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Pastimes : Kosovo -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: goldsnow who wrote (11822)	6/13/1999 7:02:00 PM
From: Douglas V. Fant	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 17770

goldsnow, Time will tell if the sudden resurgence of Conservatives in the United Kingdom is linked to Blair's Foreign Policy. Also how will we pay to establish and maintain 50,000 soldiers in readiness in Kosovo? This will be a deployment potentially for decades.... I am also not familiar with British parliamentary laws. can the Conservatives call for a vote of "no confidence" in Blair and force an early election?

To: goldsnow who wrote (11822)	6/13/1999 8:06:00 PM
From: James R. Barrett	Respond to of 17770

goldsnow, is Stratfor reading our minds or reading this thread? 2240 GMT, 990613 - The KLA Dilemma Having entered Kosovo, NATO has taken on itself the task of bringing peace to the province. It now confronts a central problem. On one hand, NATO understands itself as politically neutral, which means that, as an advocate of democracy, who holds power in Kosovo is a matter of indifference. On the other hand, the policy that has led NATO into Kosovo has forced it into a set of alliances. Clearly, NATO is allied with the Kosovo Liberation Army. NATO has used the KLA for political and military reasons throughout the campaign. However, the KLA has no a priori claim on political power, at least if NATO's moral principles are to be followed. It is just one party among many and will have to compete democratically for political power. This is the classic problem that we have seen many times. We are reminded of De Gaulle and the Communists in France during World War II. The Anglo-Americans made all sorts of promises to each, in order to induce them to support them in their war effort. Having won the war, Washington and London found themselves having made too many promises. Promises are easy to make during a war. They are harder to keep when peace arrives. The KLA sees itself, much as the French partisans did, as having borne the burden of the war. Its members have suffered and bled. They do not expect to be rewarded by being given the opportunity to compete in elections. They do not expect to be rewarded at all. In their minds, they fought and they won. They are therefore prepared now to take power in their Kosovo. If NATO's justification for the war is correct, then political power must be transferred to the Kosovo population directly and as soon as possible. Since virtually all political parties in Kosovo have been shattered, and the KLA maintains its structural integrity because of NATO support, then it follows that the KLA, as the best organized party, should govern. Not surprisingly, the KLA is not surrendering its weapons. Equally unsurprisingly, it has its own agenda, which includes dealing with Serbs remaining in the province and Albanians in Kosovo who might be opposed to their governance. Now, if NATO attempts to crush the KLA, two things happen. First, it violates its own principles on self-determination for Kosovo. Second, crushing the KLA leaves Kosovo with almost no intact political entities, leaving it to NATO to try to reconstruct the political status quo ante. The fact is that the KLA sees itself as the new government of Kosovo. The government of Albania, on whom NATO has developed a substantial dependency based on geography, also regards the KLA as the new government. The KLA's goals are very different from NATO's. The KLA wants a greater Albania. NATO is committed to Kosovo remaining inside of Serbia. Other nations in the region, like Macedonia, Greece, and Italy would be appalled if the outcome of the war is a KLA-controlled Kosovo. So while NATO worries about how to get into Pristina, an even bigger question is looming and one that can no longer be evaded: what does NATO plan to do about the KLA?