Christopher, on the "ideology" of business.
True, money does not have an "ideology." But people and companies that have/make money do have an "ideology," in the sense that they have interests that drive them to try to affect government policy by lobbying for, or against, specific legislative action. And in the process of doing so, they will generally elaborate, or borrow, certain concepts that serve to rationalize those interests as being in the general interest. ("What's good for General Motors is good for the country.")
After all, the first person to develop the notion of "ideology" was Karl Marx, who, as you will recall, defined it basically as a system of ideas reflecting the economic interests of a particular class. Now few people (including present-day Marxists) use "ideology" in precisely that sense today, but at the same time, few would say there is no relationship between class/economic interests, on the one hand, and political philosophy and/or practical policy on the other.
Now, where Business is concerned, I personally would agree that its "ideology" is neither "conservative" nor "liberal," and that its political activism is usually restricted to areas where it has a direct interest. As a matter of fact, that was part of the point I was trying to make (without writing an Opus).
In short, a given corporate executive could lobby for a One-China policy (which for some reason you consider a "liberal" policy, even though it was launched under Nixon), because he thinks it would be better for his company's trade dealings; but where social issues are concerned (issues in the outcome of which he has no direct economic interest), he could be highly "conservative."
Now, let us take your discussion of the one-China issue. You say the following:
..I would venture that liberals support the one China fiction (Clinton certainly does), while most conservatives follow the Helms position that Taiwan should be free from Commie control and that we should say bluntly that we support a free Taiwan...
There was a conservative Nixonian position once, but that is beside the point here. I just want to juxtapose the above to the passage from Fred Hiatt's Washington Post piece that I quoted in my last post (emphasis mine):
China's growing economy, and the U.S. investment that Washington had encouraged, <created a powerful business lobby that opposed any rethinking of U.S. policy. That more than anything moved Clinton from his 1992 campaign opposition to "coddling" Beijing's dictators to his 1998 willingness to slap down the aspirations of democratic Taiwan while traveling in Shanghai. "Under Clinton, commerce became the dominant motivating force behind American policy, Mann writes.
taiwandc.org
I really do not know that much about the history of China policy. But if Mann is right (and even if he is not), it seems to me you put rather too much emphasis on the role of "convictions," and too little on "concrete interests," in the shaping of policy.
Let me take another example, one with which I am familiar -- namely, Azerbaijan and Caspian Oil. In 1992, under pressure from the Armenian lobby, the U.S. Congress included an article (Article #907) in the so-called Freedom Support Act, which dealt with support to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Article #907 restricted aid to Azerbaijan, until such time as that country lifted its blocade of Armenia (imposed during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict).
Then came the Caspian oil rush, and the Contract of the Century. Azeri President Aliyev made it clear to the American oil companies involved in the deal that he expected some quid pro quo for his cooperation. So the oil companies launched a major campaign to get the Congress to drop Article #907, with the help of their top "consultants," who included many, many luminaries of former U.S. administrations -- Alexander Haig, Jim Baker, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, etc., etc.
Of course, they did not just argue that Article #907 was bad for the oil business. That would have been a bit crass. They relied heavily on other arguments as well, arguments demonstrating that Article #907 was unfair. Indeed it was unfair. But I doubt whether the oil companies would have cared, if it had not also injured their interests.
Well, the assault did not work at first. Article #907 stood its ground for several years. But a revision of the article is included in the comprehensive Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, which is due to be voted on soon in the House and the Senate. Co-sponsors come from both sides of the aisle, and my bet is that the measure (designed to provide assistance to the entire oil-rich region of the South Caucasus and Central Asia) will pass. And I personally believe that the persistence of the oil companies will prove to have had a great deal to do with it.
BTW, here is Mobil on the Silk Road Strategy Act:
mobil.com
I am not trying to say that the oil companies were necessarily wrong, still less wicked, to push for this measure. My point is simply that economic interests, as well as abstract ideas, affect policy preferences.
Was that long-winded enough? <gg>
Joan
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