All:
I must admit that Dawn is one newspaper that is better than most Indian newspapers. It is of international standard. My hats off to DAWN.
Dawn seems to put it all (the news) together very well.
Also I must mention that Pakistani doctors in US are among the best. I know them as my and my relatives' doctors
Opinion Expressed in DAWN
By Brahma Chellaney
INDIA's proposed nuclear weapons doctrine defines the role of such arms in its defence.
When the report containing the proposals was released recently, controversy immediately
erupted.
This is not surprising. No other nuclear democracy has publicly debated the parameters of its nuclear doctrine and force structure before they became policy.
India's often divisive political traditions made controversy inevitable. The report
propounding the broad framework for using nuclear weapons in national defence was made
public on August 17 by the interim government shortly before the first round of national
elections, due to begin this weekend. As a result, it was instantly dragged into the arena of
partisan politics.
The consensus-building obstacles created by political parties jostling for power was one
reason why India took more than three decades to adopt a nuclear military posture after
acquiring the capability to build nuclear weapons. While the other nuclear democracies -
the United States, Britain, France and Israel - went down the nuclear path quietly and
quickly, India publicly debated for years whether to go nuclear, a debate that began when
China exploded its first atomic device in 1964.
Given that background, the evolution of a fully operational doctrine is likely to be a slow
process. But the framework doctrine drafted by a 27-member, government-appointed
group is a major first step. It will be difficult for any Indian government to go back on the
basic parameters defined by these specialists who, despite disparate perspectives, made
their recommendations by consensus.
The proposed framework will need to be filled out with operational details. The report is
based on the unique challenges that India faces as the only country sharing disputed
borders with two nuclear-armed neighbors - China and Pakistan - that have a long history
of covert strategic collaboration.
With its modest capabilities and resources, India can pursue only modest nuclear goals. At
the same time, it is committed unequivocally and unconditionally never to use nuclear
weapons first.
The Indian framework doctrine suggests a versatile and credible nuclear force whose
deterrent value will flow from its ability to survive an enemy first strike and retaliate "in the
shortest time possible." Criticism has centred on the supposed contradiction between its
proposal for minimum deterrence and maximum survivability and credibility, and its
recommendation for building a land-air-sea triad of nuclear forces.
But India's retaliation-only policy makes it a sitting duck for a surprise nuclear attack. It
must therefore be able to ride out an enemy first strike by having a range of nuclear arms
that would survive such an attack. Unlike the simpler, more cost-effective first-use posture
- such as Pakistan's - no-first-use makes it essential to develop retaliatory weapons,
particularly those in ballistic missiles launched from submarines. These are at the heart of
the deterrence strategies adopted by the United States, Russia and Britain.
India's nuclear force is likely to include no more than a few dozen weapons in the next five
years. So its minimum deterrence must be such that its constraints do not become
handicaps.
The expected high cost of even this relatively small nuclear arsenal will be staggered over
years. Still, the reactor for its long-delayed nuclear submarine project is likely to be ready
by next year, together with longer-range ballistic missiles.
The world can never be safe as long as some countries, including India, insist on a right to
have nuclear weapons. But until nuclear disarmament becomes a reality, India has as much
right to shield its citizens from nuclear dangers as do other nuclear weapons states. After
all, most of them have smaller populations and a less insecure regional environment.
Moreover, many countries critical of India's nuclear policy, such as Japan, are protected by
the nuclear umbrella of another power.
The fact remains that the end of the cold war did not lead to the promised "new world
order." Nor did it usher in the hoped-for era of stability, cooperative security and wider
prosperity. Instead, we are approaching the new millennium with greater destructive
capacities, new political, technological and economic rivalries, and an increased reliance on
nuclear weapons.
Since 1998 alone, two more nations - India and Pakistan - have become overtly nuclear.
Three East European states have come under NATO's protective nuclear umbrella. Russia,
a fallen superpower, has placed short-range nuclear arms at the centre of its defence
strategy. China, a rapidly rising power in Asia, is expanding its nuclear missile arsenal. The
United States, the world's most powerful nation, has formally deployed a new
earth-penetrating nuclear warhead.
Today, no major economy is without the protection of an independent nuclear arsenal or a
nuclear umbrella. Nuclear disarmament is looking increasingly like a utopian idea.
This is illustrated by the recent report of the Tokyo Forum, a group of international experts
established by the Japanese prime minister, Keizo Obuchi, to follow up on the path-setting
1996 report of the Australian-sponsored Canberra Commission.
As the world's only victim of nuclear attack, Japan is heard with respect on disarmament
matters. The Japanese initiative was widely expected to develop a concrete, realistic plan
that could help resume the stalled process of disarmament. But the group's report is a
disappointment, containing not a single new idea to move the disarmament agenda forward.
In fact, it dilutes some of the key recommendations of the Canberra Commission, which
tried to create an international vision for disarmament.
The Tokyo Forum sneers at the concept of nuclear "no first use," which was strongly
endorsed by the Canberra Commission. While the commission accepted the logic of a
disarmament timetable, the forum derides "artificial disarmament deadlines." And, unlike the
commission, the forum does not suggest the physical separation of warheads from delivery
vehicles or the halting of non-strategic deployments.
However, the Tokyo Forum does recommend ending the hair-trigger alert of nuclear
weapons, and verifiably reducing and eliminating tactical arms that make up more than half
of the world's nuclear stockpile.
The forum report reflects establishment thinking in the traditional nuclear weapons states -
the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain. It emphasizes non-proliferation rather
than disarmament. In fact, the introductory section of the report barely refers to
disarmament, contending that the nuclear powers' obligation to "pursue" (not achieve)
disarmament is linked to non-nuclear states' firm support for "effective action" against those
not complying with non-proliferation norms.
The forum demands that non-nuclear states develop a stronger stake in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and take unspecified initiatives to shore up the non-proliferation
regime. Its report merely suggests that there should be progressive reduction and complete
elimination of nuclear weapons. The forum's reluctance to adopt a plan of action for nuclear
disarmament is underscored by its reticence to endorse a Nuclear Weapons Convention
similar to the international treaties outlawing chemical and biological weapons.
Another feature of the report is its repeated potshots at India, whose overt nuclearization, it
argues, "greatly compounds other nuclear dangers and makes nuclear disarmament harder
to achieve." The forum opposes any special status, let alone legal status, for Indian and
Pakistan as de facto nuclear powers.
It demands unrealistically that the two should eventually be made to give up nuclear
weapons. Yet the key to global nuclear disarmament is that all states possessing such
weapons should agree to phase them out.
Disarmament has been on the international agenda for more than half a century. The very
first resolution of the United Nations mandated the elimination of nuclear weapons. The
Tokyo Forum has only served to highlight the continuing obstacles on the path to a safer
world.-Dawn/IHT Service
The writer is one of the independent experts who helped draft India's proposed nuclear
doctrine. |
