" What does Serbian culture have to do with American culture?"
According to the Supreme Court, America is a Christian nation.
Serbia is also a Christian nation. Serbia, and Kosovo in particular,
contains some of the oldest Monasteries and Christian literature and art in the world. Monks from Mt. Athos and St. Catherine in Sinai carried many of the early manuscripts and deposited them in the hundreds of monasteries that were established in the remote mountains of Kosovo.
The common Christian heritage of the US and Serbia binds the people of the two nations in art, music, literature and most importantly in their worship and spirituality. It is impossible to understand Western art, music, literature, religion and spirituality without referring back to our ancient roots in the Orthodox Christian Faith. The New Testament was originally written in Greek. The Orthodox Church continues to preserve the Greek text without a need to translate to other languages. All translations of the Old and New Testaments refer back to the old Greek manuscripts preserved in some of the monasteries in Kosovo. The Christian bond between Serbia and the majority of the American people is more significant than any other bond.
Here is the text of the Supreme Court decision declaring America a Christian nation:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
HOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. U.S.
143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226
Feb. 29, 1892
"These and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation."
(complete text)
OPINION
Mr. Justice BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff in error is a corporation duly organized and incorporated as a religious society under the laws
of the state of New York. E. Walpole Warren was, prior to September, [143 U.S. 457, 458] 1887, an
alien residing in England. In that month the plaintiff in error made a contract with him, by which he
was to remove to the city of New York, and enter into its service as rector and pastor; and, in
pursuance of such contract, Warren did so remove and enter upon such service. It is claimed by the
United States that this contract on the part of the plaintiff in error was forbidden by chapter 164, 23
St. p. 332; and an action was commenced to recover the penalty prescribed by that act. The circuit
court held that the contract was within the prohibition of the statute, and rendered judgment
accordingly, (36 Fed. Rep. 303,) and the single question presented for our determination is whether
it erred in that conclusion.
The first section describes the act forbidden, and is in these words:
'Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America, in
congress assembled, that from and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any person,
company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in
any way assist or encourage the importation or migration, of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or
foreigners, into the United States, its territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or
agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made previous to the inportation or migration of such
alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its
territories, or the District of Columbia.'
It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the letter of this section, for the relation
of rector to his church is one of service, and implies labor on the one side with compensation on the
other. Not only are the general words 'labor' and 'service' both used, but also, as it [*512] were to
guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of meaning, to them is added 'of
any kind;' and, further, as noticed by the circuit judge in his opinion, the fifth section, which makes
specific exceptions, among them professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic [143 U.S.
457, 459] servants, strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor and service was intended to be
reached by the first section. While there is great force to this reasoning, we cannot think congress
intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the present case. It is a familiar rule that
a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit
nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the Reports are full of cases
illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator;
for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act
in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words,
makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act. As said in
Stradling v. Morgan, Plow. 205: 'From which cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore
have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes which
comprehend all things in the letter they have expounded to extend to but some things, and those
which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act they have interpreted to permit some
people to do it, and those which include every person in the letter they have adjudged to reach to
some persons only, which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the legislature,
which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the act,
sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances.'
In Pier Co. v. Hannam, 3 Barn. & Ald. 266, ABBOTT, C. J., quotes from Lord Coke as follows:
'Acts of parliament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent or free from injury or wrong be,
by a literal construction, punished or endangered.' In the case of State v. Clark, 29 N. J. Law, 96,
99, it appeared that an act had been passed, making it a misdemeanor to willfully break down a
fence in the possession of another person. Clark was indicted [143 U.S. 457, 460] under that statute. The
defense was that the act of breaking down the fence, though willful, was in the exercise of a legal right
to go upon his own lands. The trial court rejected the testimony offered to sustain the defense, and
the supreme court held that this ruling was error. In its opinion the court used this language: 'The act
of 1855, in terms, makes the willful opening, breaking down, or injuring of any fences belonging to or
in the possession of any other person a misdemeanor. In what sense is the term 'willful' used? In
common parlance, 'willful' is used in the sense of 'intentional,' as distinguished from 'accidental' or
'involuntary.' Whatever one does intentionally, he does willfully. Is it used in that sense in this act? Did
the legislature intend to make the intentional opening of a fence for the purpose of going upon the land
of another indictable, if done by permission or for a lawful purpose? * * * We cannot suppose such
to have been the actual intent. To adopt such a construction would put a stop to the ordinary
business of life. The language of the act, if construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd result. If a
literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the
absurdity. The court must restrain the words. The object designed to be reached by the act must limit
and control the literal import of the terms and phrases employed.' In U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482,
486, the defendants were indicted for the violation of an act of congress providing 'that if any person
shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier, or
of any horse or carriage carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction, for every such offense, pay a
fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.' The specific charge was that the defendants knowingly and
willfully retarded the passage of one Farris, a carrier of the mail, while engaged in the performance of
his duty, and also in like manner retarded the steam-boat Gen. Buell, at that time engaged in carrying
the mail. To this indictment the defendants pleaded specially that Farris had been indicted for murder
by a court of competent authority in Kentucky; that a bench-warrant had been issued and [143 U.S.
457, 461] placed in the hands of the defendant Kirby, the sheriff of the county, commanding him to
arrest Farris, and bring him before the court to answer to the indictment; and that, in obedience to
this warrant, he and the other defendants, as his posse, entered upon the steamboat Gen. Buell and
arrested Farris, and used only such force as was necessary to accomplish that arrest. The question as
to the sufficiency of this plea was certified to this court, and it was held that the arrest of Farris upon
the warrant from the state court was not an obstruction of the mail, or the retarding of the passage of
a carrier of the mail, within the meaning of the act. In its opinion the court says: 'All laws should
receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead
to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the
legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason
of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. The common sense of man approves the
judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted 'that whoever drew blood
in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' did not extend to the surgeon who opened
the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit. The same [*513] common sense accepts the
ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1 Edw. II., which enacts that a prisoner who breaks
prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on
fire, 'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.' And we think that a like
common sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of congress which punishes the
obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of
temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder.'
The following cases may also be cited: Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vt. 479; Ryegate v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt.
743; Ex parte Ellis, 11 Cal. 220; Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410; Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cow. 89;
People v. Insurance Co., 15 Johns. 358; Burch v. Newbury, 10 N. Y. 374; People v. [143 U.S. 457,
462] Commissioners, 95 N. Y. 554, 558; People v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43, 49, 1 N. E. Rep. 599;
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 152; Osgood v. Breed, 12
Mass. 525, 530; Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284; Oates v. Bank, 100 U. S. 239.
Among other things which may be considered in determining the intent of the legislature is the title of
the act. We do not mean that it may be used to add to or take from the body of the statute, (Hadden
v. Collector, 5 Wall. 107,) but it may help to interpret its meaning. In the case of U. S. v. Fisher, 2
Cranch, 358, 386, Chief Justice MARSHALL said: 'On the infiuence which the title ought to have in
construing the enacting clauses, much has been said, and yet it is not easy to discern the point of
difference between the opposing counsel in this respect. Neither party contends that the title of an act
can control plain words in the body of the statute; and neither denies that, taken with other parts, it
may assist in removing ambiguities. Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. Where the
mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be
derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of
consideration.' And in the case of U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631, the same judge applied the
doctrine in this way: 'The words of the section are in terms of unlimited extent. The words 'any
person or persons' are broad enough to comprehend every human being. But general words must not
only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the
legislature intended to apply them. Did the legislature intend to apply these words to the subjects of a
foreign power, who in a foreign ship may commit murder or robbery on the high seas? The title of an
act cannot control its words, but may furnish some aid in showing what was in the mind of the
legislature. The title of this act is, 'An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United
States.' It would seem that offenses against the United States, not offenses against the human race,
were the crimes which the legislature intended by this law to punish.'
[143 U.S. 457, 463] It will be seen that words as general as those used in the first section of this act were
by that decision limited, and the intent of congress with respect to the act was gathered partially, at
least, from its title. Now, the title of this act is, 'An act to prohibit the importation and migration of
foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories,
and the District of Columbia. Obviously the thought expressed in this reaches only to the work of the
manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional man. No one reading such a title would
suppose that congress had in its mind any purpose of staying the coming into this country of ministers
of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain. The common understanding of
the terms 'labor' and 'laborers' does not include preaching and preachers, and it is to be assumed that
words and phrases are used in their ordinary meaning. So whatever of light is thrown upon the statute
by the language of the title indicates an exclusion from its penal provisions of all contracts for the
employment of ministers, rectors, and pastors.
Again, another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy;
and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it
was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. U. S. v. Railroad Co., 91 U. S. 72, 79. The
situation which called for this statute was briefly but fully stated by Mr. Justice BROWN when, as
district judge, he decided the case of U. S. v. Craig, 28 Fed. Rep. 795, 798: 'The motives and
history of the act are matters of common knowledge. It had become the practice for large capitalists
in this country to contract with their agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant
and servile class of foreign laborers, under contracts by which the employer agreed, upon the one
hand, to prepay their passage, while, upon the other hand, the laborers agreed to work after their
arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages. The effect of this was to break down the labor
market, and to reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the level [143 U.S. 457, 464] of the
assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so flagrant that an appeal was made to congress for relief
by the passage of the act in question, the design of which was to raise the standard of foreign
immigrants, and to discountenance the migration of those who had not sufficient means in their own
hands, or those of their friends, to pay their passage.'
It appears, also, from the petitions, and in the testimony presented before the committees of
congress, that it was this cheap, unskilled labor which was making the trouble, and the influx of which
congress sought to prevent. It was never suggested that we had in this country a surplus of brain
toilers, and, least of all, that the market for the services of Christian ministers was depressed by
foreign competition. Those were matters to which the attention of congress, or of the people, was not
directed. So far, then, as the evil which [*514] was sought to be remedied interprets the statute, it also
guides to an exclusion of this contract from the penalties of the act.
A singular circumstance, throwing light upon the intent of congress, is found in this extract from the
report of the senate committee on education and labor, recommending the passage of the bill: 'The
general facts and considerations which induce the committee to recommend the passage of this bill
are set forth in the report of the committee of the house. The committee report the bill back without
amendment, although there are certain features thereof which might well be changed or modified, in
the hope that the bill may not fail of passage during the present session. Especially would the
committee have otherwise recommended amendments, substituting for the expression, 'labor and
service,' whenever it occurs in the body of the bill, the words 'manual labor' or 'manual service,' as
sufficiently broad to accomplish the purposes of the bill, and that such amendments would remove
objections which a sharp and perhaps unfriendly criticism may urge to the proposed legislation. The
committee, however, believing that the bill in its present form will be construed as including only those
whose labor or service is manual in character, and being very desirous that the bill become a law
before the adlournment, have reported the bill without [143 U.S. 457, 465] change.' Page 6059,
Congressional Record, 48th Cong. And, referring back to the report of the committee of the house,
there appears this language: 'It seeks to restrain and prohibit the immigration or importation of
laborers who would have never seen our shores but for the inducements and allurements of men
whose only object is to obtain labor at the lowest possible rate, regardless of the social and material
well-being of our own citizens, and regardless of the evil consequences which result to American
laborers from such immigration. This class of immigrants care nothing about our institutions, and in
many instances never even heard of them. They are men whose passage is paid by the importers.
They come here under contract to labor for a certain number of years. They are ignorant of our social
condition, and, that they may remain so, they are isolated and prevented from coming into contact
with Americans. They are generally from the lowest social stratum, and live upon the coarsest food,
and in hovels of a character before unknown to American workmen. They, as a rule, do not become
citizens, and are certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body politic. The inevitable tendency of
their presence among us is to degrade American labor, and to reduce it to the level of the imported
pauper labor.' Page 5359, Congressional Record, 48th Cong.
We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be remedied, the
circumstances surrounding the appeal to congress, the reports of the committee of each house, all
concur in affirming that the intent of congress was simply to stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled
labor. |
