George,
My first post on this thread presented some arguments why NATO should intervene in Kosovo. I still believe that it needed to be done, but I fear the psychological planning of the intervention was grossly blundered.
IMO, NATO should have begun a campaign restricted to Serbian targets in Kosovo, the forces actually committing the atrocities. It should have been as heavy a campaign as possible within those limits. This type of activity would have
* punished those actually committing the crimes;
* allowed NATO to retain the negotiating threat of a similar, larger, expanded campaign against, and in, Serbia itself;
* represented a psychological hurdle for Serbian troops assigned to Kosovo;
* lessened the number of civilian casualties;
* not been so certain to needlessly alienate large portions of the Serbian citizenry;
* made it more difficult for Milosevic to play the patriotism card;
* not made NATO guilty of strikes against civilian and non-partisan populations;
* thus, been morally more defensible. (If there's any moral grounds for a war)
Kinda late for that now.... ;^{
jbn3
|
