To: MNI who wrote (23793 ) 9/30/1999 1:48:00 PM From: Neocon Read Replies (1) | Respond to
The argument was that WWII was still too close, and the re-emergence of a united Germany would cause too much tension, both within the NATO alliance, and in the East. Furthermore, it would alter our NATO commitment automatically, pushing it much deeper into Central Europe, without giving us a chance to rethink our posture in the light of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. In essence, it would make the role of the United States in Europe even more entrenched, rather providing us with an opportunity to review our commitments, since a Europe dominated by Germany would not work, and only the United States could reassure everyone that the New Germany would not throw its weight around too much, or seek numerous border revisions, nor unduly take advantage of the vacuum in hegemony to its east. Plus, there was a simple justice question: Germany became divided through its own reckless aggression. Was it right to treat it as an external imposition to be remedied as soon as possible, or was such haste unseemly? Also, it was known that the East had never de- nazified, and so the problems of integrating a populace that had only know Communism into a democratic polity might be even greater than could be handled. These were among the problems raised....
