nuke44 and all, Update on Kosovo situation...
NATO at Odds with Itself
21 Apr 99 - 0300 GMT
Two massive cross-currents are at work within NATO. There is, on one hand, strong
antipathy toward waging all-out war against Serbia. Consider that the European Union
today was not able to pass a resolution barring the sale of oil to Serbia. The proposal
was blocked by Greece and Italy, who justified their position by arguing that a blockade
must be preceded by a UN resolution. Underlying the legal niceties was the fact that
neither country wants an intensification of the war. Given that Greece and Italy are
strategically essential to any ground war because of their port facilities, their
unwillingness to simply endorse an oil embargo poses a serious challenge to any
ground campaign. Equally negative were statements today by German Bundeswehr
chief-of-staff General Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, who said today that NATO has "an
option to intensify air operations," but that "there are no plans for other operations. We
are convinced that it will not be necessary."
On the other hand, the same Greek government that voted against an oil embargo did
hint earlier today that its ports would be available for use in a ground war, a substantial
softening of its position. The United States and Britain, at the other extreme, are trying
to make it appear that a ground war is inevitable. Indeed, there are indications of a
build-up of forces in Albania. The arrival of the 82nd Airborne Division's advanced
guard is more than a security force for the Apaches that have not yet arrived and the
MLRS. They will be joined by other elements of their division, indicating that a build-up
of forces for a ground war is already underway. Yet, at the very same time, NATO's
request for an additional 300 U.S. combat aircraft has not yet been approved, with
Pentagon planners saying they are considering the impact of such a large transfer of
forces on other areas of the world.
As we come into Friday's summit of NATO leaders in Washington, the cross-currents
are dizzying. Just as pressure dramatically increases on Serbia due to the Greek shift
on ports, the EU's decision on an oil embargo undermines that pressure. The creation
of a deliberate sense of mystery about the build-up of forces in Albania then encounters
a public unwillingness by the United States to commit requested aircraft. Statements
from Washington and London that NATO is prepared to do whatever is necessary to
solve the crisis is met by German officials saying that a ground attack is not necessary.
The problem here is not public relations, but a deep split not only within NATO, but
within each individual country over the future course of the war. There is simply no
consensus emerging over what is to be done. Without such a consensus, NATO cannot
act. Each time a consensus appears to be emerging and pressure on Milosevic builds,
the consensus cracks apart and the pressure bleeds off.
The current stalemate is less in the war than in NATO itself and even within the U.S.
military. Agreement on the next step simply isn't emerging. The problem is partly
political within countries. But the key problem remains military. The difficulties inherent
in the ground option are daunting. The strategic implications of a major air build-up are
similarly worrisome. Therefore, each day the world is whipped by conflicting signals.
The only constancy in the signal is what the Serbs have clearly heard: NATO has not yet
locked in a plan. Therefore Serbia continues to have room for maneuver. |
