China-Russia Power Sharing in Central Asia
Summary:
The conclusion of Turkmen Defense Minister Batyr Sardzhayev's visit to Beijing has solidified Turkmen-Chinese military relations, promising to enhance Turkmenistan's regional military and economic strength. With this, China is bidding for influence in Central Asia in a way that could temper Russia's traditional role in the region. China's bilateral relations with Turkmenistan will indicate how well their "multi-polar" world might proceed.
Analysis:
China's offer of military cooperation with Turkmenistan will demonstrate Russia's and China's faculties to share power in Central Asia. Russia will have to accommodate its new partner as China assumes an uncharacteristic role in the region. Because of the potential benefit of economic and military relations with Turkmenistan, both China and Russia may discover the destructive role of self-interest in their attempted "multi-polar" world.
During his seven-day visit to China, Turkmen Defense Minister Batyr Sardzhayev met with Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, Defense Minister Col. Gen. Chi Haotian, and PLA Chief of General Staff Fu Quanyou. This was the first such visit to China by the Turkmen defense minister since the two nations established diplomatic ties seven years ago. Chi declared his recent meeting with the Turkmen defense minister the "most important event in the history of military relations between China and Turkmenistan."
Military leaders from both sides discussed the potential for cooperation in personnel training and in the use and repair of military equipment. Sardzhayev was given a tour of Chinese military garrisons, an academy and an aviation division. The visit concludes a long and involved courtship between China and Turkmenistan, confirming their will to cooperate militarily.
Turkmenistan is the most neutral of the Central Asian states. Unlike the other "-stans" it has no binding relations with either the U.S. or Russia. From Turkmen President Niyazov's point of view, his country's neutrality is a product of Russian neglect and American discomfort with the poor human rights record. In a recent meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Niyazov protested that his country's "doors are open," though it was "Russia that has so far not been coming here."
In fact, Russia is in the process of downsizing its military presence in Turkmenistan. It agreed in July to withdraw its border patrol forces from Turkmenistan by November 19, 1999. This marks the end of an agreement made December 23, 1993, permitting Russia to maintain a border patrol force within Turkmen territory. The initial force presence of 1,900 has over the years dwindled to 200, and in May the Turkmen foreign ministry appealed for their removal.
Though Russia is cutting back its active personnel in Central Asia, the frequency of recent military-diplomatic efforts in the region indicates that Russia has no intention of losing any military dependents in the region. Russian supply of training, advising and hardware is on the rise in Central Asia, culminating with the Kyrgyzstan hostage crisis. On August 27, Russian air force commander-in-chief General Anatoli Kornukov announced that Moscow would provide anti-aircraft systems and fighters to CIS countries on a "long-term lease" basis. Negotiations are said to be underway with Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Russia will continue to cultivate Turkmenistan as a strategic partner, irrespective of China's recent maneuvers.
Russia has historically held influence over Central Asian states by maintaining a stable military presence in each country. This approach is being gradually phased out. Russian diplomacy is now more even-handed in the region, allowing smaller militaries to maintain their own defenses with less Russian supplements. Konstantin Totskiy, director of Russia's Federal Border Service, has negotiated with Central Asian countries more unilaterally for the past six months on issues of border patrol demobilization. Demobilizing Russian forces abroad - while offering "technical support" country to country - puts teeth in Russia's flimsy Collective Security Treaty and lets Russia become a partner in military support rather than a regional hegemon.
Turkmenistan's recent lean toward China may be Niyazov's initial step away from his characteristic neutrality. Over the past year, China has done more to fill in the bilateral void left by Russia and the U.S. on the economic front. It appears now that China will attempt the same on the military front.
Traditional Russian and growing Chinese inroads into this area are competing with the stable influence of the U.S. in Central Asia under the Partnership for Peace program. Military exchanges and training exercises between the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are common, without becoming a diplomatic affront to Russia. But China's involvement with Turkmenistan is an incipient move to check U.S. influence in the long term, not Russia's. China's military cooperation with Turkmenistan does not portend a decline of Russian influence over Central Asia.
The impact of China's cooperation with Turkmenistan is more immediate in terms of Russia-China relations. If the countries' shared influence over Turkmenistan proves difficult to manage, then shared influence over the rest of Central Asia may prove equally problematic in the future. Cooperation in Turkmenistan will challenge the resolve of Russia and China to accomplish the "multi- polar" world they envision. Military cooperation with Turkmenistan is political and flexible, and suggests no transparent victor. Turkmenistan's bilateral military cooperation with Russia and China is less likely to threaten the countries' mutual influence in Central Asia. Oil and gas, on the other hand, is a market indicating a clear victor.
China's aggressive cultivation of Turkmenistan's oil market, and Russia's inability to sanction it, may be a hitch in Russian-China relations. Over the past year, China's National Petroleum Company has helped rebuild over 100 wells in Turkmenistan, accounting for the steady increase in the country's export production. Turkmenistan is also on China's ten-year schedule for gas importation. If reserve estimates are correct, Turkmenistan will soon be the third largest gas exporter in the world behind Russia and Iran. China is essentially liberating Turkmenistan from the rigid monopoly of Russia's state-owned Gazprom, which has forbidden the westward transport of Turkmen gas and oil.
Turkmenistan is a rare and critical case study of the new diplomacy between Russia and China in Central Asia. Both nations' lobby for military cooperation with Turkmenistan will gauge the compatibility of Russia and China, illustrating how the "multi-polar" world might operate. Should Russia revise its policy on the export of Turkmen gas, and challenge the economic partnership between China and Turkmenistan, the aspirations toward a "multi-polar" world will stumble.
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