Moscow Poised for Chechnya Invasion
Summary:
Russia is poised to launch a limited invasion of Chechnya
and Moscow is likely to accomplish its goals. Russian forces will
have little time and with winter approaching, they will be forced
to hurry to retake north central Chechnya by the end of November,
driving the rebels south into the mountains for the season. Right
now, the tide of political support for war runs strong in Russia,
though the international community and some politicians are
encouraging non-aggression. But Russian forces are not fully
prepared. As a result, the cost in resources, personnel and
finances will be severe.
Analysis:
The momentum for launching a war in Chechnya is at a crescendo in
Moscow and cannot be ignored by the Kremlin or the Defense
Ministry. The Russian population is feverish for retaliation
against terrorist attacks. Chechen rebels are being blamed for
bombing civilian apartment buildings throughout Russia, killing 292
people. The extent of public outrage has caused center-left parties
and politicians to join the witch-hunt. To make matters worse,
Russia's NTV aired videotapes this week of Chechen rebels
mutilating Russian POWs during the first Chechen war.
These sentiments are already starting to ebb, however, and invasion
plans may be threatened if not carried out soon. Opposition to war
is building in the West, but has not reached critical mass,
certainly not to the point of sending observer missions into
Chechnya. Though Russian media support the war effort, it is
skeptical of the capabilities of Russian forces. If momentum flags,
the Defense Ministry may be unable to use the harsh winter climate
against the guerrillas. Due to weather conditions, Russian forces
cannot sustain a massive campaign into December and January.
Accordingly, a second Chechen war will come to a screeching halt if
the Russians delay a ground invasion.
Russia's window of opportunity for a successful ground invasion is
60 days, starting now, according to Segodnya, a Moscow daily.
Russian officials at the Kremlin, Federal Security Bureau and the
Defense and Interior Ministries have done more than just cultivate
an appetite for war at home. They have also guarded against dissent
among the ranks, having learned some strong lessons from the first
Chechen war.
The bombing campaign in Chechnya over the last seven days
demonstrates that the Russian commanders have learned from the
debacle in Chechnya in 1994 to1996. This time, air forces will
likely ferret out guerrilla hideouts ahead of ground forces moving
in. This will allow more aircraft to fly close air support and
evacuation. It also reduces the risk of friendly fire from the air,
which was arguably the most lethal threat to Russian troops in the
first war. More Su-34s are likely to appear in combat as well,
placing ground forces under cover of Russia's most advanced
fighters.
The decimation of Chechnya's infrastructure before the ground
offensive was a poorly coordinated but effective measure. More than
1,500 sorties were flown over Dagestan and Chechnya in the past two
weeks, with a sustained campaign over Chechnya since Sept. 23. The
government loosely defined "military targets" as homes, bridges,
hospitals, TV stations, broadcast towers and radar.
Targets were chosen for two reasons: to clear the territory of
civilians and to limit damaging information from coming out of
Chechnya. The high incidence of civilian casualties in Chechnya
last time turned the international community - and Russians -
against the war. Barring any stable communications relay from
Chechnya to the outside world, Russia can preclude any substantial
information war by the guerrillas and establish an information
blockade.
This will change once Russian troops encounter rebel forces in the
field. First, the tight schedule for a ground invasion will hamper
a sweeping success in Chechnya. Since an invasion must begin and
end within 60 days, planning is likely to be rushed and the
capabilities of Russian forces may be over estimated. Institutional
support, consent of the people and morale within the armed forces
may sell this war at home and abroad. These factors are so
compelling that the Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense are likely
to hastily commit forces to a war they cannot lose - nor easily
win.
Russian planners have also not field-tested most lessons from the
previous Chechen war. If Dagestan is a guide, Russian forces will
have command and control problems. A major problem in Dagestan was
the disparity of skills among combined units, particularly
paratroopers working closely with regular infantry and Dagestani
volunteers. The breakdown of discipline and poor combat skills
among regulars endangered paratroopers, putting the two groups at
odds during combat.
Some elements of air support will also act as a liability. The
weapons and on-board systems of the army's Mi-8 and Mi-24 combat
helicopters are technically obsolete. They are also more prone to
anti-aircraft weapons and sniper-fire and easily damaged. The Ka-50
Black Shark would be a better attack helicopter, but some reports
indicate this and other precision weapons will not be used. Rebels,
on the other hand, will use dated technology to their advantage,
including ZU-23-2 mobile anti-aircraft launchers, Shilka ZSU-23/4
anti-aircraft guns, Stinger missiles and RPG-7 grenade launchers.
This capability will raise the flight ceiling of support aircraft,
leaving ground forces vulnerable to ambush.
The planning for the ground campaign this time has certainly been
better. But Russian forces have not learned as much as rebel forces
over the past five years, despite the advantages of preempting a
rebel information war and encouraging the flight of the civilian
population. Rebel forces essentially participated in a war gaming
exercise with their enemy in Dagestan. What little Russian forces
may have rehearsed since the previous war is unlikely to apply
here. The rebels are quick to accommodate changes in battle tactics
and are superior in mobile warfare. To add to the burden, Russia's
weaknesses are embedded in the organizational structure of the
armed forces and cannot be overcome with planning.
Maneuvers up to this point have been preventive and will permit
Russia an eventual military victory over Chechnya. But Russia is
not fully prepared for this war, and will struggle, simply because
political motives will supercede military ability. As Russian
forces tighten a cordon around central Chechnya over the next two
months, they will suffer. The false confidence of Moscow's
politicians will be proven. Russia's campaign to seize 75 percent
of Chechnya by November will succeed in print and broadcast media,
though the war may ultimately have to rage through the winter, off-
camera. Russia will meet its objective to reclaim Chechnya, at
whatever cost.
(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
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