The Times (UK)
the-times.co.uk
April 19, 1999
Comment by:
William Rees Mogg
A ground invasion of Kosovo would be a disaster for a divided Nato
I do not believe that Nato ought to engage in a ground war in Kosovo, and think it unlikely that it will do so. The military
difficulties would be immense, the additional suffering would be terrible, the objectives would be hard to define, the outcome
would be uncertain, Nato casualties might be heavy, as were American casualties in Vietnam, Russian in Afghanistan and German in
Yugoslavia during the Second World War. These are reasons for thinking it would be a mistake to send in ground troops, but they
are not the main reason for thinking it will not actually happen. A Balkan war would require more unity than Nato could give it.
This is not just an American war, or an Anglo-American war. It is a Nato war. The base of public support for a ground war has to
be European. The more closely one examines European opinion, the clearer it becomes that the unity of Nato extends only to the
bombing campaign; it could not expect to be maintained if there were a ground invasion of Yugoslavia.
Two of the smaller Nato countries, Greece and Hungary, would find it politically almost impossible to provide Nato with invasion
facilities, though Hungary borders on the north Yugoslav plain, and Greece borders on the new Macedonia. Hungary would be
inhibited by concern for the large ethnic Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina region of Serbia.
Greece has a longstanding national sympathy for Serbia, and hostility to Macedonia and Albania. The last thing Greece wants is a
greater Albania. Greece initially opposed the international recognition of the new Macedonia, and remembers ethnic interventions
in its own civil war. Last Thursday a crowd of several thousand threw stones at the American, British and Italian Embassies in
Athens. Their slogans included "Americans, murderers of peoples" and "Greece, out of Nato".
Greece and Hungary are important because they are so close to the action, but the large European countries of France, Germany and
Italy are obviously more important. Italy has a Centre-Left Government dependent on Communist votes.
So far, the Italians have been willing to support the Nato bombing campaign, which has depended heavily on Italian facilities. Yet
even this has been politically difficult. Like the Greeks, the Italians want an early negotiated settlement: they do not want a
ground war.
We know most about the divided attitudes of the French Government. Le Monde, on Saturday, had a surprisingly full report of last
Thursday's meeting of ministers. The three Communist ministers condemned Milosevic, but called for a rapid diplomatic solution, in
line with the Russian position. The Interior Minister, Jean-Pierre Chev?nement, repeated his scepticism about the Nato strategy
itself, and called for UN intervention.
Two ministers did, indeed, call for ground action to aide the Kosovans, because they thought the bombing ineffective; other
ministers supported the Nato strategy, but also expressed doubts about its effectiveness. Alain Richard, the Minister of Defence,
gave further details of the difficulties of the Nato strategy, but assured his colleagues that patience would be rewarded.
The Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, then summed up. He considered that the conduct of Milosevic justified France's stand on the
side of Nato; he supported a political response through the UN, but added: "A diplomatic solution would be as difficult and
complex as the military action." Le Monde's own leading article on Saturday was headed La Risque de la D?faite.
The German Government has already come close to breaking Nato's apparent unity with its plan for a negotiated peace, to be based
on the United Nations, and to be brokered by the Russians. This plan has been developed by Joschka Fischer, the leader of the
Greens and the German Foreign Minister; it would involve a ceasefire while negotiations were being completed. The Greens, at least
in Brussels, believe that the Fischer plan has been deliberately blocked by Britain and the United States.
Undoubtedly the attitudes of these Governments reflect public opinion and the advice of their own defence staff. They are much
influenced by concerns about Russia; the German and French Governments are in more or less continuous conversations with the
Russian Government. Last week the Russian Minister of Defence, Igor Sergeyev, accused Nato of preparing an imminent ground war
against Yugoslavia. One of the unexpected revelations of the opening of Russian Cold War documents has been how seriously the old
Soviet Union feared an American invasion. Russia is again very sensitive. The main European governments want Russia as a
diplomatic ally for a negotiated peace, not as an arms supplier to Serbia in the middle of a war.
Tony Blair has repeated ruled out the use of ground troops, as has Al Gore, the Vice-President of the United States. That may have
been a tactical mistake, in that it removed one of the pressures on Milosevic. Nevertheless, it may also have been a political
necessity. Nato may simply have been unwilling to leave open the option of ground war.
One of the arguments now being advanced in favour of a ground invasion is that Nato must be seen to win; this is most frequently
heard in the United States. Yet it would be even more disastrous if Nato were to fall apart. A negotiated settlement, perhaps
leading to the partition of Kosovo, would not destroy Nato, which has already survived the compromise over Bosnia in the Dayton
accord.
The power of Nato would still be there, available for defence on other threatening occasions. A split between the Nato of the
Anglo-Americans and the Nato of Europe would mean that the alliance had broken up, no doubt with much ill-will on both sides.
Britain herself could not enter a ground war without deep political misgivings and division, but the Blair Government would not
fall. The coalitions in power in France, Germany and Italy would all be likely to break up on this issue, if the invasion
happened.
In yesterday's Sunday Times, Bill Clinton seemed to reformulate the Nato objectives as seen from Washington. He asserted that:
"The realisation of this vision will require a democratic transition in Serbia itself, for the region cannot be secure with a
belligerent tyrant in its midst." This is not the existing Nato war aim, nor could it conceivably be attained without a successful
and massive invasion of the whole of Yugoslavia, the forcible removal of Milosevic and the imposition of a new Constitution. The
Nato bombing has already guaranteed that Milosevic would win any ordinary democratic election.
President Clinton's new aims not only go well beyond anything that the United Nations has approved, but beyond anything Nato has
approved, or would approve. If the elimination of Milosevic were made the condition for ending the war, Yugoslavia would be faced
with a demand for unconditional surrender. All the European and Russian efforts to reach a negotiated settlement for the
withdrawal of Serbian troops and the return of the refugees would be in vain; Nato has to negotiate with Milosevic or it will have
nobody to negotiate with. The American President should not take the rest of Nato for granted.
At present, British and American opinion, shocked by the plight of the refugees, dismayed by the political ineffectiveness of the
bombing, seems to be moving in favour of invasion. This movement of opinion is not shared on the Continent. I doubt if it could be
relied on even here or in the United States if the troops did actually go in. The Americans are very sensitive to American
casualties, and they remember Vietnam. The British have been horrified by the television pictures of human suffering, but
television is a short-term, high-impact, medium in which new images constantly obliterate the old ones. At present the emotional
case for a Balkan war seems very powerful, but, as Robert Walpole said of war with Spain in 1739: "They now ring the bells, but
they will soon wring their hands."
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