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Pastimes : Let's Talk About Our Feelings!!! -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Ilaine who wrote (58881)	10/13/1999 8:23:00 AM
From: Dayuhan	Respond to of 108807

Do you think there is anything about the nature of the Philippine people that made them unwilling to resort to strong-man government post-Marcos? Their experiences under Marcos probably had a good deal to do with it. There were 20+ years of flawed but functional democracy before Marcos declared martial law (to perpetuate his rule; the communist presence was insignificant at the time), and Filipinos are much attached to elections and press freedom. I don't think very many people wanted to go back to dictatorship; what would they have to gain? Certainly none of the coups staged against Aquino had much popular support. You mentioned several men who were unwilling to commit violent acts when called upon. What gave them the strength to refuse? That, I would say, varied from case to case. For the first confrontation with civilians the Marcos group sent a Marine brigade which had just been pulled out of combat in Mindanao, which was a major strategic error. The Philippine Marines have a reputation for being disciplined and apolitical; they also pride themselves on not being abusers of human rights, etc. The main worry of the Marcos camp was presumably loyalty; the will of soldiers to shoot at fellow soldiers; I don't think they expected the civilians to stand up to soldiers. During the initial confrontation - I was there - only a few civilians were on hand, if they had sent a few dozen PSG (Presidential Security Group) thugs with gas and truncheons they'd have walked right through us. They didn't; the PSG was reserved for the defense of the palace. When the Marines came up against the civilians they had no idea what do to, and it was very obvious to all that they had no intention of shooting anybody. The other notable instance of refusal was among the pilots of the helicopter gunships that were ordered to attack the base of the rebel soldiers on the morning of the second day of the uprising. They defected instead. These were Manila residents who had been exposed to the whole travesty of the stolen election and the weeks that followed; it is also likely that they were not eager to fire on fellow officers. There was also a great deal of dithering, which was largely self-serving. Provincial commanders were ordered to assemble their troops and come to Marcos' aid. Suddenly troops were out on patrol, vehicles were out of service, the usual litany of excuses. This, I suspect, was motivated less by desire not to shoot at other Filipinos than by desire not to commit until one side or the other was clearly winning. I could go on, but that is more than enough... There were also soldiers who did shoot civilians, which was not widely reported; the image of the "bloodless revolution" was too precious to diffuse with that reality. One of the civilians bled to death in my lap; he was 16. So perhaps I am less than objective on that score.