something independent of the Russian Federation's
security apparatus, on top of an earlier report that Russia's
security forces are evacuating Dagestan, suggests that Moscow may
be ready to let the republic go.
Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on October 21 that "Russian power
structures are evacuating everything of value from the republic."
The paper noted that weapons and military hardware were being
removed from stockpiles in the Dagestan. The Federal Security
Service was also reportedly dismantling its intelligence and
security apparatus. In addition, hundreds of Russian families
were reportedly fleeing the area. This exodus, and the attempt
to conceal it, is a sign that Russia may have decided not to
fight for Dagestan as it did for Chechnya, an impression made
stronger by Komsomolskaya Pravda's reference to Moscow pursuing a
"non-Chechen" strategy for Dagestan.
That Moscow may have decided to let Dagestan collapse has
staggering ramifications. First and foremost is the issue of
sovereignty. Not only would the abandonment of Dagestan be a
tremendous blow to Russian pride, inevitably drawing a severe
backlash from nationalists, but it would be a potent signal to
other regions of the Russian Federation with aspirations of
independence. Additionally, with Dagestan possibly going the way
of Chechnya, Russia will lose more than half of its Caspian Sea
frontage. This will limit Russia's input in the ongoing
discussions of the division of the Caspian's resources.
Additionally, the loss of Dagestan would mean that Moscow would
lose control of Dagestan's oil fields and oil pipeline, and would
weigh against Russia's preferred proposed routes for the new
pipeline for Central Asian oil. Yet, even given these important
strategic considerations, it is our belief that this is more of a
tactical than a strategic decision.
In September General Alexander Lebed, governor of Siberia's
Krasnoyarsk region and former security chief to President Boris
Yeltsin, warned of brewing insurrection within the ranks of the
Russian Army. We believe that this is the main consideration for
pursuing a "non-Chechen" solution in the Caucasus region.
Russian Army troops are owed several months of back pay, which
they may never see. Numerous reports have surfaced recently
citing instances of soldiers selling military equipment in order
to money to live on. Last month Russian military sources
reported that the Army has already consumed 80 percent of its
food reserves, intended to be used in time of war. In the words
of General Lebed, "A hungry soldier is an angry soldier."
It is apparent that, at least for the moment, Moscow feels that
its control over the military is tenuous at best. Sending troops
to fight in what could be another Chechen debacle, a decidedly
unpopular campaign, would run the risk of furthering the growing
disgruntlement in the Russian Army. Even if Moscow is not
outright afraid of a military revolt, it is at the very least
concerned with the possibility of a crisis of command. Rather
than risk arousing renegade elements within the military, Moscow
has decided to avoid the issue for the time being.
The unrest in the Russian military is clearly a short-term
problem. Russia will solve its economic problems, albeit in a
Russian way. And anticipating its domestic recovery, Moscow has
already begun a concerted effort to re-establish its Cold War
influence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Once Moscow's
GOSPLAN veterans finally abandon pretenses of liberalization in
hopes of pretenses of Western aid, and set about feeding Russian
troops the old fashioned way, Russia's return to the North
Caucasus will be swift. In the meantime, no Western company will
seriously invest in long-term relations with an "independent
Dagestan." Dagestan cannot guarantee stability in the region,
making any long-term investment risky to the point of being
ludicrous. Hence, Russian withdrawal from Dagestan, while
humiliating, is a tactical decision. Russia will recover the
region in time -- though what regime launches that recovery
remains uncertain.
The real significance of this decision is that Moscow apparently
has some serious doubts about the Army's loyalty. If the Army
has become such a wild-card that it can not be deployed, then
Moscow's first priority must be to fund it, by any means
necessary, lest through action or inaction the Army becomes an
agent of regime change. The Russian Army, despite its reported
impending starvation, will survive the winter. The question is,
will the Primakov government? |
