"Democrats always liked India. It is the Republicans who want to "tilt" in Pakistan's favour"
Hello Mohan:
Here is an interesting history.
idsa-india.org
In Whitehouse....... Years
Democrats....... till 52, 61-68,77-80, 93-current
Republicans...... 53-60,69-76,81-92
Some excerpts,
The US South Asia policy document, NSC 5409 titled United States Policy Towards South Asia dated February 19, 1954, which came in tandem with the decision to arm Pakistan, stated:
"A result may be an intensification of differences in US-Indian relations and possibly more friendly Indian relations with the Soviet Union, although there would probably not be any major change in India's foreign policies."
The conclusions of the US intelligence community were no different. The National Intelligence Estimate titled Prospects for Northern Tier and Consequences dated June 22, 1954, stated that although the northern tier security arrangements would:
...in some degree increase Indo-US tensions, it is unlikely that an open rift would develop between the US and India as a result of this key factor alone...Should Pakistan be materially strengthened as a result of US aid, India would also seek to build up its own forces. In any event, it is extremely unlikely that India would move significantly closer to the Soviet bloc."
President John F. Kennedy's prompt response in his letter dated October 29, 1962 was: "I want to give you support as well as sympathy." India's request for military assistance from the United States was made on October 29, 1962, in the form of a letter from Nehru to Kenneth Galbraith, the US Ambassador to India and a friend of Kennedy. While seeking military assistance, Nehru, however, asked the US not to insist on military alliance as a quid pro quo. India's turning to the US was further strengthened by the Soviet Union's response during the Sino-Indian war with Moscow advising New Delhi to accept China's proposals for further talks on the border issue.
On December 2, 1971, two days before Pakistan declared war on India, Washington announced suspension of military sales to India, which most importantly comprised a $70 million air defence communication equipment. On the night of December 3, the Pakistani Air Force attacked eight Indian airfields on India's western front and the next day Islamabad declared war on India. On December 6, the US froze its economic assistance to India which included $87.6 million worth of aid already in the pipeline. The next day, December 7, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco declared in a State Department Press background briefing that India bore the major responsibility for the war. In the UN Security Council, China supported a US-introduced resolution criticising India for starting the war and urging an immediate ceasefire. Britain and France, two loyal North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, however, abstained from voting while the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. The alignments could not have been more pronounced. The US then moved to the UN General Assembly and managed to garner an overwhelming support of 104 to 11 with 10 abstentions.
What is disconcerting is that Nixon did not mind risking a possible world war. Kissinger's assessment was that China would intervene militarily in support of Pakistan which could offset Russian military intervention in support of India. The US, according to Kissinger's book, would have backed the Chinese in such an eventuality. India, however, had correctly assessed that China would maintain and limit its support to Pakistan in the form of verbal and moral encouragement. When the war on India's front ended, the US incorrectly concluded that India would try to retake parts of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan. Despite repeated assurances by the Indians and even the Soviets that New Delhi had no such plans, Nixon on December 10 ordered the despatch of the USS Enterprise along with supporting vessels as Task Force 74 from the Far East, where it was then stationed, to the Bay of Bengal. The reasons remained unclear.
Nevertheless, the Carter Administration encouraged New Delhi to consider arms purchases from Washington in keeping with the logic that led to the reversal of the arms supply policy towards Pakistan. In 1980, an Indian military procurement team visited the US and examined the possibility of purchasing a $300 million worth arms package comprising some 200 long-range 155 mm Howitzers, 60 TOW launchers and about 4,000 anti-tank missiles.
President Ronald Reagan's tenure began bluntly, almost with hostility towards India. Ironically enough, Reagan's tenure was to culminate with gradual warming of bilateral defence ties.
On June 15, 1981, Under Secretary of State James Buckley reached agreement in Islamabad on a $2.5 billion economic and military aid programme to Pakistan. This included the controversial sale of 40 state-of-the-art F-16 multi-role fighters, then among the most advanced fighters previously supplied only to Egypt and Israel outside NATO. Not only was the F-16 superior to anything that the IAF then possessed, it also marked the first ever introduction of a multi-role aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons with a strike range that went beyond New Delhi.
The US Administration under President Reagan opposed provision of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur facility; sought to curtail access to concessional multilateral aid; voted against a major International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to India; and even permitted a Sikh militant leader accused of indulging in terrorist attacks in India to enter the US without prohibition on his activities.
A watershed decision on Indo-US defence relations occurred on January 12, 1995 when the two sides signed an Agreed Minute on defence cooperation during the visit to India by US Secretary of Defence William J. Perry, the third visit by an American Secretary of Defence. Hailed as a "milestone" and the "beginning of a new era" in bilateral relations,
Happy Reading.
Regards,
Satish |
