henry8th, A nice analysis of the geopolitical history of the Balkans and why this war will not resovle the underlying rivalries...
BALKAN ENDGAME?
Following devastating
airstrikes in Yugoslavia,
what are the options for
an acceptable settlement
on the ground? Richard
Bassett examines the
prospects for the future
and the lessons of the
past
In the wake of NATO's attack on Yugoslavia the Balkans ends the century
much as it began; an expression of great power rivalry and a source of
potentially destabilising conflict.
As at least one military historian of note, John Keegan, has written, the
problems of Bosnia, Macedonia and indeed Kosovo would be wearily
familiar to any official of the Austro-Hungarian empire posted to Sarajevo in
1908. The inevitable competing spheres of influence led the great
19th-century German Chancellor, Bismarck, to observe: "The Balkans are not
worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier."
If history is one of the inescapable millstones of the Balkans, geography is
another. Albania today still lies across two of the most important routes that
link Europe with the East.
Its appearance on the global stage, in 1912 at the Ambassador's conference,
when it was described as the "child of Austria, with Italy acting as midwife"
was an attempt to balance the pretensions of Russia's main protegé in the
region, Serbia, and limit its access to the Mediterranean.
Today, there is still anxiety on the part of the western powers, notably the
USA, over Serbian and, by extension, Russian influence over the eastern
Mediterranean. At the same time, those in Europe (judging by recent
comments from the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, they include France)
who, like Russia, are fretful of the "naked expansion of US power" in the
aftermath of the Cold War, are equally keen to ensure that the Balkans does
not become a US sphere of influence.
Former West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, underlined his belief that
this was just a new twist to the old game when he said in a recent interview:
"Only the Americans would be naive enough to imagine that there could be a
lasting peace in the Balkans".
If, after the airstrikes, Milosevic backs down and a multi-national force is
deployed then that force may not be an entirely NATO entity.
Seen in the context of any future envisaged troop deployment in Kosovo, it is
clear that Serbia could only sign up to a deployment which reflected an
agreement between the powers (in this case the USA, on the one hand, and
Russia and Moscow's supporters on the other).
Such an agreement has proved extremely difficult to reach, not least because
of exaggerated demands on both sides which have had to be reined in by
some very tough negotiation between US Secretary of State, Madelaine
Albright and Russian prime minister and former KGB spymaster, Yevgeny
Primakov.
But all the powers know that only when faced with a credible united front can
Milosevic be persuaded to back down. Eventually the advantages of having
the West disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) may become apparent
to the Serbs and the stationing of Russian troops will ensure the protection of
their fellow Slav citizens in Kosovo.
One of the most sensitive issues is the exact positioning of the Russian
contingent as this will inevitably be the de facto line of partition in the
province. In the eyes of the KLA, the British and the French, traditional allies
of the Serbs in two world wars, can also be relied on to defend the Serbs,
though London and Paris would, with reason, deny this.
As the French and UK forces would come under a NATO commander, the
KLA believes that US influence which is largely pro-Albanian would manage
to prevent a too tough approach being taken towards the Albanians.
However, recent suggestions to shift the political control structure of the
deployment from NATO to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) would of course neutralise US influence and be an ominous
development for the Albanians.
It is, however, quite feasible to see a de facto splintering of Kosovo into
separate zones not dissimilar to those which divided Berlin, Vienna and
Trieste and its hinterland after 1945, though presumably with more cordial
relations between the various participating forces than during the Cold War.
However, given the different interests of the participants and the fact that a
NATO and Russian force would be sitting cheek by jowl under separate
commands, it can be assumed that a great deal of time and energy will be
devoted to working out the correct protocols to govern this interface of highly
sensitive, and in practice divergent, commands.
However, even if in Kosovo there is an eventual resolution of the
spheres-of-influence problem, the Albanian question, as is frequently
mentioned, also spills into Macedonia and(less frequently mentioned)
Montenegro.
Macedonia has an ethnic population of Albanians which comprises 23% of
the country's entire population. Fears that it would try to break away from the
republic have been behind the generally cordial ties between Skopje and
Belgrade.
Despite denials by the ethnic Albanian leaders, there is no doubt that, situated
as they are close to the Albanian frontier, the temptations of a future tie-up
with a Greater Albania remain high on the agenda.
Even without the Albanian issue, Macedonia has long been a controversial hot
spot where Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian interests collide. Greece has long
contested the right of the Macedonians to use the name of Macedonia, saying
that it implied a territorial claim over Greek territory. Moreover, Greek
politicians until relatively recently attempted to undermine the new state at
international forums and in discussions involving new trade links.
However, more recently under Russian, US and European pressure the
Athens government has adopted a more supportive line, though this is of little
comfort to the ethnic Albanian minority.
Bulgaria which has long maintained that Macedonian is only a Bulgarian
dialect, has also become more supportive of the government in Skopje,
though this is partly a result of the government, dominated by the newly
elected VMRO party, enjoying traditional ties with Bulgaria.
Before the Second World War, Bulgaria financed with Italy the VMRO party
which was then dedicated to destroying the newly created Yugoslav state and
was implicated in the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in
Marseilles in 1934.
The news earlier this month that Bulgaria is to donate 150 main battle tanks,
including 115 T-55As, and nearly 150 artillery pieces caused some concern in
western embassies. The concern was particularly acute over the arms import
as the Bulgarian donation came on the heels of the supply by Germany of
BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers. With all Macedonian army leave
cancelled and the deployment of two brigades on the Albanian/Kosovo
frontier, analysts fear that the arsenal now being created in this small country is
a tinderbox awaiting ignition.
More ominously, the build-up of weapons, with the tacit agreement of
Belgrade suggests that the future of Macedonia may have already been
decided by its neighbours.
The emergence of Bulgaria as a regional player is also viewed with some
disquiet in the region - traditionally Bulgaria and Serbia have a long history of
emnity, though some analysts point to the old Comintern idea of a
Serbian-Bulgarian federation possibly being revived. Such a development,
however, has been described as two stranded swimmers linking hands across
a sea of Macedonian troubles.
Certainly the agreement on 22 February by the Bulgarian and Macedonian
governments to "put an end to the artificial problems between our two
countries" suggests that events are moving rapidly towards some form of
anti-Albanian front and that a military "solution" may be imminent.
The language of the February agreement is adamant in its reconciliation of the
Bulgarian-Macedonian differences claiming that neither government will allow
its territory to be used by groups hostile to the other. In diplomatic jargon this
is a clear warning to Albanian groups smuggling weapons into or, indeed, out
of Macedonia.
It remains to be seen whether this agreement stabilises Macedonia. The clear
anti-Albanian implications of the agreement may drive the ethnic minority in
Macedonia to desperate measures. Moreover, in the long-term, Bulgarian
-Serbian-Greek rivalry over Macedonia is inevitable and partition may be
unavoidable also here.
Montenegro also has a sizeable Albanian community though only forming 8%
of the population. Moreover, in contrast to the Albanians in Macedonia and
Kosovo, these Albanians are predominantly Catholic rather than Muslim.
However, Montenegro is at perhaps one of the most strategic points in the
Adriatic. Already at the beginning of this century, the Imperial Austrian Navy
saw the importance of the great bay of Kotor, which until the Second World
War was one of the most naturally defensible harbours in the Adriatic.
Even today, the harbour is the major naval installation of the Yugoslav navy
and is Serbia's vital access to the Adriatic. The harbour is guarded by the
Prevlaka peninsular (see map) which has been the bone of contention
between Serbia and Croatia since hostilities ended between those two
countries four years ago. Croatia is adamant that it cannot cede control of the
peninsular without endangering its own security interests although for the same
reason, Serbia is determined to ensure that the peninsular is controlled by
Belgrade. Otherwise the entire Serbian fleet and its facilities can be deployed
only subject to Croatian veto. Unsurprisingly, these facilities were a priority
target for NATO attack.
Partly for this reason, Serbia last year initiated a plan to move against
Montenegro's democratically elected anti-Belgrade government. The plan met
with considerable resistance among the upper ranks of the Yugoslav army,
many of whose officers are Montenegrin and provoked the resignation of the
Serbian Chief of the General staff, General Perisic.
A move against Montenegro is still likely, however, for the strategic reasons
outlined above especially if western funds, particularly from Germany,
continue to pour into Montenegro in an attempt to detach the leadership there
from Milosevic's control. As well as German attention, Montenegro remains a
traditional focus for Russian activity. Before 1914, the Russians established
the biggest of the legations in the Montenegrin capital.
During the Cold War, a small but significant remnant of this legacy remained in
the shape of the small Soviet merchantman spy-vessel which remained at
anchor in the bay of Kotor, despite Tito's break with the Comintern in 1948.
It was a token presence but one which underlined the Churchill-Stalin deal
that Yugoslavia should be divided 50-50.
For the West that meant a Yugoslavia that was not part of the Warsaw Pact.
For the Soviets that meant despite the formal break no offensive activity or
alliance with NATO. For both sides there were small intelligence favours of
which the Kotor merchantman was one.
Russia's views on events in Montenegro are likely to be consonant with those
of Serbia and therefore hostile to any moves that appear to detach the country
from the Serbian orbit.
Thus as the century ends, the problems of the region remain bound up with
the ambitions and aspirations of the global powers as well as the hopes of
different ethnic groups. It is therefore perhaps illuminating to examine in some
detail the solutions those powers sought to impose on the region in those
times.
Before the First World War, diplomacy was secret though in practice there
were no secrets between ambassadors and those involved in foreign affairs.
An exception, perhaps, occurred during the First World War with the
controversial Treaty of London which lured Italy into breaking its alliance with
Austria and Germany in order to gain territory at Vienna's expense.
Fortunately for students of diplomacy in the Balkans, the treaty was published
when the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917.
In addition to the clauses relevant to Italy's northern territorial acquisitions,
there were several which underlined the status of the Adriatic Ð the region
which is now so hotly contested.
Italy was given important rights over the direction of Albania's foreign policy.
Albania itself remained partitioned between Serbia, Greece and Italy which
had rights over the port of Vlore (Valona), the key to the Straits of Otranto.
The rump Albania was designated a Muslim state to be governed from Tirana,
a concession few European states would tolerate today in a period of
increasing religious polarisation and anti-islamic feeling. Above all, however,
the signatories to the treaty, which included Russia and France, all agreed to
work together to prevent the Balkans becoming an area of dispute between
them. In the attempted agreements hammered out between NATO and
Russia the spirit of this Treaty can still be seen, however different the territorial
lines drawn on the map today. Although the USA is a new player in this game,
there are reasons to think that it does wish to work through consensus though
it may not understand as vividly as the Europeans the potential dangers of an
uncontrolled conflict originating in the Balkans. NATO's surprise guarantee of
Albania's territorial integrity last week is incompatible with the Treaty of
London's intentions.
In any event the USA's room for manoeuvre has been dramatically cut down
by the coalition of European and Russian forces which are traditionally
pro-Serbian. It remains to be seen what the USA can do for the Albanians
despite all the talk of this being a "single-polar world".
For its part, the UK, for which the Balkans has always been a traditional area
of expertise, remains committed to establishing a lasting solution for the
region. Although it no longer stands at England's imperial jugular, the region
remains critical to the Mediterranean and the long-term interests of Europe.
As far as London is concerned, it is synonymous with the 500-year-old game
of erecting a balance of power.
The interests of the third partner, Russia, however, remain perhaps the most
constant -preservation of some presence, albeit a token one, along the
Adriatic and the prevention of the peninsular being dominated by any one
power. Here the activities of the USA are a cause for serious alarm in Russian
strategic counsels.
The precarious internal situation in Russia also militates against the
confidence-building measures the West feels are essential to any joint solution
of the Balkans crisis. The obvious policy disputes between Russian President
Boris Yeltsin and Primakov may be just questions of degree but they continue
to overshadow the ability to come to agreements at the highest level which
can be seen as having a chance of sticking.
Yet without such an agreement there is every indication that the Balkans will
continue to smoulder and that the flames of ethnic cleansing will continue to
blaze for several years to come.
Richard Bassett, JDW's Business Editor, is a former Central Europe
correspondent for the Times of London
Jane's Defence Weekly |
