True Power Politics at play....
From Stratfor's Kosovo analysis:
stratfor.com
The United States, Kosovo, and the Price of Building Coalitions
21 Apr 99 - 2049 GMT
The United States has taken the most extreme position of any of the NATO members, with the possible exception of Britain, which is running in tandem with the United States. The United States is the one most vociferous in not compromising with Milosevic and insisting that a military campaign, even one including a ground war, is indispensable. It has therefore fallen to the United States to construct the war fighting coalition needed to execute the war.
What has happened, therefore, is that the power of the less vociferous members of NATO has increased as American belligerence has deepened. Indeed, all nations whose geography or manpower might be needed in this war have dramatically increased their ability to extract concessions from the United States. Put simply, the United States has created a situation in which it can neither back off the war nor execute the war without the cooperation of others. Therefore, these others are in a position to make demands that the United States has to either meet or it loses their cooperation.
Consider the case of Slovakia and Romania. Both are essential for an invasion of Serbia from the north. Slovakia's rail and road system are critical for a troop buildup and sustenance in Hungary. Romania is critical if NATO would want to attack toward Belgrade through the Tisa river route. Both Slovakia and Romania were excluded from NATO during the first round. They did not measure up in terms of their democratic institutions. Now that NATO is once again trying to formulate itself as a war fighting entity rather than a gentleman's club, Slovakia and Romania are essential, regardless of their commitment to democratic norms. It is clear that both countries, quite reasonably, are demanding membership in NATO as the price for taking the risks of war.
We are, therefore, in a situation where the creation of a northern option against Serbia is driving the geopolitics of Europe. Slovakia's membership in NATO is, geographically, indispensable. But including Romania in the alliance opens up massive military commitments in southeastern Europe with which NATO does not currently have the resources to deal. Moreover, expanding NATO again, or even promising, overtly or covertly, to expand NATO to include Slovakia and Romania, and even perhaps Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria, will certainly trigger a massive break with the Russians. They will respond in other areas, such as Ukraine and the Baltic States, on the theory that as NATO expands, Russia's own strategic sphere of influence will have to be rationalized.
It is not simply a matter of NATO expansion. Greece is flirting with the idea of allowing the use of its ports and rails, essential for the southern NATO option. Greece is, as always, at odds with Turkey over a host of issues. Greece will be presenting a stiff bill for its cooperation, one may be sure. Of course, the U.S. is already dependent on Turkey for the use of Incirlik in the now forgotten Iraqi conflict. Greece wants very much to drive a wedge between the United States and Turkey. Greece's price, acceptable in the context of a crisis, might turn out to be more than the United States can afford to pay.
The Russians, too, are presenting their bill on cooperation. Their bill is incompatible with the Slovak and Romanian bill. The Russians want IMF cash and a secure sphere of influence, which means no NATO expansion. That goes directly in the face of the Slovak and Romanian positions, which is that if they are going to bear the burden of NATO cooperation they deserve the benefits of NATO membership. So sometimes, the bills are incompatible. Not everyone can be paid off. That's when one side is told one thing and the other side another thing—which is fine in the short run, but causes real problems when people start comparing notes!
We see this same process of increased U.S. dependency in Albania itself. The Kosovo Liberation Army was, a few weeks ago, merely one of several Kosovo Albanian factions, and not necessarily the one the United States was most enamored with. Today, in desperately casting about for a means of harassing and tying down Serb forces, the KLA has become an integrated part of the war- fighting strategy. The short run dependence on the KLA could, in the long run, become a burden or a threat.
The extreme position adopted by the United States has turned it into a bidder for cooperation by those whose position is less extreme or whose temporary strategic significance gives them unique, though temporary, value. Each of these entities will use the short-term dependence the U.S. has for them to extract long-term concessions. In other words, to defeat Serbia in a potential land war, the U.S. will be making promises to a lot of nations that it will not be able to easily carry out in the future. The United States will be writing checks that it will be difficult and painful to cash. At the very least, the obsession with Kosovo is causing checks to be written that involve issues far more significant than Kosovo and with more lasting effect.
The most extreme position is sometimes a great negotiating position. However, in a multi-player game, the most extreme player, dependent on other players, winds up having to pay the price for the cooperation of less extreme players. NATO's leaders are coming to Washington this week. They will be presenting their bills. Those not coming to Washington will be presenting their bills as well. The demands, open, hidden, and implied are piling up as Washington tries to build what has become its coalition. A short-term humanitarian crisis will start rapidly defining U.S. geopolitical issues and even strategy.
|
