0235 GMT, 990810 ? With Few Options, NATO Turns Up Heat on KLA to
Lukewarm
On August 8, French troops clashed with ethnic Albanians on the bridge in
Mitrovica, that divides the ethnically Albanian and Serbian parts of the city. In the
third day of clashes in Mitrovica, about 150 Albanian protesters, yelling anti-French
slogans, were pushed back by French soldiers armed with rifles. The past
weekend saw numerous incidents of anti-Serb violence conducted by ethnic
Albanians, some of whom were directly involved in the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA). In addition, according to KFOR spokesman Major Roland Lavoile, KFOR
continued to discover illegal arms caches along with uniforms and supplies linking
the finds to the KLA. Most recently, on August 8, British troops found a number of
weapons in a house in Lipljan searched in connection with a wave of grenade
attacks. Along with weapons, "KLA Interior Ministry Police" identification cards and
uniforms were found in the house. The evidence linking the KLA to violent activities
and the series of clashes between the KLA and KFOR in Mitrovica illustrate both
the continued threat posed by the KLA and, significantly, the rising tensions
between the KLA and NATO peacekeepers.
The August 9 Scotsman newspaper quoted the NATO KFOR commander
Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Jackson as saying KLA attacks on KFOR troops
had raised questions about KLA leadership?s ability to control KLA hardliners. "I
can't say I am fully confident that they are in full control," said Jackson. After ethnic
Albanians clashed with French peacekeeping troops for the third day in Kosovska
Mitrovica, Jackson called on KLA leaders to explain to their people that currently
"free Kosovo" represents "a great deal of what they fought for," although not quite
independence. Despite his concerns about "hardliners" in the ranks of the KLA,
Jackson dismissed the possibility that the KLA as a whole is close to clashing with
the KFOR troops. "We may get some difficulty with fringe hot-heads and we will
deal with it," Jackson said. He concluded that challenging KFOR "would be the
most foolish thing to do and I am sure they are not going to be that foolish."
The continued KLA-perpetrated and facilitated violence in Kosovo has put NATO
in an impossible situation. From the beginning of its involvement in the Kosovo
crisis, NATO?s actions have, directly and indirectly, supported the KLA and its
leader Hashim Thaci. NATO thought it could use Thaci and the KLA as a lever in
Kosovo, and just as easily put them away after driving out the Yugoslav Army.
However, having enticed NATO into fighting their war for them, Thaci and the KLA
have no intention of putting down their weapons, and are instead intensifying their
fight for Kosovo?s independence. Now that it has become clear who was using
whom, NATO is left with few if any options to deal with the problem.
First, NATO is stuck spinning doubletalk, attempting to distinguish Hashim Thaci
and the KLA leadership from KLA "hardliners." There are none harder in the KLA
than Thaci, yet after giving him legitimacy during Operation Allied Force, NATO
finds it politically impossible to call him a thug. For the same reason, NATO cannot
arrest Thaci. Not only would this be politically difficult, such move would be
tantamount to a declaration of war against the KLA. NATO can not challenge the
KLA head to head without accepting some brutal casualties. The KLA operated
quite successfully against a similarly sized force of Serbs who knew the territory
and were anything but subtle in their efforts to eradicate a guerrilla army. To
attempt a serious crackdown against the KLA with winter approaching, in
unfamiliar terrain, surrounded by civilian supporters of the rebels and constrained
by NATO?s political and military baggage would be nothing short of disaster for
NATO forces.
So if NATO can not seriously take on the KLA for political and military reasons, why
not just ignore them and let them finish expelling the Serbs from Kosovo? After all,
just a few tens of thousands more Serbs to go and NATO can begin to "move
beyond" that political shame. Serbs and Russians charge NATO with doing just
that. However, Serb and Russian forces have also warned NATO that if it does not
rein in the KLA, they will be forced to do so themselves.
On July 31, Russian forces in Kosovo briefly detained KLA military leader General
Agim Ceku after he was unable to produce documentation that allows some KLA
members to continue wearing uniforms and carrying sidearms. Following Ceku?s
detention, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on August 1 claiming
that the KLA was using force against Serbs in Kosovo and made public threats to
international peacekeepers. The statement further said, "immediate efficient
measures are needed to ensure KLA?s unconditional fulfillment of all the terms of
the Kosovo peacekeeping process and to prevent development endangering the
whole peacemaking operations in Kosovo." Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
sent corresponding messages to the commanders of peacekeeping forces in
Kosovo, to foreign ministers of the Western countries and to the United Nations.
Russia?s detention of Ceku was meant to send a message to NATO that it is ready
to step in and provide protection to Kosovo Serbs.
Belgrade is also more than ready to return to Kosovo and fight the KLA. In an
unmistakable reference to the KLA made on August 8, Third Yugoslav Army
commander Colonel-General Nebojsa Pavkovic said, "KFOR troops, and its
civilian component especially, are trying to suspend the laws of Serbia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by forging alliances with illegal authorities." The
Beta news agency cited Pavkovic as insisting that, according to the Kumanovo
agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Army, Yugoslav army troops are
supposed to return to Kosovo at some point in the future. Pavkovic has claimed
multiple times that the Yugoslav Army will return if NATO does not bring unbiased
order to the province, and on August 8 he again noted to Beta that the UN forces in
Kosovo "are coping poorly with the situation on the ground."
Given Russian and Yugoslav willingness, even eagerness, to take on the KLA,
NATO can not afford to do nothing. Such a maneuver would create the worst of all
outcomes for NATO, which would end up caught in the crossfire with serious
questions about whom to shoot. NATO cannot effectively fight the KLA, it cannot
eliminate the KLA?s leader, and it cannot let the Russians or the Serbs step in. So
NATO is stuck, playing the game of squeezing a little harder on the "fringe
hardliners," while appealing to Thaci to bring his forces under control. In the end,
this squeezing tactic is but a slight variation of the "do nothing" approach, NATO
hoping to step up pressure just enough to keep the Russians and Serbs away but
not enough to draw too much KLA fire. |
