Georgia's Pullout from CIS Security Alliance will Redefine
Regional Geopolitical Balance
Summary:
On February 22, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze announced
that his country will not extend its membership in the
Commonwealth of Independent States' Collective Security Treaty.
This announcement follows similar decisions by Uzbekistan and
Azerbaijan. Georgia will face severe obstacles in reaching its
goal of politico-military independence from Moscow. Tbilisi will
have to confront, first, the presence of Russian troops on its
territory, second, a threat of renewed conflict in Abkhazia where
Russian peacekeeping troops are said to be backing the separatist
forces, and third, the military power of Armenia, Moscow's
strategic ally in the region. Looking at the situation
realistically, Georgia must attempt to forge military
understandings with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and NATO. The questions
are how will Russia respond to these new circumstances, and to
what degree will Washington be dragged into this ongoing
redefinition of the geopolitical balance in the CIS.
Analysis:
On February 22, Georgia President Eduard Shevardnadze announced
that his country would withdraw from the Commonwealth of
Independent State's Collective Security Treaty. Shevardnadze told
a press conference in Georgia's capital Tbilisi that the CIS
security union controlled by Moscow was "ineffective" and that
the agreement "has shown that it does not work." Two other
parties to the treaty -- Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan -- have
previously decided not to extend their membership in the CIS
security alliance after the treaty expires in May of this year.
Although it is clear that Russia is losing its politico-military
control over an increasing number of former republics of the
Soviet Union, Moscow still has powerful levers it can use to
reassert its influence. In the case of Georgia, Tbilisi's
decision to withdraw from the CIS security agreement leaves
Russian military troops stationed on Georgian territory, and
Russian military acting as a peacekeeping force in the separatist
Abkhaz zone. Moreover, Russia has recently stepped up its
military backing of its strong regional ally -- Armenia. Russia
could, and very likely will, use all these levers to maintain its
grip on Georgia. We expect Georgia to respond by intensifying its
efforts to liberate itself from the local Russian military
garrison. Tbilisi will also have to forge closer alliances with
Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the U.S. This development will strain the
already tenuous geopolitical situation in Central Asia.
As we previously reported, only six out of nine current members
confirmed their intention to renew their membership in the
alliance at the February 5 meeting of the CIS security alliance
signatory countries. Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
expressed their skepticism over the Moscow-dominated CIS'
Collective Security Treaty and did not sign the preliminary
protocol extending it. Prior to the February 5 summit,
Uzbekistan announced that it was withdrawing from the CIS
military pact, and Azerbaijan made its decision official four
days later, on February 9. At the Moscow summit, Georgia left the
possibility of remaining a member open, but stated that certain
conditions would first have to be met. These conditions were not
publicized; however, Georgia implied that certain issues
involving the Russian presence in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict
zone would need to be resolved. On a separate occasion, Georgia
claimed that it could easily replace Russian peacekeeping forces
with its own armed forces along its border areas.
Following the Moscow meeting, Russia took steps to meet Georgia's
demands. During his visit to Tbilisi, Russian Deputy Defense
Minister Nikolay Mikhaylov agreed that Russia would hand over the
military facilities Georgia demanded, and that this list would
then be submitted to the Russian government. He also said that
the issue would be resolved to Georgia's advantage by the time of
the next scheduled meeting of Russia-Georgia commission. Tbilisi
has been demanding return of some military facilities based on
the Russian-Georgian treaty, which was signed a few years ago,
but has not been ratified by the Russian State Duma. In fact,
Russia's previous government, headed by Sergei Kirienko, was
widely criticized for handing over to Georgia ten military
facilities last year. Similarly, the Russian media, in particular
"Nezavisimaya Gazeta," strongly criticized Mikhaylov's latest
visit to Georgia for an "Insufficient use of economic, political
and other levers for pressure on Georgia and [for] failing to
defend Russian interests in the face of increasing U.S. influence
in the region." The newspaper apparently did not realize that, by
making certain concessions to Tbilisi, Moscow was desperately
trying to guarantee, by diplomatic means, Georgia's continuing
membership in the CIS security alliance.
Having decided to reject Moscow's overtures, Georgia stated its
decision on February 22 to follow Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan in
withdrawing from the CIS security pact. The decision seemed to
coincide with the flaring up of the latest conflict between
Georgia and Russia. On February 22, Shevardnadze said that, by
not extraditing former Soviet KGB agent and former security chief
Igor Giorgadze, who has been accused of organizing a 1995
assassination attempt against Shevardnadze, Russia is in
violation of the friendship treaty between the two countries.
Shevardnadze added that the issue has had a disturbing effect on
the relations between the two countries and that Georgia would
like to see other CIS troops replace the Russian ones currently
acting as peacekeepers in Abkhazia. Shevardnadze summarized his
country's position: "It would be the best option if a U.N.
official commanded those forces." Linkage of the assassination
dispute with Russian presence in Georgia is not a matter of cause
and effect. Rather, both stem from a deeper and carefully
considered strategic policy decision on Georgia's part.
Georgia's reluctance to remain under Moscow's military grip is
part of a broader and natural tendency among former Soviet
republics towards asserting autonomy, a process that commenced
with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This process of
liberation, however, is complicated by the fact that, although
many of these countries, like Georgia, are intensifying their
cooperation with NATO and NATO's regional allies, Russian troops
remain stationed on their territories. In the case of Georgia,
Moscow has a further advantage -- it has the ongoing
responsibility of militarily securing the peace in the separatist
region of Abkhazia. Georgia, however, believes that Russian
peacekeepers in Abkhazia are supporting the separatists. The fear
on the Georgian side, therefore, has been that Russia would play
the Abkhazia card against it if Georgia decided to cut its
military ties to Russia. This is not the only danger that Georgia
now faces. A look at the map of Transcaucasia reveals another
card that plays to Moscow's advantage. Russia is militarily
aligned with Georgia's neighbor Armenia. Should Moscow step up
its military backing for Yerevan, this country could readily pose
a military threat to both Georgia and Azerbaijan. Russian
influence aside, Armenia can be expected to react hostilely to
the prospect of being surrounded by allied Georgia, Azerbaijan,
and Turkey.
What are Georgia's options following its decision to withdraw
from Moscow's politico-military sphere of influence? In the
context of CIS affairs, Tbilisi has to build up its relations
with Azerbaijan and Ukraine. In fact, these three countries have
already agreed to establish a peacekeeping unit to protect the
transportation infrastructure that carries oil from the Caspian
region. At a minimum, if Georgia hopes to break free of Russia's
grasp, its military and political cooperation with other former-
CIS countries that reject Moscow's dominance will have to
continue.
Moreover, Georgia can be expected to step up its cooperation with
Turkey, its NATO neighbor, and in a broader perspective, with the
U.S. NATO is already helping Georgia to build its military and
navy. The key question is how far is the U.S. willing to be
dragged into the conflicts between Moscow and its former vassals
in the Caucasus. The economic and political costs at stake are
enormous, and Washington has to consider carefully all aspects of
greater involvement. On the other hand, now is the moment when
geopolitical borders are being redrawn in the CIS and its
neighborhood. And there is no doubt that the U.S. has a historic
chance to adjust -- according to the dictates of its national
interest -- the new balance of power in the region.
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