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Pastimes : Kosovo -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: John Lacelle who wrote (11269)	6/7/1999 11:14:00 AM
From: cody andre	Respond to of 17770

10% to DNC - you forgot it. Where is Ron Brown when one needs him?

To: John Lacelle who wrote (11269)	6/7/1999 5:34:00 PM
From: goldsnow	Respond to of 17770

Full text of the peace document This is the text of the agreement obtained from European Union sources in Cologne and was the document taken to Belgrade by the EU's envoy, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, and Russia's Viktor Chernomyrdin. Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis: 1. Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable. 3. Deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 4. The international security presence, with substantial Nato participation, must be deployed under unified command and control, and authorised to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, as part of the international civil presence, under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy a substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life of all inhabitants in Kosovo. 6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions: Liaison with international civil mission and international security presence Marking/clearing minefields Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organisations. 8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarisation of the KLA. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions. 9. Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilisation of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below. A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo. Withdrawal Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn. Returning Personnel Equipment associated the returning personnel. Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities. Timetable for their return. Delineation of their geographical areas of operation. Rules governing their relationship to international security presence and international civil mission. Other required elements Rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals meaning, for example 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25km mutual safety zone within 48 hours. Return of personnel for the functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands). Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals. The discussion and achieving of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. A second footnote refers to the composition of the international force, as follows: It is understood that Nato considers an international security force with "substantial Nato participation" to mean unified command and control and having Nato at the core. This in turn means a unified Nato chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-Nato force contributors. All Nato countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. Nato units would be under Nato command. It is understood that Russia's position is that the Russian contingent will not be under Nato command and its relationship to the international presence will be governed by relevant additional agreements. news.bbc.co.uk

To: John Lacelle who wrote (11269)	6/7/1999 5:59:00 PM
From: goldsnow	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 17770

* Russia has sold out the Serbs. We predicted a crisis in Kosovo on January 4, 1999 precisely because of Russo-American tensions. When Primakov fell, we stated that this represented a major geopolitical setback to Milosevic. We have always argued that the Russians made possible Milosevic's position. The Russians began to weaken their support for Milosevic when the IMF's $4.5 billion loan was made available. Perhaps one of Strobe Talbott's missions in Moscow was to negotiate a side deal with the Russians for delivering Milosevic to NATO. If so, it is not clear what the quid pro quo is. It is also not clear what the response in the Duma will be if it is revealed that Yeltsin approved a sell-out of Milosevic for unspecified goodies later on. stratfor.com

To: John Lacelle who wrote (11269)	6/8/1999 9:30:00 PM
From: goldsnow	Respond to of 17770

Kremlin Refuses To Comment On "Sleeping Yeltsin" Report MOSCOW, Jun 8, 1999 -- (Agence France Presse) The Kremlin refused to comment Tuesday on a Daily Telegraph report that Kosovo peace negotiations in Bonn were postponed because President Boris Yeltsin was sleeping or otherwise "unavailable" in Moscow. The foreign ministers meeting in Bonn as the Group of Eight seven industrialized nations plus Russia had expected to sign an agreement Monday night. The Telegraph however said the agreement was delayed after Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov could not confer with Yeltsin by telephone late Monday. "I heard this information on television," a Kremlin spokesman told AFP, refusing to comment on the report. The British newspaper headlined its Kosovo story: "Sleeping Yeltsin delays Kosovo deal." According to the newspaper, Ivanov left the talks to obtain assent from Moscow on three points of the peace plan. "But his attempts to seek approval at the highest level in Moscow were unsuccessful," the newspaper said. Ivanov "returned to tell the ministers that it was after 10 p.m. Moscow time and President Yeltsin was asleep or otherwise "unavailable" to give his assent," it said. ((c) 1999 Agence France Presse)