RB, According to my sources, The KLA has already begun to murder and torture political opponents and remnant Serbs in Kosovo....
2225 GMT, 990613 - According to a source outside of the NATO air base at Aviano, NATO aircraft sortied on Sunday, June 13, between 6:45 pm and 8:30 pm local time. This included 2 E-6 Prowlers, 6 F-16s, 2 F-18s, loaded with full ordinance packs. Three A-10s also took off. The planes returned without ordinance. One F-15 appeared to have been damaged and was approached by fire and ambulance immediately upon landing. The observer reported extremely heavy security, in excess of any seen during the war itself. We cannot confirm or deny this report but are passing it on as it is sufficiently detailed to be credible and will provide NATO spokesmen an opportunity to confirm or deny the report. It seems to indicate that combat sorties have resumed or that intense training is going on during a period one would expect to be devoted to R&R.
1955 GMT, 990613 - Itar-Tass is reporting that Russia is insisting on the principle of no direct subordination of Russian troops to NATO. First Deputy Minister Alexander Avdeyev has stated that "It is pscyhologically difficult" for NATO to give Russia a sector of its own. . "Unfortunately, their mentality is still not partnership."
1903 GMT, 990613 - Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Avdeyev stated on June 13 that Russia was not happy with the current settlement in Kosovo. He stated, "The Russian decisive contribution to the Kosovo settlement was repeatedly mentioned at the negotiations. But as long as you assess Russia in such a way, dear partners, do give Russia a worthy place in the security operation in Kosovo."
1715 GMT, 990613 - White House Spokesman Mike Hammer reported on June 13 that U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin will have another telephone conversation on June 14 to discuss Russia's participation in the peace enforcement mission in Kosovo.
The KLA Dilemma
Having entered Kosovo, NATO has taken on itself the task of bringing peace to the province. It now confronts a central problem. On one hand, NATO understands itself as politically neutral, which means that, as an advocate of democracy, who holds power in Kosovo is a matter of indifference. On the other hand, the policy that has led NATO into Kosovo has forced it into a set of alliances. Clearly, NATO is allied with the Kosovo Liberation Army. NATO has used the KLA for political and military reasons throughout the campaign. However, the KLA has no a priori claim on political power, at least if NATO's moral principles are to be followed. It is just one party among many and will have to compete democratically for political power.
This is the classic problem that we have seen many times. We are reminded of De Gaulle and the Communists in France during World War II. The Anglo-Americans made all sorts of promises to each, in order to induce them to support them in their war effort. Having won the war, Washington and London found themselves having made too many promises. Promises are easy to make during a war. They are harder to keep when peace arrives.
The KLA sees itself, much as the French partisans did, as having borne the burden of the war. Its members have suffered and bled. They do not expect to be rewarded by being given the opportunity to compete in elections. They do not expect to be rewarded at all. In their minds, they fought and they won. They are therefore prepared now to take power in their Kosovo. If NATO's justification for the war is correct, then political power must be transferred to the Kosovo population directly and as soon as possible. Since virtually all political parties in Kosovo have been shattered, and the KLA maintains its structural integrity because of NATO support, then it follows that the KLA, as the best organized party, should govern.
Not surprisingly, the KLA is not surrendering its weapons. Equally unsurprisingly, it has its own agenda, which includes dealing with Serbs remaining in the province and Albanians in Kosovo who might be opposed to their governance. Now, if NATO attempts to crush the KLA, two things happen. First, it violates its own principles on self-determination for Kosovo. Second, crushing the KLA leaves Kosovo with almost no intact political entities, leaving it to NATO to try to reconstruct the political status quo ante.
The fact is that the KLA sees itself as the new government of Kosovo. The government of Albania, on whom NATO has developed a substantial dependency based on geography, also regards the KLA as the new government. The KLA's goals are very different from NATO's. The KLA wants a greater Albania. NATO is committed to Kosovo remaining inside of Serbia. Other nations in the region, like Macedonia, Greece, and Italy would be appalled if the outcome of the war is a KLA-controlled Kosovo. So while NATO worries about how to get into Pristina, an even bigger question is looming and one that can no longer be evaded: what does NATO plan to do about the KLA? |
