The objection to Mossadegh had nothing to do with becoming a client state of the USSR. It stemmed from the British objection to his nationalization of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, though ironically the British had already nationalized the same company. It should be noted that the Soviets never moved to help Mossadegh, though they must have considered the notion of a US client on their border every bit as threatening as we thought Cuba. It should also be noted that Mossadegh never appealed to the Russians for aid: most of my reading, and discussions with the large Iranian exile population here, suggest that Mossadegh disliked and mistrusted the Russians every bit as much as he disliked and mistrusted the British.
Much of the dislike for the British that resonates throughout the Middle East stems from the open contempt expressed by Englishmen toward the locals, and from British administrators and corporate officials dictating to supposedly sovereign governments. They got away with it until WWII, but couldn't sustain it after.
"Dealing with the government in power", and realpolitik would have dictated dumping the British, who had clearly shot their imperial wad, and making a deal with Mossadegh, the deal being that we would guarantee his right to run his country without interference from outside, if he would promise not to play with Ivan. |
