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The Caspian Connection: Pipeline Politics and the Balkan War
Carl Limbacher and Caron Grich
June 9, 1999
What has America accomplished in the Balkans after 70-plus days
of NATO bombardment?
Cease fire negotiations sputter along on a wing and a prayer. And if
they are successful, America will be rewarded with the privilege of
contributing 7,000 troops to a force of 50,000 Kosovo
"peacekeepers". Tour of duty: indefinite.
Though Bill Clinton's Balkan adventure did much to keep the press
distracted from matters like Chinese nuclear espionage and
inconvenient rape charges (reporters last hit Clinton with a question
about Juanita Broaddrick just five days before he ordered airstrikes
on Serbia), it's debatable whether Kosovar refugees will be better
off for all the effort.
Slobodan Milosevic, recently dubbed an official war criminal, will
retain power over Serbia. And NATO may even have to
accommodate a Russian presence in Kosovo, which will only
further discourage displaced ethnic Albanians from returning home.
Not much of a victory. Not much, that is, until one considers
another factor that may have propelled NATO into the Balkans; an
incentive which has nothing to do with humanitarian relief or
scandal spin.
NATO's Eyes on the Prize
If President Clinton were to level with the American people, he
might just explain NATO's first hot war by using a variation of his
old campaign theme: "It's the global economy, stupid." Because
NATO's entry into the Balkans, though thus far an abject failure in
terms of the mission's ostensible goals, places the West, and
especially Western Europe, on the doorstep of resources so vast
that the move could mean decades worth of economic well-being
for member nations.
Ponder this nearly two year-old observation from the New York
Times, reported when a U.S. security force in the Balkans was only
a twinkle in Madeleine Albright's eye:
"Forget mutual funds, commodity futures and corporate mergers.
Forget South African Diamonds, European currencies and Thai
stocks. The most concentrated mass of untapped wealth known to
exist anywhere is in the oil and gas fields beneath the Caspian (Sea)
and lands around it.... The strategic implications of this bonanza
hypnotize Western security planners as completely as the finances
transfix oil executives." (New York Times -- September 21, 1997)
Or this, from a conservative think tank the year before:
"The vast expanses of the former Soviet Union harbor oil and gas
riches which will be crucial to funding the global economy in the
next century. The huge oil reserves, estimated at over 25 billion
barrels under the Caspian Sea and in the central Asian republics of
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are similar to those in
Kuwait and larger than those in Alaska's Northern Slope and the
North Sea combined." (Ariel Cohen, Senior Policy Analyst, The
Heritage Foundation - January 25, 1996)
"Control over these energy resources and export routes out of the
Eurasian hinterland is quickly becoming one of the central issues in
post Cold War politics," Cohen added, without noting that Caspian
oil played a major role a pre-Cold War geo-strategic conflict as well.
In an attempt to gain control over access routes to the same oil
reserves during World War II, the Third Reich waged the bloodiest
battle ever fought, the siege at Stalingrad.
More recent history shows that war for oil isn't exactly a new
concept, even for America. When the U.S. went to war to chase
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwaiti oil fields in 1991, then-U.S.
Secretary of State James Baker was unabashed about our motives,
saying that there were three reasons behind Operation Desert
Storm: "Jobs, jobs and jobs."
Today Kosovo, Tomorrow Azerbaijan
Ever since the break-up of the old Soviet Union, the West has had
its eye on the oil fields of Central Asia. And security for pipelines
carrying the crude out is a priority concern that could make or break
billions of dollars already invested by U.S oil companies like Mobil,
Chevron, Amoco and others.
But to get Caspian oil to the trillion petro-dollar market of Western
Europe, planners need alternatives to old pipeline routes that
traversed Iran and Russia. That means development of the huge
Eurasian reserves must focus on the corridor between those two
potentially hostile regions.
Almost all roads lead to Baku, Azerbaijan, the Caspian seaport
believed to be sitting on trillions of dollars of untapped crude. 12
energy companies have entered into a $7.5 billion consortium, the
Azerbaijani International Operating Company (AIOC). Five are
U.S. based: Penzoil, Unocal, McDermott and Exxon, and Amoco,
now merged with British Petroleum.
In April the 515 mile Baku-Supsa pipeline opened for business and
was hailed by Azerbajaini officials as a breakthrough because it
avoided Russian territory, thereby adding to Azerbaijan's economic
independence. But Baku-Supsa will be able to handle only 10% of
the expected Caspian gusher. The AIOC is considering two other
possible pipeline routes to the West:
The Northern Route: From Baku northwest through the Russian
Republic of Chechnya, to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk,
where tankers would transport the oil through the Bosporous and
Dardenelle straights to the Agean Sea. (Some energy experts worry
that transport through the unregulated Bosporus passage would
represent a chokepoint for terrorists, with a cutoff of Caspian oil
easily accomplished by sinking a single tanker. Alternative plans
include a detour north across the Black Sea to Burgas, Bulgaria --
where the oil would be pipelined to Alexandroupolis, Greece along
what has been dubbed the Trans-Balkan Pipeline.)
The Mediterranean Route: From Baku west, skirting Iran through
Turkey -- where Western tankers would collect the oil from Turkish
port of Ceyhan. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is the strong favorite of
U.S. energy planners.
Undoubtedly, Baku-Ceyhan has its advantages. It avoids some of
the risks posed by warring factions along other pipeline routes. And
should, for instance, Kurdish rebels attempt to disrupt the free flow
of oil, NATO member Turkey could be counted upon to resolve the
situation to the West's satisfaction, especially since Turkey itself
would stand to gain hundreds of millions of dollars in pipeline tolling
fees alone.
How a DNC Donor Changed U.S. Pipeline Policy
Some suspect that the Clinton administration staunchly supports the
Baku-Ceyhan route, not so much out of concern over pipeline
security -- but because the Turkish route was initially favored by a
major contributor to the Democratic National Committee, Lebanese
oilman Roger Tamraz.
As recently as May 1995, the U.S. took no official position
supporting either the Black Sea, Turkish or other pipeline plans.
That month, Tamraz met with NSC official Shelia Heslin but failed
to sell her on his plan to pump oil from Baku to the Turkish port
city of Yumurtalik. Afterwards, Heslin tried to keep Tamraz out of
the White House and away from Clinton.
But throughout the summer and fall of 1995, $195,000 of Tamraz's
money made its way into DNC coffers. That September, the
persistent oilman attended two White House coffees with Clinton on
hand. Afterwards, former Clinton Chief of Staff Mack McLarty
arranged for Tamraz to meet with Energy Department officials. By
October, Tamraz's project had the backing of the Clinton State
Department.
The pressure brought to bear on Tamraz's behalf was quite
impressive, considering that even with his subsequent donations, he
had given a only $300,000. But for that amount, spare change really
for someone in Tamraz's league, DNC chairman Don Fowler
personally chatted up Ms. Heslin on Tamraz's behalf. Around the
same time, even the Clinton CIA began sending Heslin favorable
reports on the Lebanese oilman.
But just as Tamraz seemed to be making headway, the Azerbaijani
oil consortium began to move away from the Turkish route, seeing
projects like Tamraz's as too costly. Falling crude prices throughout
the late 90's cooled other larger oil companies on a Turkish pipeline
as well.
Still the Turkish route, Baku-Ceyhan in particular, continued to
enjoy strong American support, despite the fact that by October
1998 the major oil companies had flat out rejected the plan.
Writing for Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty in May, Michael
Lelyveld explained it this way:
"For several months, the gap between the U.S. government and the
oil industry appeared to be widening....the (Clinton) administration
has refused to accept the industry's rejection and has mounted a
determined diplomatic effort to keep the Baku-Ceyhan scheme
alive....The result has been increasing friction and loss of (U.S.)
credibility on the pipeline issue."
One possible reason the U.S. stubbornly clings to the now rejected
Turkish pipeline may be Turkey's ever increasing value as a
strategic ally. Before the peace agreement, there were plans for
NATO planes to begin striking Serbia from Turkish bases like
Bandirma and Balikesir. Turkey supplied the U.N. coalition with its
northern air bases for 1991's successful Persian Gulf campaign
against Iraq.
Making Turkey the major Western conduit for the Caspian oil basin
jackpot would help the NATO member evolve from a third world
economic backwater to a major European player. And of course, a
significant NATO presence in Turkey would place Euro-America's
enforcers on the doorstep of the Caspian oil fields.
NATO Slips into Caspian Region
"The Clinton administration has also offered the promise of greater
U.S. defense cooperation with Azerbaijan. For example, NATO,
through its Partnership for Peace program, has established the
Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, or CENBAT," reports Jofi
Joseph in a January 1999 case study on "Pipeline Politics" for
Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs.
"As part of one of the first joint exercises involving American
soldiers and the CENBAT force, 500 members of the U.S. Army's
82nd Airborne Division parachuted into Kazakhstan (Azerbaijan's
oil rich neighbor across the Caspian Sea) after a 23- hour flight from
Ft. Bragg. The impressive display powerfully represented the
strategic reach of the U.S.; the Kazakhstan deputy foreign minister
stated, 'Five years ago, no one here could even dream of such
things as American soldiers dropping out of the sky into a remote
area of Kazakhstan.' "
Prof. Joseph adds, "Evolving closer defense ties with Azerbaijan's
neighbors sends a clear signal that the U.S. and NATO are
interested in the security of the region, of which Azerbaijan is one
of the most valuable pieces."
Joseph isn't the only one who sees a compelling NATO interest in
the Caspian region. RFE's Michael Lelyveld, says that a U.S.
military presence in Azerbaijan is inevitable, especially as Western
leaders continue to expand NATO's protective umbrella:
"Having said yes to Eastern Europe, the U.S. and NATO may not
be able to close the door on a region that is seen as a strategic
prize.... Security for the planned Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the
trans-Caspian gas line may be impossible without some U.S. role or
credible support.....Because of Russia's role in the region, there may
be no power other than the United States, or U.S. backed
organizations, that can serve as a guarantor of peace."
The China Connection
Getting Caspian oil to world markets may be a boon for another big
player just now emerging on the world's economic stage. Here's
how the Clinton Energy Department described China's oil needs just
months before the Balkan War began:
"China's economic growth has made it the second largest
energy-consuming nation in the world. This rapid growth has
outstripped China's domestic oil production and, in 1993, China
became a net oil importer. Imports currently account for 15% of
total consumption, but they are projected to increase to between 40
and 50% of China's consumption by 2020."
China's demand for oil could have a major impact on world markets
unless new reserves are tapped. U.S. oil and gas interests are now
the largest investor in China's petroleum sector. The Clinton Energy
and Commerce Departments have already begun talks in Beijing
about new opportunities for oil exploration and development.
Interestingly enough, Roger Tamraz, the oil pipeline gadfly who
pushed the Clinton administration to get behind a Caspian route
through Turkey, turned his sights eastward when those plans
foundered. At last report, Tamraz has the support of the China
National Petroleum Company in new efforts to help Beijing tap into
the Caspian oil jackpot.
Europe's Goals, America's Troops
In April, a new strategic concept was adopted by the NATO alliance
at its 50th anniversary celebration in Washington, D.C.. The new
initiative "propels the U.S. military into unlimited responsibilities for
policing a new world order," according to syndicated columnist
Robert Novak.
One Senator told Novak that the shift in NATO policy is so
dramatic that it might be necessary to submit the revisions to
Congress for ratification, since the move formalizes the new U.S.
role as global policeman.
These new responsibilities begin in the Balkans, but where do they
lead?
Novak noted that British Prime Minister Tony Blair seemed
extraordinarily enthusiastic about NATO's expanding role; which is
a great bargain from Blair's standpoint if the current division of
labor holds. The U.S. is currently shouldering about 80% of the
Balkan war effort today.
Blair regaled the gathering with his own theories about " a new
doctrine of international community." According to Novak, "He
made it clear that the West now recognizes no bar to intervention
into the domestic affairs of a sovereign country." Meanwhile,
Clinton sat passively as the Brit outlined their alliance's new
ambitions.
Perhaps the President knew the Prime Minister had said too much,
inadvertently lifting the veil on the West's designs beyond Kosovo --
which may one day lead all the way to the Caspian Sea.
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