Primakov Tightens Grip on Strategic Enterprises and Media
Summary
Anticipating parliamentary and presidential election campaigns,
Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov is strengthening, at an
accelerating pace, the regime's control over the media and
strategic industries. Primakov headed Russia's intelligence
service from 1991-1996, and since he took office as Prime
Minister in September 1998, he has appointed former KGB
colleagues to key positions throughout the country. Former
Soviet spymasters have now been installed as head of the
government administration, the Presidential Chief of Staff, the
director of the Department for Special Programs, and the chief of
the Main Control Directorate. On January 25, the former public
relations boss of the Russian Federal Foreign Intelligence
Service (SVR), successor to the KGB's international directorate,
was appointed First Deputy Director of the Russian press agency
ITAR-TASS. To increase the state control over the strategic
enterprises, Primakov named a former KGB colleague as chief of
the state weapons company Rosvooruzheniye, and launched a major
restructuring of the Russian oil and gas industry that included
personnel changes in the administration of many major companies.
Primakov's appointment of loyal Soviet-era cadres to strategic
posts is not merely building a strong political faction that is
loyal primarily to him, but one that controls the commanding
heights of the communications and large-scale industries.
Analysis
Since becoming the Russian Prime Minister five months ago,
Yevgeny Primakov has assumed the vast majority of powers from the
ailing President Boris Yeltsin. During this time, Primakov has
systematically appointed "his" people to key positions in Russia
-- "his" people being former officers of the KGB and its
successor agencies. In September 1998, former SVR official Yury
Zubakov was appointed head of government administration. Later
last year, Primakov succeeded in installing Grigory Rapota, who
has no experience in weapons trade, as the new head of the arms
exports monopoly Rosvooruzheniye. Rapota, who had worked for the
KGB since 1966 as an agent in Western Europe and the U.S., was
named by Primakov in 1993 as the number three man of the Russian
intelligence service. Primakov had to face serious obstacles to
win the Rosvooruzheniye post for Rapota and was able to succeed
in this effort only due to his post as a chief of the state
military-cooperation committee.
A number of other former Soviet spymasters were recently named
into key positions. Former high KGB and border guard officer
Nikolai Bordyuzha was named as President's Chief of Staff in
December 1998. According to the Russian magazine Obshchaya
Gazeta, Bordyuzha, as well as Zubakov, and the head of the
president's secretariat Robert Makaryan, were appointed to their
posts late last year on advice from Primakov. Other posts
currently occupied by former KGB agents and bureaucrats include
head of the Department of Special Programs, held by former FSB
deputy chief Viktor Zorin, and head of the main Control
Directorate, held by Nikolai Patrushev, also former FSB official.
Former KGB agent in Germany, Vladimir Putin, is now acting as
first deputy chief of the president, responsible for the
administration's relations with Russian regions.
Most recently, Primakov was involved in promoting the SVR's
public relations department chief, Yury Kobaladze, into a high
position in the Russian media. Last week, Russian newspapers
reported that Kobaladze would soon be named director of the
state-owned management company VGTRK, which owns the RTR and
Kultura TV channels, Radio Russia, and a number of regional radio
and TV stations and transmission systems. Kobaladze confirmed he
was offered the position and announced that he was retiring from
the Foreign Intelligence Service on January 22. However, on
January 25, Kobaladze was not placed at the helm of VGTRK, but
rather was named First Deputy Director of Russia's leading news
agency ITAR-TASS. The move is further evidence of Primakov's
serious, possibly long-term political ambitions.
Following the abject failure of neoliberal economic reforms in
Russia, the state has been gradually increasing its control over
the industrial sector. The main contributor to the state budget
in Russia is the oil and gas sector, which had been partially
liberalized during the last couple of years. Foreign investors
have been allowed to make major investments in the sector, and a
number of joint ventures with foreign partners were established.
Foreigners mainly contributed financial investment and technical
know-how to the Russian oil and gas sector. However, it is
becoming clear that the Russian government is now moving away
from liberalization and towards renewed dominance over this
industry. The Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy has recently
designed a plan for founding a national oil company by merging
such oil companies as Rosneft, ONAKO, and Russia-Belorussian
Slavneft. Also, the government plans a major restructuring of
the gas giant Gazprom, including all-encompassing personnel
changes.
We have predicted and subsequently tracked Russia's increasing
assertiveness in its foreign policy and Russia's rebuilding of
its empire. As Moscow, with the old Soviet crew back in charge,
reverts to familiar foreign policy patterns, the same clearly
holds true in domestic policy. Primakov, backed by his
Gorbachev-era supporters and colleagues among the security
apparatus, is now asserting control over the institutions of
government, the media and the military and extractive industries.
Those Primakov has placed in charge are quickly and
systematically reasserting familiar patterns of heavy-handed
control over Russia's internal politics. After briefly flirting
with economic and political liberalization, the Russian polity is
quickly reverting to a familiar form.
___________________________________________________
To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates,
sign up on the web at stratfor.com,
or send your name, organization, position, mailing
address, phone number, and e-mail address to
alert@stratfor.com
___________________________________________________
STRATFOR, Inc.
504 Lavaca, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com
|
