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Strategies & Market Trends : India Coffee House -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: JPR who wrote (6012)	8/27/1999 8:44:00 PM
From: sea_biscuit	Respond to of 12475

The affair provided a lesson in the utility of nuclear deterrence. Had Slobodan Milosevic possessed a nuclear deterrent, NATO would not have bombed his country. Not so fast! As another analyst said : "At first glance, the above argument is seductive. In the popular mind, and even in the minds of strategic analysts, the theology that nuclear weapons deter limited conventional wars appears very convincing. But the intrinsic logic of nuclear weapons will force India to abandon its nuclear "no-first-use" principle in favour of "first-use;" it would also necessitate heavy investments in a nuclear war-fighting capability, something that is well beyond India's current economic, organisational, and technological means. Abandoning "no-first-use" would not only entail a heavy moral and political price, but investments in a nuclear war-fighting capability would invariably come at the expense of a robust conventional defence. This course would leave India's national security managers with two dangerous options in case of a limited conventional war: defeat or national suicide." And he also goes on to say : "Similarly, another crisis like the one that was caused by the US deployment of its 7th Fleet in the Bay of Bengal in 1971, would have to be met using conventional means for three reasons. First, the US deployment would be unlikely to threaten the fundamental existence of the Indian state. Thus, for India to threaten nuclear retaliation would be disproportionate to any political and military objectives that New Delhi might hope to achieve. Second, India has a declared "no-first-use" nuclear employment doctrine. Nuclear "first-use" or the threat of use would be in violation of this doctrine. Finally, even if India were to abandon "no-first-use" in favour of "first-use," it would lack the nuclear military capability to make good that threat." And... "In order to fight limited conventional wars like the one in Kargil, or deter limited foreign interventions like the US' 1971 naval deployment in the Bay of Bengal, India would have to rely on conventional means. However, a conventional military machine that suffers from obsolescence due to investments in a nuclear deterrent, or lacks operational readiness due to internal security duties, would become vulnerable to defeat on a modern battlefield. Faced with defeat, Indian planners could then threaten to escalate to a nuclear level, a course of action, which would be both incredible and suicidal." As Oscar Wilde said, "In the world there are only two tragedies. One is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it."