SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Strategies & Market Trends : Investment in Russia and Eastern Europe

 Public ReplyPrvt ReplyMark as Last ReadFilePrevious 10Next 10PreviousNext  
To: Rob Shilling who wrote (952)3/30/1999 6:58:00 PM
From: CIMA   of 1301
 
Russian Arms Shipment Signals Deteriorating Relations with West

Summary:

A shipment of Russian jet fighters, intercepted in Azerbaijan,
may have been intended to send a final message to NATO regarding
Russia's views on the Kosovo crisis. NATO air strikes against
Yugoslavia, appearing more likely with each passing moment, will
mark a fundamental turning point in relations with Russia.

Analysis:

Events surrounding the Kosovo crisis are overtaking us, even as
this report takes shape. U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke's
11th hour mission to Belgrade failed to convince Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic to accept the Kosovo peace
agreement. Belgrade has declared a state of emergency, citing an
"imminent threat of war." NATO Secretary General Javier Solana
announced he has ordered air strikes. And Russian Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov canceled a visit to the U.S. en route, with his
aircraft reversing course over the mid-Atlantic, after receiving
a briefing on NATO intentions by U.S. Vice President Al Gore.
Earlier in the day, before boarding his abortive flight, Primakov
reiterated Russia's firm opposition to air strikes, a position
that increasingly appears likely to be ignored.

Russia has been consistent in its opposition to the use of
military force against Yugoslavia, particularly by NATO, since
the crisis emerged. Primakov argued on March 23 that such an
attack would fundamentally change "the nature of international
order," as Yugoslavia was not an aggressor against foreign
countries. "Maybe someone would like to make an air strike
against Turkey because the Kurdish problem hasn't been solved
yet," he mused, "Or maybe against Spain because the Basque
problem has not been solved." Primakov insisted that all
diplomatic options had not been exhausted, while Russian Foreign
Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin repeated the argument that,
"One cannot use force in international relations without the
agreement of the UN Security Council."

The Kosovo crisis strikes a deep chord in Moscow, and has been
the exceptional case uniting Russia's contentious political
factions [http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/101598.asp].
Moscow not only opposes the use of force against its traditional
Slavic ally, but also sees NATO action as a dangerous precedent,
furthering the encirclement of and threat to Russia itself.
Already incensed at the geographic expansion of NATO, Russia is
fiercely opposed to the expansion of NATO's mission. In October
1998, the last time NATO aircraft prepared to carry out strikes
against Yugoslavia, Russian Defense Ministry main directorate for
international military cooperation chief Leonid Ivashov warned
that, "The operation which is being prepared against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is a provocation by the alliance's
military forces against Russia, too. Yes, this will only create
a precedent. Other countries in Europe, the CIS and Russia
included, could find themselves the next targets of NATO action."

During last October's escalation, as Russian concerns appeared to
be having no effect on NATO decision-making, word leaked out that
Russia had supplied surface-to-air missile components and
possibly entire state of the art SAM systems to Yugoslavia, in
violation of an arms embargo. Moscow denied the rumors, though
it threatened that Russia would sever relations with NATO and
contemplate arming Belgrade if air attacks were carried out.
Allegations of Russian and Belarusian military assistance to
Belgrade have persisted, as have the threats. On March 23,
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said in an interview on
Russian television that NATO military action would jeopardize the
arms embargo against Yugoslavia. The Russian Duma's references
to arming the Serbs have been phrased as threatening certainties.

Also on March 23, Vafa Goulizade, senior foreign policy advisor
to Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, announced that a Russian
cargo plane carrying six MiG fighters and 30 pilots and
technicians had been detained at Baku's Bina airport on March 18.
According to Goulizade, the Antonov An-124's crew had admitted
that the plane was bound for Yugoslavia. According to
Azerbaijani authorities, the crew later repeatedly changed their
story, claiming to be bound alternatively for North Korea or the
Czech Republic. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir
Rakhmanin denied that the MiGs were destined for Yugoslavia,
claiming instead that the cargo aircraft belonged to the private
Russian company Polyot, and was transporting Kazakh aircraft to
Slovakia. Slovak Defense Ministry spokesmen, in turn, denied
knowledge of any expected MiG shipments.

The Antonov incident is odd on several counts. First, it has
more to do with Russia's deteriorating relations with Azerbaijan
than with Russian aid to Yugoslavia. A quick look at a map will
show that Baku is not on the flight path from Russia to Belgrade,
Pyongyang, Bratislava, or Prague. Moreover, even if the Antonov
was taking a circuitous route to one of these destinations,
Azerbaijan was not a wise choice for overflight. Baku is at odds
with Moscow over Russia's support for Armenia, and recently
appealed to NATO to establish a base on Azerbaijani territory.

While the Antonov was detained on March 18, Baku withheld the
announcement until it could have maximum effect. Not only does
the announcement coincide with NATO and Russia's end game over
Yugoslavia, but it was also made the day Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Leonid Drachevsky was due to arrive in Baku to discuss
Azerbaijan's complaints about Russian arms deliveries to Armenia.
Azerbaijan's timing was marvelous. The Antonov's route over Baku
is still in question. It is possible that Russia intended the
aircraft to be intercepted, to once again raise the specter of a
resumption of Russian aid to Yugoslavia. If that was the case,
Baku's decision to withhold announcement must have been
particularly galling to Moscow. Alternatively, if Russia
intended the aircraft to reach its destination, just what was
that destination? Two candidates leap immediately to mind, Iran
and Iraq. Iraq seems the most likely candidate, as detailed
allegations surfaced last month in the British press that Russia
was violating the arms embargo against Iraq.

Whichever proves to be the real story, the implications are the
same. It is important not to underestimate Moscow's resentment
of the way in which Russia has been marginalized in international
affairs. And deeper still is Russia's opposition to what it sees
as the tightening noose being drawn around it by the U.S. and
NATO. As we have argued previously, air strikes against
Yugoslavia have little chance of forcing Belgrade to surrender
its fundamental national interests. What they will certainly
succeed in doing, however, is to mark the beginning of a new
pattern of relations between Russia and the West -- relations
rooted in mistrust and animosity.

___________________________________________________

To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates,
sign up on the web at:
stratfor.com
or send your name, organization, position, mailing
address, phone number, and e-mail address to
alert@stratfor.com
___________________________________________________

STRATFOR, Inc.
504 Lavaca, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com

Report TOU ViolationShare This Post
 Public ReplyPrvt ReplyMark as Last ReadFilePrevious 10Next 10PreviousNext