Greg,
<<From my perspective the Series C offering was so much more damaging than the Series B offering because of the "applicable pricing period." >>
Agreed. I think where most of us got fooled was when Ancor management described these 3 Reg D entities as "patient, long-term investors", insinuating that the rest of us were just panicky, short-term investors who didn't care about the company anyway. That's one reason why we didn't figure out what was going on until it was too late. Who would suspect these model investors of such shenanigans? I think the real patient, long-term investors are on this thread. (It still irks me, in case you hadn't noticed. <g>)
<<Calling in an airstrike (if we could) would only work if it could be sustained for many days or weeks.>>
That's true, but since we only had to protect the closing bid price, it might have been doable, especially if we had some help from the other Reg D guys who were long.
The reason many of us didn't step up big and buy ANCR at $1 was that we simply didn't know what was going on. Why had the price slipped so much, and how much further down could it go? This discussion has changed that, because we now have a pretty good handle on what happened, the dilutive effects, and how much selling there is likely to be in the future. Even though we don't know exactly when the end game will occur, we can look for signs of it happening or not happening.
I know some of the other people on the thread don't want us to even discuss this, but I'll use myself as an example of why this discussion is important. The dollar value of my ANCR holdings now are only a small fraction of what they were before the Sun debacle. Why? Because I simply don't have the risk tolerance that I used to have, and I'm pretty sure I'm not the only one. Lower risk tolerance is a direct result of being blind-sided by the unexpected time after time.
This is the reason why the INRANGE revenue recognition over five years was disappointing to me. I was quite confident going into the conference call that we would see the INRANGE revenue recognized over the next three quarters. That would provide a stable revenue base to build on, and give other investors an idea of what these OEM contracts could be worth. It would also significantly reduce the quarterly losses. During the next three quarters, I fully expect an OEM contract to be announced, hopefully with revenues that would begin just when the INRANGE revenues ended. That sequence of events would make people really sit up and take notice.
I'm not arguing the fact that the INRANGE deal was necessary. It clearly was, and it provided much needed capital in the short term, but it does sound a lot like BullStroke's "Ancor Inside" deal, with revenues not arriving until 1999. I still think we need to see an OEM deal for Ancor's MKII-8 and MKII-16 to make believers out of the unbelievers. <g>
Craig |
