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Strategies & Market Trends : Investment in Russia and Eastern Europe

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To: Z Analyzer who wrote (908)2/9/1999 10:42:00 PM
From: CIMA   of 1301
 
CIS Security Union Crumbles

Summary:

On February 9, Azerbaijan's top foreign policy presidential
advisor declared that his country will not renew its membership
in the Commonwealth of Independent States' Collective Security
Treaty. This significant announcement follows hard on the heels
of similar indications on the part of Uzbekistan and Georgia that
their defection from the collective security treaty -- which is
due to expire in May of this year -- is now possible. The timing
of these declarations is critical, coming as they do as Russia
has begun to reassert its power especially among the states of
the CIS. With fractures forming in the CIS, the questions arise:
How will Russia regain the upper hand among the former republics
of the Soviet Union and what will the U.S. response be?

Analysis:

Out of growing dissatisfaction with Russian policies toward the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Azerbaijan's top
foreign policy presidential advisor, Vafa Goulizade, announced on
February 9 that his country will not renew its membership in the
CIS's Collective Security Treaty. In 1992 nine members --
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- signed the treaty, which
constituted the basis for the military-political union among CIS
countries. However, three of the twelve CIS members -- Ukraine,
Moldova, and Turkmenistan -- never became parties to the security
alliance. Because the treaty will expire in May of this year,
the foreign ministers of signatory countries held a meeting on
February 4 in Moscow in order to discuss an extension of the
treaty. At the meeting, however, only six countries -- Russia,
Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan --
confirmed their intention to renew their participation in the CIS
security alliance. The concept of a Russian-dominated military-
political coalition of CIS countries appears to be crumbling, and
the CIS summit that has been planned for February 26 is unlikely
to result in a quick and easy reestablishment of the alliance.

Azerbaijan was not the first to signal its defection from the
collective security alliance. Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry
announced it will no longer participate in the CIS Collective
Security Treaty prior to the February 4 CIS summit. With regard
to its future relationships with the other CIS countries,
Uzbekistan expressed the pious hope that international law and
non-interference in internal affairs should guide their policies
toward one another. Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry made it clear
that the country's withdrawal from the CIS security treaty is in
protest against "Russian policy aimed at strengthening
integration ties with former Soviet republics and opposition to
Russia's military activity in some of the CIS countries." In
particular, Uzbekistan's relations with Moscow have been strained
during the past couple of years because both countries have been
competing to extend their influence in Tajikistan at the other's
expense. Russia is providing political and military support to
Tajikistan President Rahmonov and maintaining a military presence
in the country. In response, Uzbekistan has been secretly
backing anti-regime political forces in Tajikistan. By declaring
its decision not to extend its membership in the CIS security
alliance, Uzbekistan not only unveiled a regional power struggle
between Moscow and Tashkent, but also set an example for other
dissatisfied CIS members to break their politico-military ties
with Moscow.

Following Uzbekistan's move, Georgia's Lieutenant-General Valery
Chkheidze stated at a press conference in Tbilisi that his
country's "national border troops can guard state frontiers of
Georgia as reliably as Russian colleagues," thereby obliquely
threatening the expulsion of the Russian military force. At the
latest CIS summit, Georgia indicated it would remain in the CIS
security alliance and continue to tolerate Russian peacekeeping
troops on its territory provided certain conditions involving
separatist Abkhazia are fulfilled. Difficult negotiations
regarding this issue are expected during the next CIS summit in
late February.

The latest blow to Moscow's ambitions to keep at least part of
its former empire together in a politico-military union came, not
unexpectedly, from Azerbaijan. Always at odds with its regional
rival Armenia, Azerbaijan has for some time openly expressed its
dissatisfaction with the intensification of the military
relationship between Moscow and Yerevan. During his meeting with
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Drachevsky over the
weekend, Azerbaijan President Aliyev warned Russia that continued
Russian sales of weapons to Armenia will seriously damage
relations between his country and Moscow. To counter the Russia-
Armenia alignment, Azerbaijan has openly stated its interest in
closer military cooperation with NATO, in particular the U.S. and
Turkey. Baku has even recently expressed its interest in having
an American military base stationed on its territory. While
Azerbaijan also left open a door for Russia, it is unlikely that
Moscow will accommodate Baku. Goulizade noted, "If Russian does
not like our plans, it can prevent all this. For that, it is
necessary for all Russian bases to be withdrawn from Armenia and
Georgia, to stop supplying Armenia with arms and to assist the
liberation of occupied Azerbaijani territory." The continued
presence of Azerbaijan in the CIS security alliance can be
expected to become a subject of tangled negotiations during the
February 26 CIS summit.

The process of disintegration of the Moscow-dominated politico-
military alliance of CIS countries can no longer be denied. Ten
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet
republics are now behaving more like independent countries in the
sphere of foreign policy. When their strategic interests clash
with those pursued by Russia, submission to Moscow's pressure is
no longer the only option. However, this assertion of political
autonomy is occurring precisely when Moscow is embarking on a new
course, one that is aimed at reestablishing Russia's presence
internationally, starting with the CIS.

Some of our recent Global Intelligence Updates have analyzed the
steps Moscow has been taking in order to reclaim its former
empire, including putting economic pressure on the Baltics. Over
the short run, Russia can be expected to become increasingly bold
in pursuing its strategic goals with regard to the members of the
CIS. Should some CIS countries indicate a willingness to join
NATO or at very least to tie themselves more closely to the West
in response to Moscow's strategy of reintegration, the essential
question is what does the U.S. propose to do and how far is it
willing to commit its resources. The geographic extension of
NATO or less formal alliances is a tempting idea, with
Azerbaijan's oil riches and the strategically important
Uzbekistan beckoning. But the costs need to be carefully weighed
in the balance: the economic drain associated with such alliances
would be enormous; relations with Russia would sour even further;
and the location of these countries points to a tremendous over
extension in U.S. military commitments -- all of which will
restrict U.S. involvement in the grand geopolitical game that is
unfolding in the CIS.

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