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Politics : Bill Clinton Scandal - SANITY CHECK

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To: cody andre who wrote (38075)3/12/1999 9:33:00 AM
From: Les H  Read Replies (3) of 67261
 
U.S. Iraq Strategy Apparently Working, Despite Incoherent Policy
stratfor.com
March 11, 1999

SUMMARY

Shiite forces in southern Iraq have reportedly begun substantial attacks,
following the reported killing of a top Iraqi commander and the creeping
U.S. bombing campaign. The potential outcome remains debatable.

ANALYSIS

Iraqi Shiite opposition forces have reportedly launched a major military
operation in the southeastern Iraqi provinces of Maysan and Basrah,
according to a statement issued March 10 by the Iran- based Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI claimed that the
operation, launched in retaliation for the February 19 assassination of Iraqi
Shiite cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, has resulted in heavy
losses among Iraqi troops. The Shiite forces reportedly pummeled a tank
battalion between Talha and Uzair with rockets and mortar fire, and
destroyed an additional eight tanks along a road from Hamayon to
Suwayb.

The reported offensive, for which there has been no independent
confirmation, comes only a day after the also unconfirmed report of the
assassination of Saddam Hussein's commander for southern Iraq. The
Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan on March 8 cited Iraqi opposition
Al-Intifadah Television, broadcasting from the Iranian border, as reporting
that Iraqi Southern Region commander General Ali Hasan al-Majid had
been killed by his aides in the southern city of Nasiriyah. Al-Watan added
that the same story was being reported by SCIRI leader Mohammad
Baqir al-Hakim's Voice of Rebellious Iraq radio, as well as by Iraqis in the
south. Al- Majid was reportedly traveling to Qurnah District, near the
Shatt al-Arab in northern Basrah province, when he was attacked.
According to sources at Al-Hayat, SCIRI's London office has
categorically denied that Baqir al-Hakim had made such a claim, and
Stratfor has been unable to otherwise confirm the death of al-Majid.

If, in fact, al-Majid has been either executed or assassinated, it would be a
highly significant development. Al-Majid, known as "Ali Chemical" for his
use of chemical warfare agents against the Kurds, was Saddam Hussein's
cousin and one of his closest and most trusted commanders. Al-Majid was
made governor of Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation. He was placed in
charge of southern Iraq last December 16, during the reorganization of
Iraq's armed forces that took place immediately preceding Operation
Desert Fox and which, we believe, was in reaction to a foiled coup
plot[http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/030299.asp ].

In fact, Al-Majid reportedly personally ordered the executions of General
Ali Maaruf al-Saidi and Lieutenant Colonel Sabah Dhiyab al-Khalidi, from
the Iraqi 3rd Corps, during Desert Fox. The 3rd Corps appears to have
been central to the failed coup plot. Al- Majid also commanded the
reportedly brutal suppression of Shiite uprisings that swept southern Iraq in
the days following the murder of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr and
his two sons in Najaf. The crackdown reportedly resulted in the deaths of
25 to 300 Shiites, depending on the source, as well as the execution of
eight Iraqi officers.

Interestingly, Al-Majid's aide and deputy commander for the Southern
Region, Lieutenant General Kamel Sachet al-Janabi, was reportedly
among those killed for involvement in yet another failed coup plot. The plot
was allegedly foiled in late January, when two Iraqi generals reported to
Saddam Hussein that they had been contacted by exiled officers. The Iraqi
generals were to have built support among divisional commanders and to
have moved to take control of key installations under cover of a future
confrontation with the U.S. and Britain. Multiple Iraqi opposition sources
reported on February 25 and 26 that Sachet, eight of his aides, and
Lieutenant General Namiq Hassan, commander of the Iraqi 3rd Corps,
were arrested on January 26 and executed shortly thereafter on charges of
treason.

SCIRI reported on March 9 that a total of 24 officers, including Sachet,
Hassan, and former Baghdad air defense commander Major General
Ghadaban Abed al-Ghriri, whose clan controls the highway south of
Baghdad, were executed on February 8 for involvement in the coup plot.
Sachet's reported execution does raise the question of whether al-Majid, if
killed, was assassinated by his anti-Saddam aides, or was executed by his
pro-Saddam aides for his own involvement in the coup plot. Either
possibility suggests serious security breaches in Saddam's inner circle.

Events in southern Iraq point to the inadvertent success of U.S. military
strategy in Iraq, despite the apparent chaos paralyzing U.S. policy toward
the country. U.S. policy makers, while agreeing on the need to remove
Saddam from power, apparently remain divided over how exactly to effect
his overthrow, with whose assistance, and with what outcome. Top U.S.
commander in the Persian Gulf, Marine General Anthony Zinni, last month
told a Senate committee, "I don't see an opposition group that has the
viability to overthrow Saddam at this point." Despite generating a list of
eligible recipient opposition groups, the Clinton administration has yet to
distribute any of the $97 million approved by Congress last year for use in
funding the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. This has drawn the ire of
Congressional hawks who argue that the Clinton administration is moving
too slowly in Iraq.

American policy is not only stalled by lack of a suitable contender for
power in Iraq, particularly among the preferred Sunni minority, but also
because the most viable groups, Shiites and Kurds, have post-Saddam
goals not altogether palatable to Iraq's neighbors. As we reported in the
March 2 Global Intelligence Update, newly appointed U.S. coordinator for
transition in Iraq, Frank Ricciardone, effectively ruled out cooperating with
Iraq's Shiites and Kurds for the overthrow of Saddam, instead proposing a
coup by Sunni military officers
[http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/030299.asp]. Ricciardone explicitly
ruled out a division of Iraq into a northern "Kurdistan," southern Shiite
entity, and Sunni central Iraqi rump state.

Turkey opposes a Kurdish state that could stir up unrest among eastern
Turkey's Kurdish population. Persian Gulf states are concerned about a
Shiite state in southern Iraq that would effectively be an extension of Iran.
Yet according to the Bahrain newspaper Akhbar al-Khaleej, which cited
"well informed diplomatic sources" in Doha, U.S. Defense Secretary
William Cohen was attempting to drum up support for an Iraqi partition
plan during his recent tour of Gulf states. Under the alleged plan, ongoing
air strikes would intensify and cut off northern and southern Iraq from
Baghdad's control. Iraqi opposition forces, protected by U.S. air cover,
would then enter the "liberated" territories, their governments would be
recognized, an they would begin launching attacks on Baghdad. The
Akhbar al-Khaleej argued such a plan is already being implemented. "The
aim is both to gradually destroy Iraq's defensive capabilities and try to
establish the principle that such attacks are a routine matter, thus getting
public opinion accustomed to them ahead of stage two," the paper
claimed.

While U.S. policy is clearly divided within the administration, Congress,
and the military, evidence suggests that U.S. miliatary strategy of gradually
eroding Iraq's defense capability and tightening a noose around Baghdad
through continuous air strikes is proceeding effectively. U.S. aircraft have
struck more targets since Operation Desert Fox than were hit during the
December operation itself. The attacks have reportedly destroyed more
than 20 percent of Iraq's air defense capability. But though specifically
aimed at Iraq's air defense system, targets have extended to coastal
defense missile batteries, communication facilities, and command and
control bunkers.

The U.S. has all but acknowledged that the air strikes, officially acts of self
defense for aircraft patrolling the "no fly" zones, are more of a creeping war
of attrition. One senior State Department official described the strikes to
the Washington Post as a "mini undeclared war." U.S. Undersecretary of
Defense Walter Slocombe was cited by the International Herald Tribune
as saying, "What we are working to do is to help create the political and
military conditions that will permit a successful change of the regime." The
International Herald tribune also cited a senior administration official as
saying, "We think we see Mr. Saddam flailing. We are working toward a
slow whittling- down of his power, his authority, and his nerves. There are
reports of military guys perhaps not following orders."

The "mini undeclared war" last month may have just missed a major
victory. According to "travelers from Baghdad" in Jordan, cited by the
Egyptian news agency MENA, the February 24 air strike in the suburbs of
Baghdad was, in fact, targeted at Saddam Hussein. The "command
bunker" that was struck in the attack was reportedly the Radwaniyah
Palaces, near Baghdad International Airport, and the attack allegedly
occurred minutes after Saddam left the area. According to the unidentified
travelers, the U.S. had information that Saddam was inspecting the facility.
As with much news out of Iraq, this report too is unconfirmed.

While the air campaign may have missed the big one, it still appears to be
succeeding. However, in the absence of coherent or at least realistic U.S.
policy, it is not succeeding exactly according to plan. Repeated attempts to
foster a military coup have been thwarted by Saddam. But the Shiite
opposition seems ready to take full advantage of the destabilizing effect of
the U.S. air strikes. SCIRI claims to have moved some 20,000 fighters
into southern Iraq from Iran in mid-February, and is now claiming to have
launched an offensive against Iraqi forces in southeast Iraq. If they have
also managed to decapitate the Southern Region command, they may see
some success. However, the Shiites do not have what it takes to capture
Baghdad and control Iraq. Neither do the Kurds. So whether a U.S.
policy preference or not, the success of U.S. air war strategy combined
with the failure of the U.S. to coordinate the ground war against Saddam,
could inadvertently create a divided Iraq.
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