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To: Ron McKinnon who wrote (3459)8/12/1999 7:15:00 AM
From: Herschel Rubin  Respond to of 10027
 
London Exchange Braces for Change As Technology Boosts Potential Rivals

By SUZANNE MCGEE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
August 11, 1999

LONDON -- With an annual trading volume of $3 trillion, the London Stock Exchange is the world's third-largest market for corporate shares, behind only the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market. The 200-year-old institution would seem to have a comfortable lock on stock trading in this financial center.

So why are its leaders looking over their shoulders?

They can't afford not to.

As the exchange's American counterparts are also learning, size alone no longer guarantees success. The rapid pace of technological change has spawned a growing number of potential rivals, while the economic and monetary union of 11 European nations has increased the potential competitive threat from the Continent's traditional exchanges.

With the Big Board and Nasdaq considering initial public offerings, London Stock Exchange officials have proposed the exchange become a for-profit business. The exchange said it doesn't plan an offering, but some traders say it won't be long before the exchange makes such a move.

Exchange officials refuse to discuss specific initiatives that might follow a vote to demutualize. Chief Executive Gavin Casey will say only that the move would make the exchange more attentive to the interests of both its customers and its shareholders, and allow it to compete more effectively.

"The time to make changes is from a position of strength," Mr. Casey says.

The London Stock Exchange, which bills itself as "the world's oldest marketplace for the buying and selling of shares," reinvented itself more than a decade ago. In the "Big Bang" liberalization of United Kingdom financial markets in 1986, it mothballed its trading floor and moved to electronic trading. Today, its former trading floor sits idle.

The exchange accounts for about 97% of all shares traded in the U.K., on much larger overall trading volume. In the past five years, annual trading volume in British and foreign stocks traded on the exchange has more than doubled to 3.22 trillion pounds ($5.17 trillion or 4.81 trillion euros) last year.

Even as volume has soared, though, the exchange's sense of vulnerability has grown. In recent weeks, some of its rivals have become more menacing.

Easdaq, a struggling Belgian-based electronic network for European growth stocks, last month received a $25 million infusion from investors including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. and Nasdaq's biggest market maker, Knight/Trimark Group Inc. Some of the same investors already have injected $23 million into Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC, a London electronic trading system.

So-called crossing networks also are thriving, presenting another threat. These systems help solve two of money managers' biggest gripes about stock markets: the cost of executing large trades and the risk that the market will find out what they are doing. Managers can opt instead to submit "wish lists" of purchases and sales to an anonymous computer matchmaking system, and execute anywhere from 5% to 50% of their desired trades in bulk at the current market price.

Late last month, a group of 19 giant institutional investors led by Barclays Global Investors and Merrill Lynch Mercury Asset Management announced the creation of Crossnet, a new multilateral crossing system.

So far, all of these rivals still depend on the London Stock Exchange. Crossing networks take price cues from exchange activity, and all trades are still registered with the exchange.

But, warns Ruben Lee, director of Oxford Financial Group and author of a book on stock exchanges, "the exchange doesn't have that task as of right now. The exchange may still be a key source of information about bids and trades, but it's quite conceivable that it will no longer be THE key source."

On the surface, the risk seems greater in the U.S. Alternative electronic-communications networks already trade about 30% of Nasdaq's volume; in London, that figure is only about 3%. Yet the London exchange also faces a potential challenge from the big European stock exchanges in Frankfurt and Paris.

A year ago, the London exchange attempted to minimize that particular threat by concluding, with great fanfare, an alliance with its largest European counterpart, Frankfurt's Deutsche Boerse. But the two exchanges still haven't managed to agree on a common trading platform or settlement system and the role of other exchanges within the pact also remains vague.

Easdaq, flush with new cash and with a fresh strategic direction, might re-emerge as a rival to both the alliance and to the London exchange itself. Its officials are quick to concede that it failed to live up to its original promise of becoming Europe's answer to Nasdaq. But Easdaq plans to fight back, quoting prices for growth stocks that already have a primary listing elsewhere in Europe or in the U.S., and eventually luring volumes away from the primary exchange.



To: Ron McKinnon who wrote (3459)8/12/1999 7:19:00 AM
From: Retta  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 10027
 
Herschel,
Sure it was strategic, for managements personal gain.
How will they "rescue" the stock now?
I think you're missing Morgan's point entirely. (and I resent your snide references to him, and I'm sure I'm not alone.)
The point is simply that they cancelled the buy back and deliberately kept it from us. I for one took the biggest bath of my life on this company. And, if you ask me, this behavior has "LAW SUIT" written all over it!
Wake up, and try to use a little more class when you post on this board.
Retta



To: Ron McKinnon who wrote (3459)8/12/1999 5:47:00 PM
From: Sir Francis Drake  Respond to of 10027
 
Ron, thank you for your comments.

I suppose one can always interpret any event as pivotal, or an overreaction.

I understand your position. However, I also think it misses the point.

1) I do not doubt that buying back shares at 52 would have made no difference, and made no sense. And I would not have advocated such an action.
2) I have no doubt that you could have used the capital to build long term shareholder value through other means than a share buyback (expansion, acquisitions etc.).
3) I do not deny that the company has the right to cancel a share buyback program, and I do not deny that even if you have a share buyback program the company is not actually ever obliged to buy a single share.

These are the issues as I understand them:

1) The value of the buyback program is psychological. Knowing that it is there, would in my opinion, limit the more extreme decline momentum. I explored this in more detail in other posts, so I won't repeat it here, I'll just point out that the issue was never that they should have been buying absurdly at 52. However, neither should they have been giving a signal that it's open season on the longs.

2) The way the whole issue of the buyback program was handled, displayed, at the very least, incompetence on the part of management. There are at least 3 ways in which I think this was badly handled. Timing – why was this program canceled when NITE shares were under tremendous pressure? Why wasn't the program canceled during a time when any possible collateral damage would have been limited? Suggestion: announce the cancellation, during a time of strong upward momentum, f.ex. together with the split announcement. There was no downside to that – because even if that somewhat blunted the subsequent run-up (which I doubt), that actually could have been good, in that it would have limited the extreme run-up (and prevented some folks from buying in excessively high) – limiting the volatility is actually good, for it makes for *sustainable* gains (MSFT is a great example of a company that “manages” expectations and subsequent volatility – NITE should take some lessons from them in protecting shareholder value). Further, a cancellation would have been announced at a higher price level – that was a more logical place than 52, obviously a price of 80 needs even less defending than 52, so why wait until later? Another benefit to canceling back then, would have been the avoidance of the unhappy correlation between subsequent insider sales and a sneak cancellation. In short, canceling at the time of the split announcement would have accomplished everything they wanted (free up capital etc.), and had no downside – it was a far superior time frame.

3) I do not accept that management didn't know until July 21, that they may have better uses for the capital – this is a no-brainer, any young expanding company needs capital, they knew that, I assume, before July 21. It is clear to me, that the timing of the canceling was very damaging, and completely unnecessary, as they could have just as well canceled at the time of the split announcement, and it would have made a lot more sense back then. That, my friend, is BAD MANAGEMENT of shareholder value – by timing the cancellation so badly, they gained nothing, but did damage.

4) Second, having decided to cancel, they should have made a full press release announcing that fact. The fact that this was not announced, left the retail investor without a vital piece of information that directly impacts shareholder value – the fact that a program that was designed to buy back shares was canceled.

5) Why was this not announced? We've been around the block a few times, and both of us know, that information like this leaks out to the “well-placed” – often larger institutions that then can take advantage of it. The last one to find out, is the small shareholder. Do you think that had there been a press release, the small shareholder would have kept buying in, while FBCO unloaded (or shorted)? Why not level the playing field? Why this middle of the night behavior?

That again, to me is BAD management.

And as to the whole reason for canceling – IMO, once they missed the obvious time to cancel, they should have stuck it out – they didn't have to make the decision at the worst possible time, in fact, a truly forward looking management, understands that there are occasions where it pays not to be penny wise and pound foolish. Instead of buying that extra piece of machinery, it may make sense, to shore up investor confidence. Because wise management understands, that over the long term, investors who have confidence in management, confidence that management is extremely concerned about shareholder value, will be more stable investors, and the stock will tend to be less volatile – the MSFT way. It actually makes good BUSINESS sense - because with higher and more stable shares, you can use them to make acquisitions, issue debt and generally capitalize on the good shareprice – this is something that will pay off far better in the long term, than the quick buck approach of “the shareholder comes last, here we can use the capital to buy this nifty widget”. The ironic thing, is that you still could have bought that widget without canceling the program. There are other ways to access capital without hitting the shareholder when he/she is down. Unnecessary, callous, and SHORTSIGHTED. Not the highest caliber of management.

But regardless – EVEN IF, they had excellent reasons why they didn't want to find capital in some other way, then at least certainly they could have canceled at a more logical and better time. And having missed all of that, at least they could have announced it, instead of hanging the shareholder out to dry.

These are quite clearly management missteps. I am not in the mind of KP or anyone else, so I can only speculate on the motives. But the options are not pretty: either incompetence, or lack of concern, or the desire to fetch a higher price for their own shares which they could only sell during a certain time-frame.

Under such circumstances I cannot be a long-term investor in this company. Not because the company is not going to do well. I'm sure they will. Rather, that I don't believe they have the kind of concern for shareholder value and the kind of far sighted priorities, that management of companies I invest in for the long term, have. When I decide to stick it out for the long term, I can't be thinking to myself that at any moment they can pull a fast one in the middle of the night and not tell us. I cannot have even a fleeting suspicion that they are incompetent/callous/ or venal. Yet, I am quite convinced that the *best* case scenario here is: appalling incompetence in timing this cancellation, and more incompetence in not announcing it. Confidence in management must extend to their skills as preservers of shareholder value, not just nominal business execution – there are companies that have good profits, but poor price share, because management is not seen as concerned with shareholder value, or skillful in building it.

These are all obviously just my opinions, and everyone can come to their own conclusions. I simply wanted to give the grounds for my personal opinion.

Regards,

Morgan