STRATFOR's
Global Intelligence Update
April 19, 1999
Weekly Analysis:
Understanding the War in Kosovo in the Fourth Week
Summary:
The war in Kosovo grew out of fundamental miscalculations in
Washington, particularly concerning the effect Russian support
had on Milosevic's thinking. So long as Milosevic feels he has
Russian support, he will act with confidence. If Russia wavers,
Milosevic will have to deal. With the air war stalemated and
talks of ground attack a pipe dream, diplomacy remains NATO's
best option. That option depends on Russian cooperation.
However, Russian cooperation will cost a great deal of money.
That brings us to the IMF, the Germans, and former Russian Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who is Russia's new negotiator on
Serbia, a leading economic reformer and a good friend of the
West.
Analysis:
On March 24, 1999, NATO aircraft began to bomb Yugoslavia. We
are in the fourth week of the campaign, which now appears to be a
stalemate. NATO is unable to force Belgrade to capitulate to its
demands using the force currently available. Yugoslavia is
unable to inflict sufficient casualties on the attackers to
dissuade NATO from continuing the campaign nor has it been able
to drive a wedge into NATO from which a peace party might emerge
that is prepared to negotiate a conclusion to the conflict on
terms favorable to Serbia. As in most wars, the rhetoric on both
sides is filled with purple prose, horrible accusations and much
confusion.
Given that the current stalemate cannot be maintained
indefinitely, we are, almost by definition, at a turning point.
While the stalemate can, theoretically, go on indefinitely,
neither side has it in its interest to permit this to happen.
NATO's unity is fragile at best, particularly if the conflict
fails to resolve itself. Yugoslavia is losing valuable economic
assets that it would rather not lose. Since neither side appears
ready to capitulate and neither side wants the current stalemate
to continue, it is useful to consider, leaving rhetoric aside,
how we got here and where all this is likely to go.
It is clear to us that the war began in a fundamental
miscalculation by NATO planners and particularly by the civilian
leadership of the United States: Madeleine Albright, Sandy
Berger, Richard Holbrooke and the President. They made a
decision to impose the Rambouillet Accords on both sides in
Kosovo. It was simply assumed that, given the threat of
bombardment, Slobodan Milosevic would have no choice but to
capitulate and accept the accords. By all accounts, Richard
Holbrooke, architect of the Dayton Accords and the person most
familiar with Milosevic was the author of this reading of
Milosevic.
Holbrooke had good historical precedent for his read of
Milosevic. After all, when Serbs in Bosnia were bombed in 1995,
Milosevic capitulated and signed the Dayton Accords. Holbrooke's
reasoning was that history would repeat itself. The evidence
that Washington expected capitulation was in its complete lack of
preparation for an extended conflict. At the time the air
campaign began, NATO had about 400 military aircraft available
for the campaign, with less than 200 hundred for bombing
missions. Even with the availability of cruise missiles, no
serious military observer, including apparently senior U.S.
military officials, believed this to have been anywhere near the
amount required to inflict serious damage. Indeed, most
observers doubted that an air campaign by itself could possibly
succeed without a ground campaign. Thus, Washington and NATO
were either wholly irresponsible in launching the campaign with
insufficient forces, or had good reason to believe that Milosevic
would rapidly capitulate. Since Albright, Berger, Holbrooke and
the President are neither fools, nor irresponsible, we can only
conclude that they were guilty of faulty judgment about how the
Serbs would respond.
There are three reasons for the difference in Milosevic's
behavior in 1999 and 1995. First, Kosovo is strategically and
psychologically critical to the Serbs. The demands of the
Rambouillet Accords were crafted in such a way that the Serbs
were convinced that NATO occupation would mean the loss of Serb
sovereignty over Kosovo. Thus, where NATO was calculating that
Milosevic could not survive politically if he brought a bombing
campaign on Serbia, Milosevic was making the exact opposite
calculation: that he could not survive if he accepted NATO's
demands. In fact, Milosevic's view was that a bombing campaign
over Kosovo would increase his domestic political power, by
positioning him as a champion of Serbian national unity, thereby
limiting the ability of his opposition to oppose him.
The second reason had to do with the shift in Russia's position.
In 1995, Russia was deep into its love affair with the West.
That meant that Serbia was politically isolated, without hope of
support or resupply. Milosevic saw the world very differently in
1999. He had observed the U.S. bombing of Iraq in December 1998
and Russia's reaction to it. He concluded that not only was he
no longer isolated, but that the internal dynamics of NATO were
such that they would limit the intensity and duration of the
campaign. Milosevic expected a vigorous Russian reaction to war.
It was also his expectation that NATO's fear of a return to the
Cold War would create a peace faction inside of NATO. He was
confident that Greece would not join in the campaign, and he had
great hopes for Germany, France, and Italy. It was Milosevic's
view that the Germans would be terrified of a breakdown in good
relations with Russia; that France would play its normal game of
being a good NATO member while simultaneously hoping to weaken
the Anglo-Americans; and that the Italian government was so weak
that it would not give NATO carte blanche for the use of its air
bases, particularly after the cable car incident. Thus,
Milosevic felt that the geopolitical and diplomatic situation had
shifted in his favor, and that the NATO operation would be
limited in time and intensity.
Finally, Milosevic was acutely aware that, although the U.S. and
Britain had been conducting an air campaign in Iraq since mid-
December, the constraints on U.S. and British air forces were
such that they were extremely reluctant to enter into two
simultaneous air campaigns whose intensity was not fully under
their control. Milosevic was convinced that the small number of
aircraft allocated to the anti-Serb campaign represented resource
limitations on the United States.
In a sense, both sides miscalculated. The United States assumed
that Milsosevic would capitulate when he realized that the United
States would actually bomb Serbia. Milosevic assumed that the
Russians would be a more limiting factor on NATO behavior and
that American concern for the Iraqi theater would deter them as
well. But of the two, the American miscalculation was the
greatest. NATO has not yet split as Milosevic hoped, but a split
in the coming weeks, as discussions of a ground campaign
intensify, is not only possible, but even likely. Moreover,
while the U.S. has transferred air assets into the Serbian
theater at an increasing rate, the transfer has been slow in
coming, precisely because it strips air reserves from the United
States and forces the redeployment of scarce aircraft from the
Iraqi theater. There is no doubt in our mind that Washington's
misunderstanding of Belgrade's thinking was much more profound
than Belgrade's misreading of its opponents.
Thus, Milosevic is quite content to absorb the current level of
air attacks. He has established what is for him an acceptable
reality on the ground in Kosovo. He has cemented his political
supremacy in Belgrade, helped along by Clinton's extraordinary
error in identifying the removal of Milosevic as a war goal and
thereby wedding the idea of Serbian national interest and
Milosevic's personal survival together in the Serbian mind.
Milosevic is quite content with the situation as it stands. He
is so content that he has, for the time being, rejected the
German proposals for a compromise on Rambouillet including non-
NATO police forces. He sees no need for a compromise right now.
Milosevic is waiting for NATO to make a move and, in his view,
they don't have many moves to make.
NATO has three options:
* Intensified Air War: This is the option it is officially
pursuing. The available air power is being raised to over 1,000
aircraft, although it is not clear when all aircraft will be in
theater. There are three weaknesses with the strategy. First,
air campaigns, no matter how intense, simply have not
historically succeeded in forcing capitulation. An air campaign
can be effective in wearing down a military force but to take
advantage of it requires a ground option. Moreover, wearing down
a military force in Serbia's terrain and with Serbia's climate
will take substantially more aircraft than are currently
contemplated. Second, building a sufficient attack force of
aircraft against Serbia will require stripping forces from Iraq
and elsewhere. As a result, the United States will find itself
wide-open for attack in other areas. Finally, and most
important, NATO is committing the fundamental error of air power
as a weapon of psychological warfare: gradualism. Rather than
overwhelming the enemy with sudden, terrible power, NATO is
permitting the Serbs to adjust themselves psychologically to
increasing levels of violence. An air war by itself will not
cause Milosevic to capitulate, let alone resign. The increased
commitment to the air war compounds the original error and the
expectation that it will result in capitulation is sheer wishful
thinking.
* Ground attack option: This is a complex matter about which we
have prepared a fuller study "Analysis of NATO's Ground Invasion
Options" at stratfor.com. We will
simply summarize our findings here. First, the only doable
option from Albania alone is an attack on the Pagarusa Valley.
Not only is this a complex and costly operation, but it achieves
little. Second, an invasion of Kosovo proper is impossible from
Albania alone because the roads will not sustain the necessary
supplies to the size force required. At the very least, an
invasion must also come from Macedonia, but Macedonia has refused
to permit this. It must also be supported from Greek ports,
which the Greeks have refused to allow NATO to use. A general
invasion of Yugoslavia would require the cooperation of both
Hungary and Romania as well as permission from Austria or
Slovakia for transshipment of men, equipment and supplies. A
build up of military assets for such an operation will take many
months and the result could be a quagmire like Vietnam if the
Serbs retreat into their national redoubt, which they plan to do.
We simply do not see a credible ground attack option available
for logistical and diplomatic reasons before the end of the
summer. The only option, the Pagarusa invasion, is so trivial in
its effect on Belgrade as not to be worth mounting.
* Diplomatic option: Germany and Russia appear to be working in
tandem in bringing about some sort of proposal. The United
States has adopted the role of "bad cop" to Germany and Russia's
"good cop." Milosevic is not particularly impressed. There is a
key here, however: Russia. If Milosevic becomes convinced that
Russia has abandoned him, he may become much more flexible. It
is, of course, very hard, for the Russians to abandon the Serbs
for internal political reasons. However, it is interesting to
note that Viktor Chernomyrdin, former reform Prime Minister has
been appointed to manage Russian diplomacy on Serbia. Why
Yeltsin would want to frighten Milosevic by appointing a liberal
who is well liked by the West is an interesting question? A
press report out of Moscow, saying that they expect to start
receiving IMF money in a few months may be part of the answer.
The Russians may be for sale. If so, NATO had better go
shopping.
Neither the air campaign, nor a ground attack, nor Clinton or
Albright's ferocious rhetoric worries Milosevic. The loss of
Russia as an ally does worry him. Now, for political reasons, it
is not clear that the Russians can completely abandon the Serbs.
However, the mere hint of Russian softness could cause Milosevic
to become more flexible in his terms. But Russia needs to be
motivated to turn soft, and the color of motivation remains
green. If we were cynical, we would be tempted to say that
Russia encouraged Milosevic in order to put Russia in a strong
position vis-à-vis Germany and other nations able to extend
credit. However, since we are not cynical, we will be simply
startled at the sudden opportunity the West has to work closely
with the Russians in solving their financial problems.
Washington's nonsense about overthrowing Milosevic, bombing him
into submission and invading Serbia is of little consequence. At
the center of this crisis now is Russia, and the price it will
charge for placing Milosevic back into isolation. Milosevic
undertook his adventure in part because of the Russia factor. As
Russia softens, Milosevic has to weaken. Therefore, the question
for this week is how Milosevic reads Moscow? If he is getting
concerned about Russia's commitment to Serbia, then German peace
proposals might suddenly get a warmer reception. If not, the war
goes on.
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