Richard and Zeev,
The latest informed public commentary on the Columbian political situation that I have seen is last Thursday's (7/29/99) Stratfor Global Intelligence Update, which deals with implications of the crash of our RC-7B (one of only six such intelligence gathering aircraft) while on a mission nominally designated as assistance to the Columbian government's anti-drug efforts.
The copyrighted document, rights to which are hereby acknowledged, can be found at Stratfor's GIU website at:
stratfor.com
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Colombia/United States
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
Colombia Loses its Secret Weapon against the FARC
July 29, 1999
SUMMARY
Last week's crash of a U.S. RC-7B intelligence gathering aircraft
in southern Colombia not only highlighted the rapidly escalating
U.S. involvement in the war against Colombia's guerrillas, but
also opened a window of opportunity for the rebels. Two of their
most recent offensives were quickly rebuffed by the Colombian
military, almost certainly thanks to intelligence gathered by this
aircraft. Until a replacement is rotated into the area, the FARC
can move with greater freedom, and may strike back not only at
the Colombian military, but at its U.S. allies.
ANALYSIS
The Colombian Army, long outmatched in the Colombian
hinterlands by the rebel Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), scored two quick and decisive victories over
FARC guerrillas in recent weeks. The first incident occurred in
the run-up to peace talks when the FARC attempted to strike at
the mountain headquarters of paramilitary leader Carlos
Castano, but was quickly intercepted and driven back by
Colombian Army troops. The second incident occurred following
the postponement of peace talks when a column of FARC
guerrillas marching on Bogota was intercepted and routed by
the Colombian Army. The successful interceptions of FARC
attacks – more than anything intelligence coups – were quite
stunning for a military that is renowned for falling victim to FARC
ambushes. Clearly, something was up.
What was up, in the words of one of our readers from Cali, was
Colombia's new "Ghost Plane," the U.S. Army's
intelligence-gathering De Havilland RC-7B that is now down,
crashed into the side of a mountain on the border of Putumayo
and Narino states in southern Colombia. Rescuers have
reached the widely scattered wreckage of the aircraft, which
crashed sometime in the early morning hours of July 23, and
have reported thus far finding the remains of four of the aircraft's
seven member crew – five U.S. soldiers and two Colombians.
All seven are presumed to have died in the crash.
The RC-7B is a COMINT (communications intelligence) and
IMINT (imagery intelligence) aircraft, based on the four-engined
De Havilland Dash 7 commuter plane. According to Jane's
Aircraft Upgrades, it is equipped with an HF/VHF/UHF/SHF
intercept and direction finding system, an infrared linescanner,
Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) camera, daylight imaging
system (television camera), and an MTI/SAR sensor. The basic
sensor package can also be augmented with low-light
television, moving target indicator cueing radar, synthetic
aperture radar, multispectral camera, acoustic sensor, precision
targeting subsystem, and direct air-to-satellite data link. Variants
of the RC-7B, of which there are approximately six total aircraft,
have been used to aid FEMA disaster relief efforts after
Hurricane Marilyn and for "operations other than war" in Haiti.
The one that crashed in Colombia was based out of Fort Bliss,
home of EPIC, the El Paso Intelligence Center.
The official details of the mission are sketchy and inconsistent.
Early reports claimed the aircraft was carrying contracted U.S.
civilian counternarcotics advisors, though it was quickly
acknowledged that the aircraft and its crew were from the U.S.
Army's Southern Command. According to Colombian Air Force
officials, cited by Agence France-Presse, the aircraft was on a
routine counternarcotics mission over Putumayo state, filming
coca and poppy crops. Putumayo is an area of heavy drug
trafficking and production – and FARC guerrilla activity. The
officials reported that the aircraft left its "work zone" and may
have crashed due to a "navigational error" compounded by poor
weather creating a low flight ceiling. U.S. officials speculated it
might have crashed into an uncharted mountain, perhaps in part
due to the chronic fog and low clouds in the area. The aircraft
reportedly radioed in for the last time at 0140 local time from a
position 50 miles south of San Jose del Guaviare. An alert was
sounded when it failed to return as scheduled, six hours later.
While the cause of the crash remains unclear, the Colombian
Air Force chief, General Hector Velasco, ruled out the possibility
that it could have been shot down by insurgents, claiming it was
flying high enough to be safe.
Contradictions and questions are rife both in details of the crash
and in explanations of the plane's mission. The reason to
scud-run below the low clouds would be to make effective use of
daylight or low light television cameras, but it was some time
between 0140 and 0740 – mostly dark – and the aircraft was at
least equipped with an infrared camera and possibly a
multispectral camera. It was also taking tremendous risk for a
routine poppy filming mission, scud-running in unfamiliar and
uncharted territory with a high value asset – one of six RC-7Bs.
But how low was it flying? According to General Velasco, it was
high enough to be out of reach of the FARC. Assuming the FARC
are minimally armed with bargain basement anti-aircraft
systems, a man-portable 12.7mm machine gun, that would be
over about 1,600 meters above ground level. If, as reports have
indicated, the FARC has possession of man-portable surface to
air missiles, "safe" would be somewhere above 2,300 to 3,500
meters. Of course, if the plane simply strayed into a
mountainside, it was, for a moment too long, well within those
ranges.
According to the Los Angeles Times, U.S. Southern Command
refused to comment on whether the aircraft had been used to
eavesdrop on FARC communications. However, the speed and
precision with which the Colombian military has intercepted
recent FARC columns suggests otherwise. The Colombian
Army was twice vectored directly to major FARC columns, one of
which was in the normal area of operations of the RC-7B.
Colombia's El Espectador newspaper declared outright that, "A
U.S. official confirmed that practically all radio transmissions by
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia from the past two
months" were intercepted by U.S. surveillance equipment.
According to the newspaper, this has "provided the [Colombian]
army a huge strategic advantage over the rebels."
The FARC, which arguably would do so if it could, has not
claimed responsibility for the crash. However, the FARC
leadership warned on July 26 that the crash was an example of
what awaited the U.S. should it pursue what the FARC believes
is a planned invasion. The FARC continues to aver that U.S.
military advisors in Colombia are legitimate targets. The aircraft,
a potent symbol of increasing U.S. involvement in the war
against the Colombian rebels and a potent tool against those
rebels, would have been a prime target for the rebels. Whether
or not the FARC were in some way responsible for the crash, the
incident removes a key advantage enjoyed by the Colombian
military and has exposed some of the U.S. involvement in the
country.
U.S. involvement in Colombia is growing rapidly. Currently the
U.S. provides training for Colombian military officers and drug
enforcement police. According to the Los Angeles Times, about
a dozen U.S. soldiers are currently training a Colombian army
battalion at the Tolemaida military base in Colombia, and next
month the U.S. will reportedly begin training a Colombian river
patrol unit. In 1998, the U.S. Southern Command carried out
seven joint training operations in Colombia, involving some 30
to 40 U.S. troops each. Currently, 160 U.S. soldiers and 30
civilian Defense Department employees are acknowledged to
be in Colombia.
The Dallas Morning News cited anonymous U.S. sources
involved in the Colombian drug war as saying the definition of
the FARC as "narcoterrorists" has sufficiently blurred the line
between the drug war and the counterinsurgency effort to allow
U.S. troops to deploy forward surveillance posts in rebel territory.
Additionally, the sources claimed that U.S. intelligence services
are now employing retired Special Forces personnel to conduct
active patrols with the Colombian Army against the guerrillas.
U.S. military aid for Colombia has jumped since President
Andres Pastrana took office, with Congress approving a $289
million dollar package for Bogota last October. According to
Agence France-Presse, Colombia now ranks third behind Israel
and Egypt in the amount of U.S. military aid it receives. U.S. Drug
Policy Director General Barry McCaffrey has proposed offering
$1 billion in aid to Colombia and its drug producing neighbors,
and the Colombian military has requested $500 million.
While covert and overt U.S. aid for Colombia's
counter-narcoterrorist effort has jumped, and U.S. rhetoric has
skyrocketed, Washington appears committed to a still deeper
involvement. A U.S. proposal for the establishment of a
multinational intervention force for Latin America was rejected by
the OAS, but the U.S. has since offered intelligence and aviation
support to Colombia's neighbors. The line between the U.S.
drug war and Colombia's guerrilla war, always semantic at best,
is now gone. The only question remaining is how many U.S.
troops and assets Washington will push across it. And in the
meantime, with one of the key assets in small pieces on a
Colombian mountainside, how quickly will the FARC move to
exploit this window of opportunity to strike back? There is no
doubt that after their recent U.S.-facilitated defeats, U.S. troops
currently in Colombia will place far higher on the FARC's target
list.
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Although the pertinence to this thread is related to the content and information on the Columbian political situation, one cannot help but also be concerned with other considerations resulting from the loss of this valuable intelligence gathering asset, and about implications of what its demise in an unsecured location, not readily under our control and protection, may mean about certain of the equipment onboard becoming available to those with interests different than ours.
In many frustrating ways, Columbia appears both closer to and farther from settlement, or at least normalization, of their insurgency and rebel situation.
Positive progress toward stability is probably essential to improved reflection of HEC's true asset value in its stock price.
Steve |
