NATO Expansion and the Problem of a NATO Strategy
Summary:
NATO's expansion has raised the serious question of what the
military strategy of the NATO alliance is. The inclusion of
Poland and Hungary creates certain serious strategic problems
that must be dealt with if NATO is going to be a military
alliance as well as a moral project. There is a rare opportunity
and a clear danger defining the strategic moment.
Analysis:
This past week Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally
became part of NATO. This means that the mutual guarantees of
assistance in time of war, that have been the essence of NATO for
several generations, have now been extended to these three. If
any of them are attacked then it is the legal and moral
obligation of all NATO members to come to their assistance. This
dramatically increases both the responsibilities and
vulnerabilities of NATO. The expansion may also increase the
opportunities. These possibilities need to be carefully
considered.
NATO has become defined in two ways. First, it has been defined,
along with the European Union, as an alliance among democratic
states. To be a bit more precise, it has been identified as an
organization that motivates formerly non-democratic states to
become democratic. The assumption is that membership in NATO and
the EU is so attractive that the formerly socialist states, now
freed from Soviet control, would be motivated to reconstruct
their political, social and economic systems in order to be
permitted to joint. Thus, in the first round of admissions,
membership was given as a reward to three countries that had gone
the furthest in evolving into democratic polities with market
economies that do not discriminate against ethnic minorities.
The second role that NATO has defined for itself derives from the
first. If NATO is a club for democratic capitalist countries,
and if its purpose is to motivate countries to be democratic and
capitalist, then it follows that NATO should also punish
countries that are not democratic and capitalist. One punishment
is exclusion. Slovakia and Romania, for example, both wanted to
join NATO, but were rejected for membership for not living up to
NATO's standards. Since rejection, both have been trying to
reform their internal systems in order to be eligible in the next
round of expansion. There is another punishment. In extreme
cases where the anti-democratic, anti-free market behavior of
states goes beyond certain limits, NATO is seen as an instrument
of rectification, imposing penalties on the transgressor,
including military penalties. Serbia has become the exemplar of
this treatment.
NATO has, in other words, transformed itself from a defensive
alliance against the Soviet Union, into a system of relations
designed to regulate the internal political, economic and social
relations of not only member countries, but also of non-members
on the periphery of the NATO alliance. Thus, in addition to
admitting new members based on their adherence to democratic
principles, and inducing others to adopt and adhere to those
principles, NATO has become an instrument for punishing those
nations which violate those principles in particularly egregious
ways. Thus, while Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were
being admitted last week, NATO aircraft were poised to attack
Serbia unless Serbia agreed to permit Kosovo internal autonomy.
NATO sees itself as being engaged in low-risk operations. The
question of Polish or Hungarian admission to NATO did not depend
on the perception of any strategic threat to Europe. Instead,
their admission depended on moral questions, such as the nature
of their political and economic life. Excluding a country did
not carry with it any particular risk. Including a country did
not carry with it any particular benefit, beyond expanding a
community of nations having shared values. Bombing Serbia was
not perceived as carrying with it any particular risk either.
Serbia was seen as isolated, weak and helpless.
What we are getting at is this: NATO has evolved into a moral
instrument from a strategic instrument. Its evolution into this
moral instrument depends on the accuracy of the core perception,
which is that NATO no longer faces a strategic challenge from any
quarter. If this is correct, then the moral project of
transforming all of Europe into democratic, tolerant, market
driven economies is a low-cost, low-risk operation, certainly
within the capability of NATO. But if this perception is false,
if there are still serious, potential risks to European security,
then treating NATO as a moral rather than a strategic project
carries with it enormous risks.
This issue revolves entirely on the Russian question: how can we
expect Russia to behave in the first decade of the 21st century?
Are there any circumstances under which Russia could once again
pose a threat to Europe? Russia certainly attempted to transform
itself into a democratic, tolerant, market driven society.
Russia tried quite hard to fit into what we have termed the
Western moral project. It is our perception that Russia has not
only failed in this transformation but more, that it knows it has
failed.
Now, there is a tendency to dismiss the ability of Russia to
assert itself internationally because of its economic problems.
No one should take comfort from this. First, Russia's military
has certainly suffered from economic neglect. However, this
policy is changing very quickly and the Russian military has
become the beneficiary of additional resources in recent months.
This is particularly true of core units that have always
represented the heart of Russian military power. Much of the
Russian military machine remains intact. The very depression
that tore Russia apart preserved the Russian military's cadre.
Since the civilian economy could not absorb them, much of the
officer corps is still intact. Russian research and development
have continued with some intensity and the Russians have
developed, if not fully deployed, some excellent and important
new weapons.
It should never be forgotten that Hitler took a completely
hollowed military force in 1933 and within five years turned it
into the awesome Wehrmacht. As important, the very process of
rebuilding German military strength revived the German economy.
Defense spending is a very efficient way to implement Keynesian
deficit financing to revive the civilian sector. What the
Germans had was an intact officer corps, a strong research and
development capability, an idle industrial plant, and a political
consensus that rearmament was essential. All but the last of
these is present in Russia, and we see that political consensus
rapidly developing.
It is interesting to note that among the new members joining NATO
as well as among those who are hoping to join, there is a very
different perception of why they are joining. The Poles, for
example, have seen the Russians come and the Russians go. The
one thing that they know without any doubt is that nothing is
permanent in this region. The retreat of the Russians is merely
the preface for their return. The Polish reason for joining NATO
was certainly a desire to be part of the Western moral project.
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary all certainly see
themselves as a part of that project. But the driving force for
membership had less to do with that than it had to do with the
strategic fear of a return of the Russians to their borders and
the inability of any of these countries, by themselves, to
protect themselves. Since each of them was invaded and occupied
by Soviet forces, the dread of a return is real and justified.
This is the real, underlying weakness in today's NATO. The older
NATO members have adopted a view of NATO that it is primarily a
low-risk moral project. The newer members of NATO see NATO has a
strategic guarantee of their independence in the face of the
inevitability of a resurgent Russian power. Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic view NATO membership as a military guarantee
of their territorial integrity. The rest of the NATO members do
not see any threat to their territory and have focused on using
NATO as a force for political reform in Europe.
One of the consequences of this is that Brussels has done almost
no serious and meaningful strategic planning for the defense of
the new region. Hungary, for example, is completely
geographically isolated from the rest of NATO. It is separated
from Poland by Slovakia, from the Czech Republic and Germany by
Austria, and from Italy by Slovenia. At the same time, it is
being used by NATO forces as a staging area into the former
Yugoslavian territories in support of military operations there.
Obviously, no one expects to have to rush forces to Hungary
either to defend its territory or to defend U.S. airbases there.
Alternatively the assumption is that in time of conflict,
Slovenia, Austria and Slovakia would all permit the passage of
reinforcements and material. Now this may be true, but the test
will come in the event of a crisis and in a crisis, the ability
of Russia to assert itself may condition any secret guarantees
that may be given.
The admission of Hungary is a strategic absurdity without the
admission Slovenia. But the deeper mystery revolves around the
defense of Poland. Poland has about a two hundred mile border
with Belarus, which is now federated with Russia. The southern
part of the border is marshland, not suited for military
operations. About half of the border is flat, superb tank
country. That border can be defended. The problem is that
Poland also faces an extensive direct frontier with the Russian
enclave around Kaliningrad (the old German city of Koenigsberg).
That enclave is separated from Belarus by Lithuania. Now, if
Russian forces take Lithuania, then the northeastern frontier of
Poland becomes almost indefensible. NATO defenders will have to
abandon the eastern part of the country and retreat to the
Vistula River line. This not only means giving up a third of the
country, it also makes Warsaw the front line. This is compounded
by the fact that just as Slovenia hasn't been admitted to NATO,
Slovakia hasn't been admitted. Slovenia is secure, well behind
the lines of any future confrontation with Russia, and without
having to ante up for the common defense. If Slovakia were to
ally itself with Russia, and this is not an unpopular view in
parts of Slovakia, the entire southern frontier of Poland would
be exposed as well as Hungary's northern frontier.
The point we are making here is that using a military alliance
for a moral project becomes very dangerous if a strategic threat
reemerges. Since we see the reemergence of a strategic threat
from Russia, we are arguing that the current shape of NATO since
its expansion is militarily insupportable. It might have been
better not to expand NATO, but having expanded, NATO's eastern
frontiers are no longer defensible. It has become absolutely
indispensable that Slovakia and Slovenia be admitted to NATO if
NATO is to be able to defend its frontiers. Now, this poses a
challenge to NATO's vision of a moral project. NATO has been
cautious about Slovakia because of certain anti-democratic
tendencies of its former Prime Minister. Whatever the moral
character of the regime, its location in the Carpathian Mountains
makes its inclusion essential.
There are more serious long-term issues. The situation on the
northern frontier of Poland is unsupportable. Since the
Kaliningrad enclave cannot be liquidated, we assume, it must be
isolated. Lithuania must be included in NATO. Indeed, if that
flank is to be protected fully, the rest of the Baltic States
must be included, shortening NATO lines substantially and
anchoring the left flank on the Gulf of Finland. In the south,
Romania must be included in order to anchor the southern
frontiers of NATO in the Carpathians, defending the Hungarian
plane. Finally, and most importantly, a decision must be made on
Ukraine. Ukraine in NATO hands creates a magnificent pincer on
Belarus along with the Baltics.
The Russians won't like this. If our assumption is correct and
Western relations with Russia have already been ruptured beyond
hope, then now is the time to act, before Russia fully revives
and can preempt such moves. If the West does not act now, it
will regret its dilatory behavior for generations. However, if
our assumption is incorrect, and Western-Russian relations can
remain at this level indefinitely or improve, than the West will
have created an unnecessary and dangerous crisis. Turn the matter
around. If the Russian view of the West has become as negative
as it appears from what they say, then Russia will assume the
worst of the West and act preemptively. In that case, it is a
race over who will act first in the Baltics, Ukraine, and
Slovakia.
These are the deep and pressing strategic issues facing NATO.
The fate of Kosovo may be morally pressing, but it is not
strategically significant. It is not that moral issues are
frivolous, but they always carry with them a price. That price
can sometimes be paid, sometimes not. The price for Kosovo is
not a military price. As a military operation it is of little
cost or consequence. Rather it is an intellectual challenge. Do
the NATO planners who are currently studying strikes on Serbian
towns also have the ability to ask broad geopolitical and
strategic questions about NATO's expansion? Put differently,
while NATO goads the Russians, particularly in Serbia and more
generally with NATO expansion, it may compel the Russians to
begin acting strategically again. That development will compel
NATO to respond to, rather than control, events. We believe that
to be what is happening.
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