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Non-Tech : Greenspan, Rubin & Co - the Most Irresponsible Team Ever?? -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: MythMan who wrote (183)6/29/1999 5:56:00 PM
From: Cynic 2005  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 309
 
Another new-era prponent who blasts at Greenspam from a different angle.
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June 29, 1999


The Fed, Not the Economy,
Is Overheating
By Brian S. Wesbury, chief economist at Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson in Chicago.

It now appears all but certain that the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates tomorrow. Keynesians and monetarists are saying that it is about time. Even some supply-siders favor the move, but argue weakly that it is "for the wrong reasons." Nonetheless, the Fed is making a costly mistake: Raising rates is the wrong move for the wrong reasons.

Why would the Fed raise rates? Because the economy has been growing at a 4% rate and the Fed believes that the sustainable level of economic growth is just 3% (1% labor-force growth and 2% productivity growth). The excess growth, according to Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, has been "spurred by the rise in equity and home prices," a "wealth effect" that the Fed believes has added at least one percentage point to growth over the past three years. This, he fears, threatens to produce an increase in inflation by lowering the rate of unemployment to a point where upward wage pressures will become irresistible.

The Fed's reasoning, however, contains some questionable assumptions, the first of which is that productivity is growing at just 2%. This figure is at best a guess: Productivity is virtually impossible to measure in the service sector and new technologies have made measurement errors worse.

Thus, even as academic economists debate whether productivity is rising by 1.75% or 2% per year, "New Era" companies--that is, those using new technologies to raise productivity--are pushing productivity through the roof. For example, Amazon.com sold $375,000 worth of books per employee in 1998, while their closest competitor, Barnes & Noble, sold just $100,000. Amazon accomplished this 275% increase in productivity in three years--an average annual increase of 55%. More broadly, the explosion of online possibilities has radically increased the value of computers even as their price has fallen. When prices fall, but value rises, by definition productivity is increasing.

This overall increase in productivity is immeasurable. But where we can measure productivity, it is surging. For example, productivity in durable-goods manufacturing has increased at a 5.9% annual rate--the fastest it has grown in the postwar era and stronger even than the best estimates of productivity gains during the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, were it not for the serious policy implications, the current suggestion that productivity is growing at 2% would be a laughing matter. Productivity growth is not only much greater than 2% but will remain so for decades.

But what about the so-called wealth effect? The thinking at the Fed seems to be that raising interest rates will damp the stock-market boom and thus force consumers to spend more conservatively. Alas, there is a flaw in this reasoning: The "wealth effect" does not exist. As most accountants--but too few economists--know, it is impossible for the economy as a whole to spend the wealth created by the stock market.

Think about it. If I buy a stock for $50 a share and it appreciates to $100 a share, I definitely have more paper wealth. But in order to spend that wealth, I must sell the stock to someone else. Only then will I have $100 to spend, while the buyer will have the stock but not the money. For every credit, there must be a debit. Increases in asset prices cannot increase aggregate demand. [What a bunch of baloney. How can this guy can explain the fall in savings rate?]

The same logic applies to homeowners or stockholders who borrow against their assets in order to spend. It is impossible for aggregate spending to increase because for every borrower there must be a saver. Once again, credits in the economy must equal debits.

The stock market represents the value of future earnings. And when productivity is strong, stock prices go up. However, while a company or individual can spend those future earnings by issuing or selling stock, the economy as a whole cannot. We must wait for the actual earnings before aggregate demand increases.

A third point on which the Fed errs is his view that low unemployment presages inflation. This notion flatly ignores the laws of supply and demand. A rise in nominal wages will not create inflation as long as the Fed does not accommodate the higher wages with excess money creation.

But there is a still more important point. There are now roughly 800,000 new business starts in the U.S. per year. Many of these are highly efficient New-Era companies that will eventually replace less efficient Old Era ones. One mechanism for this transformation is higher real wages. Highly productive New-Era companies can afford higher real wages, while less productive Old-Era companies cannot.

Again, the book-delivery business offers a good case study. Crown Books filed Chapter 11 last year and Lauriat's, a 127-year-old, 72-store Boston bookseller, closed its doors just weeks ago. Many Old-Era industries are overstaffed; higher real wages will force them to fold or transform. But the fact that the unemployment rate continues to fall suggests how effective New-Era companies have been in picking up the pieces. It's a sign of a dynamic economy, not an overheating one.

The Fed's decision to raise rates will certainly make life harder for old-era firms. By mistaking low unemployment for a sign of overheating the Fed runs the risk of creating deflationary forces that could harm the economy, especially in the commodity sector. Already, low prices are forcing mines to shut down and commodity producers to seek trade protection or federal aid through emergency spending bills. These pressures are just as real as the strong growth in wages and consumption but far more damaging.

Because the Fed is convinced that the economy is growing too rapidly, the bond market has priced in a significant interest-rate hike. The run-up in bond yields during recent months is partly due to misplaced fears of inflation, but mostly due to fear of the Fed. For the Fed to use the rise in bond yields as evidence of higher inflationary expectations is just circular logic.

The Fed is ignoring the signals of commodity prices and New-Era technologies and seems intent on bursting what it thinks is an asset bubble and an overheating economy. No one knows how far the Fed must go to slow the economy to 3% real growth. But the data suggest that attempting to do so may cause the onset of severe deflation and spell the end of the New Era. The real problem today is not that the economy is overheating, but that the Fed is using the wrong models to justify the wrong move.




To: MythMan who wrote (183)6/29/1999 6:00:00 PM
From: Cynic 2005  Respond to of 309
 
Another from the editorial page of WSJ:
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June 15, 1999


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Review & Outlook
The Fed's Curio Closet
The U.S. economy is thriving. Creativity and new technologies abound, people are working in record numbers and even the battered world economy shows signs of pulling out of crisis. This is all good news. But the mood now could hardly be called exuberant. Everyone is worrying about inflation.

Or, would it be more accurate to say that everyone is worrying about the Fed worrying about inflation?


This distinction matters, because there are signs the Federal Reserve is worrying about inflation for the wrong reasons. While modern markets keep trying to move on to the 21st century, the Fed won't let go of such hand-cranked notions as the Phillips curve, or NAIRU, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment--a concept as dense as its name.

These models ply the idea that there is a tradeoff between unemployment and inflation: that you can have fast growth, or you can have low inflation, but you can't have both at once. So to fight inflation, stamp out growth. Or at least stamp out "overheating"--whatever that may mean.

This is nonsense. Good growth with low inflation is exactly what this country has been enjoying for years now. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, this country had high inflation and low growth--the very opposite of what the Phillips curve would imagine. Over the past 20 years, the Phillips curve has failed completely to serve as a model with any predictive power.

Phillips-curve economics never made much sense, even in the days when it seemed to coincide somewhat better with reality. Inflation is a matter of price level, and depends on the supply of money (and the demand for it, which confounds simple-minded monetarism). So, you might think the Fed would shelve the Phillips curve in some library of quaint but useless curiosities, maybe next to the flat-earth exhibit. Nope. As one senior Wall Street banker notes, some of these folks grew up with the Phillips curve implanted in their brains.

Fear of too much growth was the basic reason for the Fed's warning last month that its policy had "tilted" toward fear of inflation. Tighter money might soon be called for, said a Fed press release: "against the background of already tight domestic labor markets and ongoing strength in demand in excess of productivity gains." (Translation: Lots of Americans are employed, and we'd better soon put a stop to that.)

It makes sense, of course, to be alert to real signs of inflation--which disrupts commerce and costs the economy. Certainly the Fed needs guideposts in deciding how fast to create money. The place to look, however, is not the Fed's curio closet, but the market itself. Folks with real money on the line every day have lots of incentive to pay attention not to Phillips-whatevers, but to real life, and their judgments will be reflected in the prices they pay to clear the market.

There, the signals on inflation are mixed. As the nearby charts show, the Consumer Price Index rose noticeably last month. Much of that change appears to have been a one-time rise in the price of oil. And as a measure of price level, the CPI itself falls well short of telling us what's actually happening in the way of quality of life and productivity in this country, where the hard-to-quantify service industries increasingly dominate. Certainly the May CPI number, due out Wednesday, bears watching. But nothing here so far warrants panic.

On the contrary, the price of gold has been hitting record lows, suggesting not inflation, but deflation. With the exception of oil, where the price has been driven up by OPEC production curbs, other commodity prices have also been weak. And the dollar, despite some bad days recently, remains high relative to other major currencies this decade. Falling commodities and high foreign exchange rates are signs of tight money, not easy money.

In quest of other inflation indicators that start to steer clear of Phillips-thinking, one intriguing measure involves some of the relatively new inflation-indexed bonds that Treasury began issuing last year. As Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has repeatedly observed, the spread between yields of these inflation-indexed bonds and fixed-rate Treasurys offers a theoretical measure of what the market expects in the way of inflation. To the extent this is a valid indicator, it does suggest an inflation uptick; see nearby chart, where the shaded area indicates the spread. Back in early October of 1998, the difference in yield between inflation-indexed and fixed-rate, 30-year bonds reached a low of only about 1.29%--suggesting expected inflation of 1.29%. Since then, this spread showing expected inflation has widened to 2.38%.


As indicators, though, even these bonds come with caveats, as Chairman Greenspan keeps noting. For one, the flexible-rate bonds are indexed to the CPI, itself a faulty measure. Also, given limited experience with this measure, we're not sure to what extent the spread may include market expectations of what the Fed might do next. It was also at about this level a year ago, when there was a lot of talk about a NAIRU-induced rate increase. When the Fed began signaling it would instead cut rates, and then did so because of the international economic crisis, the spread fell.

The rationale for Fed policy matters a great deal. If it seems justified by tomorrow's price announcement and related to actual market prices, an interest rate boost would not reverse economic growth or roil markets. But if the Fed is getting on the NAIRU bandwagon, making growth itself the enemy, we would be in for a series of tightenings until we get the recession this perverse ideology demands.



To: MythMan who wrote (183)6/29/1999 6:02:00 PM
From: Cynic 2005  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 309
 
One more. This is on Greenshit preservation for future use in Olympics as bronze medal! -g-
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June 29, 1999


The Greenspan Rule
In a country with inflation so low it's almost gone, it is intriguing to see the Federal Reserve on red alert, with Chairman Greenspan madly signaling that the Fed in its meetings today and tomorrow may tighten money to ward off inflation. Leading inflation indicators have been mixed, with May's flat consumer price report canceling the April alarm. The best argument for a boost, maybe the only one, is that the Chairman wants it. In his 12 years as Chairman, Mr. Greenspan has logged a record solid enough that we're prone to bet he knows what he's doing. The question is, does the rest of the world know what Mr. Greenspan is doing? How, precisely, does he decide when and how much to ease or tighten money?

Having spent much time ourselves deciphering the speeches, acts and runic utterances of one of this nation's most successful Fed Chairmen, we figure Mr. Greenspan's technique goes roughly as follows: He fuels up on a few tons of data, checks such vital readings as the consumer price index, the price of gold, the stock and bond markets and the extent to which his countrymen are sounding irrational, exuberant, off on an unsustainable track, or whatever.

Then he flies by the seat of his pants.

This approach has worked for the economy, and is of course politically handy for Mr. Greenspan. It lets him make his own calculations, and the explanations of them let him throw bones to various constituencies. In particular, it spares him having to actually shut down such nonsense as the apparently endless discussion in some dusty quarters of the Fed over the Phillips Curve--which wrongly preaches that high growth brings inflation. Growth is good for an economy. It creates wealth, not inflation. The job of the Fed is not to decide how much wealth the country should be allowed to create, but to keep the price level steady enough so it's easy to create all we can.

Mr. Greenspan himself made clear in testimony to the Congressional Joint Economic Committee last week (excerpted nearby) that he doesn't think much of the Phillips Curve, or its sidekick notion, known as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU--which in the spirit of further nonsense argues that it's bad for everyone who wants a job to actually have one. The Phillips curve has "significant flaws," warned Mr. Greenspan, who also said that growth due to normal rises in employment and productivity should not be seen as "anything other than a plus." Yet the absence of a Phillips curve doesn't mean there are "no limits" to how fast employment can grow without raising a danger of inflation. The Phillips curve doesn't generally apply, that is, but does right now.

Well, OK, we guess. Our worry is that once the 73-year-old Mr. Greenspan moves on, whoever succeeds him may prove less skilled at off-the-cuff navigation. Word is that Mr. Greenspan might agree to stay, if offered reappointment when his term expires in June 2000, with a Presidential election campaign in progress. But there's no guarantee he won't at some point, say in a Gore or Bradley Presidency, be replaced by a Fed Chairman without such sure instincts. Someone trying to imitate his methods might either actually unleash inflation or, alternatively, crash the economy by picking the wrong time to follow the Phillips curve.

With Mr. Greenspan still in the Fed's top chair, this would be a good time for the Fed to try to codify his technique. Some form of some clear rule for Fed decisions might not be more reliable than Mr. Greenspan's pantseat, but would have the virtue of letting the rest of us understand what the Fed is doing, and giving us a standard against which to measure future action. Most immediately, such a rule could provide enough certainty to help the bond markets avoid the convulsions that come with trying endlessly to second-guess the Chairman.

We know it's a tall order. The Fed's job is to keep the price level stable, and the challenge there starts with simply figuring how to measure whatever it is we call the price level. Any rule amounts to a grab for certainty, which can never be completely achieved in a fast-changing world. There is even a danger that the best of Mr. Greenspan may become outdated by changes in technology and the economy that no one can predict right now. But these dangers pale next to the worry that Mr. Greenspan's departure, whenever it comes, might leave us adrift.

In the long run a Greenspan rule could transform the talents of one man into a useful legacy for the future. Mr. Greenspan has presided over an era of bounty, in which the Fed looked mainly to steadying the money, and left the economy free to grow. That's a great way to navigate, and unless Mr. Greenspan plans to remain Fed Chairman forever, it's time he tried to share