To: goldsnow who wrote (37151 ) 7/14/1999 9:35:00 PM From: Eashoa' M'sheekha Respond to of 116960
ANALYSIS-Blair magic loses its touch in N.Ireland Updated 7:00 PM ET July 14, 1999 By John Morrison LONDON, July 15 (Reuters) - For a political magician of the calibre of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, it was as if the magic wand, the spells and wizardry had suddenly ceased to work. All that was missing was to be booed off stage. Frustrated and disappointed, according to his office, Blair suffered an unprecedented rebuff on Wednesday when the Ulster Unionist Party took only 15 minutes to reject his plans to end the impasse in Northern Ireland. While Blair is likely to do his best to salvage what he can from the crisis, his failed gamble this week in trying to bounce both sides into a deal is bound to raise questions about his judgment, which is usually hard to fault. After months of stalemate -- during which he and the Irish government tried to nudge the Protestant Ulster Unionists and the Catholic Sinn Fein into finding their own compromise -- it was Blair's own decision to opt for strong arm tactics. First he proclaimed an arbitrary deadline at the end of June, then spent a whole week in Belfast with his Irish counterpart Bertie Ahern locked in ultimately unsuccessful talks with the two sides. Breaking with past tactics, Blair and Ahern published their own blueprint entitled "The Way Forward" which would have meant Unionists welcoming Sinn Fein into government before its Irish Republican Army (IRA) allies gave up any weapons. Hailing the plan as the only chance for peace in a generation, Blair appears to have misjudged the Unionists' readiness to believe his claims about a "seismic shift" in IRA policy over arms. Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble dismissed this as wishful thinking and Sinn Fein did nothing to back up Blair's idea. The IRA, maintaining its long silence on the subject of disarming, did nothing to make Blair's claim look more credible. Many in Northern Ireland felt Blair also miscalculated by picking the most difficult two weeks of the year -- Northern Ireland's early July "marching season" -- to seek a deal. Continuing his high-wire strategy, Blair decided to rush a bill through parliament within three days. But the fast-track approach misfired. Instead of putting Trimble's party under pressure, it was Blair who ended up racing against the clock, seeking frantically on Wednesday to draft fresh concessions to the Unionists. By refusing even to put the concessions to his 110-member party executive, Trimble called the prime minister's bluff. By early Wednesday evening, Blair was already seeking to prepare the ground for the expected rejection by calling on the Unionists not to close the door on the deal forever. The problem for Blair is that his greatest triumph, last year's Good Friday peace accord, was only achieved by burying several key issues of disagreement in layers of political fudge. This was true above all for guerrilla disarmament, which he recognised early on was of great importance to the majority Protestant community and their Unionist political leaders. Under heavy pressure from Blair and his ally U.S. President Bill Clinton, Trimble reluctantly agreed to a vague formula which lacked any clear commitment by the IRA to give up the weapons it used to fight British rule and bound all sides only to do their best to achieve disarmament. Trimble's "yes" to the Good Friday accord divided his own party, but assurances from Blair that disarmament should start immediately helped produce a clear majority for the deal in referendums on both sides of the Irish border in May 1998. More than a year later, Protestants feel Blair's promises were of little value. As the IRA remained silent and its Sinn Fein political wing offered no fresh assurances on a weapons handover, Trimble's internal party rivals gained strength. Meanwhile, the fudge of the Good Friday accord proved ever stickier for Blair, leaving him less and less room for manoeuvre to satisfy both sides. On Wednesday, his legendary powers of persuasion failed. Blair's instinct for compromise is based on a deep, almost religious belief that no political dispute is irreconcilable if enough effort is put into bringing opposite sides together. "I am an eternal optimist," he said this month, refusing to admit the possibility of failure in Northern Ireland. Despite saying he had no "Plan B" up his sleeve, analysts believe Blair will seek to limit the damage and try again in the autumn to bring the two sides together. Above all he will try to keep intact his political understanding with the Irish government. At home in Britain, public opinion is unlikely to be too unkind. But the risk he runs is that this month's botched attempt at forcing a deal will leave both sides in Northern Ireland even more mistrustful than before.