Sarmad -- Net stocks could collapse without any reason having to do with the stocks themselves. At this point, all data pertaining to the stocks -- their growth rates, earnings, business models, analysts statements etc. -- all of this might well be irrelevant. DITTO for the day traders and the elephants. The fate of the net stocks may well lie in the murky waters underlying the rising tide of interest rates. Nope -- it could come down to "hedge funds sellng treasuries". You might think treasuries are being sold in response to this or that piece of data. While you are looking at AMZN and YHOO and waiting for the 'big rebound' in these stocks, consider the following:
(1) These high pe and ps stocks will do what the bond market tells them to -- at least in the event of a rising bond yield. At 6.5% AMZN will drop like dung off the Empire State Building.
(2) Bond yields rise because there are more sellers than buyers. So who has been selling? And how long is the selling pressure likely to go on? Last fall, the collapse of the yen carry trade was a big shock to the market -- unwinding the yen carry trade forced a massive sell-off of bonds by hedge-funds to cover their yen exposure. Earlier, the widening of credit spreads was the trigger, in turn triggered by the drying up of liquidity due to the sudden repricing of risk premiums as investors realized how much extra credit risk was not yet priced into debt securities -- remember Asia? Russia? Collapse was only averted with the most incredible cloudburst of liquidity ever seen -- and three easings.
(3) Asia is now 'recovering' or at least coming off of life support. There is a shift from deflation and economic collapse with massive overcapcity to reflation, growth and tighter markets. And the US markets have been plenty tight for some time -- only offset by the weakness every place else.
The question for AMZN and the others is this: Is there now a drying up of liquidity as represented by the rising bond yields -- and who is do the selling (I.E. will they continue to sell)?
Gold is part of the story because it has been one of the major sources of HIDDEN liquidity since the collapse of the yen carry trade last fall. I attach the following analysis because it helps to clarify some of these issues.
Lessons for gold in yen fiascos
By Stephen Wyatt
The gold market is precariously positioned and an unexpected wild price rally with dire implications for hedge funds is very likely, right? To a number of analysts, this is not right. There is so much gold in the vaults of central banks and so many willing sellers that any hefty rally will be sold into.
And testament to the oversupply of gold is its price collapse to fresh 20-year lows last week.
But to some, like Mr Peter Hambro, ex-deputy managing director of Mocatta London and now chairman of Zoloto Mining, a gold miner in Russia, the risks are clear and growing. Just as the "yen carry trade" sent Long Term Capital Management and a swathe of other hedge funds scrambling for Fed protection and sent the yen surging and bond market falling, so may the new "gold carry trade" do the same to a number of other hedge funds, he argues.
And this sort of view is gaining some currency in some quarters.
The US-based Gold Anti-Trust Action group, GATA, has similar concerns
although it believes that the gold price is being artificially depressed by hedge funds with the support of some governments.
There has been so much gold borrowed by hedge funds over the past year, says Mr Hambro, that in the event of a gold rally, these funds would never be able to acquire adequate gold at the right price to repay this borrowed gold.
The yen carry trade involved the borrowing of yen at, say, 2 per cent per year and buying US Treasury bonds at 5.75 per cent, all the time leveraging up the transaction. Some groups bought higher-yielding Russian bonds before the Russian Government defaulted.
The problem here was that the dollar/yen currency exposure was not
covered/hedged. In late August, when the G3 decided to support the yen
around 147, suddenly the rising yen undermined the hedge funds. As they rushed to buy the yen to cover their exposures, the yen suddenly accelerated from around 138 ¥/$US to 111 ¥/$US in the first week of October.
Now, hedge funds are in a similar position with their "gold carry", argue some.
Just as no-one knew the extent of the yen short position of the hedge funds, today no-one knows the extent of the gold short position of the hedge funds. Some estimates are as high as 8,000 tonnes, but most analysts believe that speculators could be short anywhere between 1,000 tonnes and 3,000 tonnes. Last week, gold analyst Mr James Cross at the FT Gold Conference in London estimated total central bank gold lending at 4,000 tonnes. And this gold is spread between forward selling gold producers and speculators.
The "gold carry" involves the leveraged borrowing of gold by a hedge fund from a central bank. The cost of borrowing gold is currently around 1.5 per cent. The hedge fund then sells this borrowed gold and with the cash proceeds to invest in some form of government security, such as US Treasury bonds.
"Gold is 'fabricated' ... by people, firms, funds ... who sell gold that they do not own and deliver a promise instead of metal," says Mr Hambro.
There are two reasons for hedge funds playing this game. The first is the hope of buying the gold back at a lower price and redelivering itto the original lender. This is the original vanilla speculative short gold play.
The second, argues Mr Hambro, is driven by the necessity of hedge funds to demonstrate super-normal returns for their investors. This is the "gold carry" part of the trade.
An investor (hedge fund) with $US1 million and solid credit can leverage this into a gold tradeworth $10 million with any number of bullion bankers. Ten million dollars worth of gold is borrowed at, say, 1.5 per cent. If the gold is then sold, the money could be invested in US Treasury notes at, say, 5.5 per cent. The net result is a return of $400,000, or 40 per cent per annum, on the $1 million initially invested.
In the gold carry, unlike the yen carry, there is no currency exposure, but a gold price exposure and an interest rate exposure. If the gold price rallied, the hedge funds would have to repurchase the gold at a higher price and give this back to the lender - ultimately the central bank.
The argument of the "gold carry" critics is that the rush by hedge funds to cover their gold short position would be so great that the price of gold could soar and hedge fund bankruptcies could eventuate.
The hedge funds are "staring disaster in the face", says Mr Hambro. If any one central banker asked for their gold back now, "there is no chance that they would get it back".
"It has all been sold to China and India and is proudly worn around the necks of the beautiful brides. All the central bankers own is a paper promise from a Master of the Universe," he says.
This sort of argument is, of course, music to gold miners' ears. Many, and probably most well- recognised analysts in the markets, are not at all convinced that such concerns are valid.
"There is a lot of gold out there," says Mr Alan Heap, commodities analyst with Salomon Smith Barney. He says that central banks are very willing lenders. After all, they still hold in their vaults a third of the gold ever mined.
Mr Robert Sleeper, of the BIS, said at the FT Gold Conference that a gold price rebound "will take very few prisoners" among short positions.
Others suggest that gold producers and central banks would welcome the rally and sell into it with relief - the gold producers to lock in future returns and the central banks to "rebalance portfolios", converting non-income earning gold into US Treasuries or Japanese bonds or German bonds.
In short, most analysts argue that the enormous mobilisation of gold by central banks via their gold lending and selling policies will ensure adequate supply, even into a short sharp covering rally by gold carry-playing hedge funds.
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